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The Ambivalent Animal project explores the interactions of animals, culture and 
technology. The project employs both artistic practice and critical theory, each in ways 
that inspire the other. 
My creative practice centers around two projects that focus on domestic pets. These 
projects highlight the animal's uncertain status as they explore the overlapping 
ontologies of animal, human and machine. They provide concrete artifacts that engage 
with theoretical issues of anthropocentrism, animality and alterity. 
My theoretical work navigates between the fields of animal studies, art and design, 
media and culture studies, and philosophy. My dissertation explores animality through 
four real and imagined animal roles: cyborg, clone, chimera and shapeshifter. Each 
animal role is considered in relation to three dialectics: irreducibility and procedurality, 
autonomy and integration, aura and abjection. These dialectics do not seek full synthesis 
but instead embrace the oscillations of irresolvable debates and desires. The dialectics 
bring into focus issues of epistemology, ontology, corporeality and subjectivity. When the 
four animal roles engage the three dialectics, connected yet varied themes emerge. The 
cyborgian animal is simultaneously liberated and regulated, assisted and restricted, 
integrated and isolated. The cloned animal is an emblem of renewal and loss; she is 
both idealized code and material flesh and finds herself caught in the battles of nature 
and nurture. The chimera is both rebel and conformist; his unusual juxtapositions 
pioneer radical corporeal transgressions but also conform to the mechanisms of global 
capital. And the shapeshifter explores the thrill and anxiety of an altered 
phenomenology; she gains new perceptions though unstable subjectivity. These roles 
x 
xi 
reveal corporeal adjustments and unfamiliar subjectivities that inspire the creative 
practice. 
Both my writing and making employ an ambivalent aesthetic—an aesthetic approach 
that evokes two or more incompatible sensibilities. The animal's uncertain status 
contributes to this aesthetic: some animals enjoy remarkable care and attention, while 
others are routinely exploited, abused and discarded. Ambivalence acknowledges the 
complexity of lived experience, philosophical and political debate, and academic inquiry. 
My approach recognizes the light and dark of these complex ambivalences—it privileges 
paradox and embraces the confusion and wonder of creative research. Rather than 
erase, conceal or resolve ambiguity, an ambivalent aesthetic foregrounds the limits of 









1.1 Human, Animal and Machine Interactions 
Contemporary cybernetic systems mingle hardware and software in complex digital 
ecologies. These responsive systems were once inspired by biological mechanisms.1 
After developing into sophisticated hardware-software configurations, cybernetic 
systems have returned to their biological roots. The methods and tools of information 
technology now underpin the fields of molecular biology and biotechnology. The most 
idealized biotech projects perceive biological materials as something similar to digital 
media. Organic matter becomes plastic and replicable2 and flesh is programmable. 
Donna Haraway notes: 
…communication sciences and modern biologies are constructed by a common 
move—the translation of the world into a problem of coding, a search for a 
common language in which all resistance to instrumental control disappears and 
all heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly, reassembly, investment, and 
exchange.3 
For the body to become a medium, its internal mechanisms need to be defined as 
fundamentally informational. When we perceive the body as information, it becomes 
available to replication and inscription. Informational bodies solicit programming 
techniques—genetic codes become available for algorithmic modification. Animal bodies 
are at the forefront of these material changes. The biotech animal, born in the traditions 
of domestication and breeding, is re-imagined as a transgenic creature—a cross-species 
mix of plant, animal and human genes. Research labs house pigs with baboon-gene 
hearts, mice with human-esque immune systems and rabbits with jellyfish 
phosphorescence. The best informational bodies can be broken apart, modified and 
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reassembled. Researchers are developing in-vitro organs that can be transplanted into 
patients. These body parts are sometimes produced using the familiar processes of 
media production. A mouse heart, for example, is carefully “printed” by spraying one thin 
layer of tissue after another.4 Flesh becomes media that is enlivened by bio-techniques. 
Idealized biotechnology perceives all bodies as plastic, both animal and human 
bodies. This biological equivalency challenges human and animal divisions. Bio-
techniques transfer animal parts into humans. Cow and pig tissue are used in human 
heart valve replacements.5 Animals also incorporate human genes—human stem cells 
are injected into the brains of embryonic mice.6 As genetic and biological material flow 
back and forth between humans and animals, critical species barriers are broken. The 
flesh of many becomes one.  
Human-nonhuman interactions challenge traditional hierarchies. Power relations that 
favor the human appear outmoded. As human, animal, and machine act in concert, the 
question of who leads and who follows comes to the fore. Our integrated actions make 
autonomy and agency less certain. We are witnessing a rapid expansion of interfaces 
and codes that make possible the tight affiliations of humans and nonhumans. As we 
stitch together diverse phenomenologies, we reflect on our peculiar and particular 
perspectives. This reflection opens us up to the unfamiliar perceptions and capabilities in 
the nonhuman “other.”  
My research examines the discourse of animal, human and machine interaction. This 
discourse includes texts and artifacts from the fields of art and design, animal studies, 
media and cultural studies, and philosophy. My analysis is framed by three dialectics: 
irreducibility and procedurality, autonomy and integration, aura and abjection. These 
dialectics are associated with issues of epistemology, subjectivity and corporeality. The 
dialectics do not seek synthesis but instead remain actively engaged. They fluctuate 
between two opposing ideas, unable or unwilling to come to a final resolution. These 
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oscillating dialectics bring new interpretive insights—they question the boundaries 
between human and nonhuman and challenge our anthropocentric assumptions.  
These dialectics are specific to particular context (a humanities-based digital media 
program in an engineering school) and identity (an art-trained graduate student drawn to 
media culture and technology). Someone reading the same texts and reviewing the 
same artifacts may likely imagine an alternative framework. It is not my intent to create a 
totalizing interpretive matrix. Instead, I’m following my unique interests and tendencies, 
developing a particular perspective designed to highlight the ambiguities of creative 
work. My framework is always partial—it does not aim to provide a comprehensive 
picture of creative research. 
1.2 The Ambivalent Animal 
In the mix of human, animal and machine, the focal point of my thesis is an ambivalent 
animal. The animal is often the least resolved participant of the triad. The animal’s 
uncertain status makes him a rich source of inquiry for a framework of ambivalence. An 
ambivalent animal oscillates between divine and degraded, subject and object, detached 
and integrated, flesh and machine. In my exploration of the animal, I’m examining four 
roles that highlight the interactions of human, animal and machine. These roles are: 
cyborg, clone, chimera and shapeshifter. Examining animal roles emphasizes the 
exchanges of culture and technology and encourages a holistic research approach.  
The first four chapters of this dissertation explore these animal roles—each animal role 
has its own chapter. The roles are framed by the three dialectics and reveal different 
aspects of animality and alterity. The cyborgian animal is simultaneously empowered 
and regulated, assisted and restricted, integrated and isolated. The cloned animal is an 
emblem of renewal and loss; she is both idealized code and irreducible flesh and finds 
herself caught in the battles of nature and nurture. The chimera explores ontological 
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confusion as he fuses unrelated elements; his unusual juxtapositions suggest radical 
corporeal transgressions but also conform to the mechanisms of global capital. And the 
shapeshifter explores the thrill and anxiety of a radically altered phenomenology; she 
gains new perceptions though unstable subjectivity. 
Though I am foregrounding the animal, the human shadow is ever present. By 
examining the animal, we also inspect the human. Human identity is established through 
the exclusion of animals. Without a clear divide between human and animal, human 
subjectivity dissolves. An ambivalent animal challenges this barrier. Caught in the sights 
of technology and culture, the animal’s situation often reflects our own. We see our 
uncertainties in the experience of the animal. And in the process, we recognize the 
animal’s subjectivity and our own animality. Ambivalence brings to light the unresolved 
nature of human and animal subjectivity. Its methods emphasize the interdependent 
dance of humans and nonhumans.  
The final chapter of the dissertation examines the interactions of theory and practice. 
This dissertation combines both writing and making—as I write about the ambivalent 
animal, I am also making artworks that inform and respond to my writing. In the last 
























1.1 Diagram of the Dialectics of Ambivalence 
 
1.3 The Dialectics of the Ambivalent Animal Project 
1.3.1 Irreducibility & Procedurality   
The three dialectics frame the discourse of the ambivalent animal project. The first 
dialectic is irreducibility and procedurality. Cultural artifacts and processes are 
irreducible when they refuse closure, seek out idiosyncratic and unpredictable methods, 
and emphasize the complexity of each moment. Irreducibility celebrates sensuality and 
experiments with materials. It foregrounds embodiment and the complexities of 
phenomenology. Procedural artifacts and processes, on the other hand, categorize and 
clarify, develop repeatable rules, and create consistent patterns. Procedurality pursues 
modularity and abstraction. It examines concepts and discovers essential truths. It 
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highlights disembodied codes and discursive signs. The ambivalent animal project 
oscillates between these poles, embracing ways of knowing that are both concrete and 
abstract. We see echoes of this dialectic in Aristotle’s materialism and Plato’s idea
as well as in Cartesian rationalism and Lockean empiricism. But while rationalists 
emphasize the mind and empiricists the senses, irreducibility argues that neither mind
nor body can provide complete knowledge. Instead, it suggests that mind-bodies are 








bracing irreducibility may help temper the totalizing 







nd philosophies with the potential to disrupt conventional wisdom.  
Prodecurality creates efficiency and greater accessibility, expands our reach, 
recognizes important patterns, provides focus, and reduces the most tedious elements 
of human labor. Irreducibility invents new perspectives, seeks out contingent methods
and knowledge, celebrates chaos, and embraces the mystery of life. In a digital age, 
procedurality is on the rise. Its logic sweeps through social, intellectual and commercia
endeavors. At this moment, keeping prodecurality and irreducibility in play is perha
more important than ever. Em
.3.2 Autonomy & Integration 
The second dialectic is autonomy and integration. An ambivalent animal is 
autonomous when she seeks new forms of independence, opposes the status quo, an
breaks with tradition. She is integrated when she accommodates the needs of culture 
and context and foregrounds intersubjectivity and interconnectedness. Autonomy free
from repressive customs and controls, but it may suffer from a sense of isolation and 
self-absorption. Integration acknowledges the wisdom of community and culture b
succumb to the constraints of tradition. The ambivalent animal is simultan
etached and embedded, rebel and conformist, liberated and restricted.  
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This dialectic also examines the traditions of subjectivity. Human subjectivity is 
founded on the division between the human and nonhuman. The ambivalent animal 
emerges in the gap between human and animal. He oscillates between subject and 
object and argues for an expansion of subjectivity beyond the human—human privilege
is questioned and more fluid hierarchies are promoted. This dialectic also investig
the boundaries between human, animal and machine. These human-nonhuman 
“assemblages” engender new forms of collaborative agency. These affinities encourage




ference. They keep in play the connection of community 





nomies. He is both 
elevated and degraded, simultaneously exceptional and banal. 
 
lds two 
.3.3 Aura & Abjection 
The final dialectic is aura and abjection. Materiality and corporeality are key 
components of this dialectic. The fragile and ephemeral nature of existence helps to 
generate the tension between aura and abjection. The ambivalent animal experime
with new “becomings” but is also frequently exploited and abused. In the realm of 
cultural production, auratic art creates rarified, unique, immediate, and enduring artifact
and experiences. Abject art is scatological, entropic, ephemeral, perverse, violent an
peripheral.7 The ambivalent animal shares in these cultural taxo
1.4 Ambivalent Aesthetic 
The integration of animals, humans and machines sparks utopian and dystopian 
rhetoric. Optimistic scenarios of more leisure and better health compete with dark tales
of coercive regulation, corporeal mutations and environmental degradation. The trade-
offs of innovation and unexpected consequences of action inspire the aesthetic of this 
dissertation. The research employs an ambivalent aesthetic—a sensibility that ho
or more opposing ideas in tension and foregrounds the limits of knowledge and 
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representation. An ambivalent aesthetic seeks out conflicting ideas and sensibilitie
highlights contradiction and paradox. When this aesthetic engages with the three 
dialectics, it highli
s and 
ghts epistemological doubt, ontological confusion and corporeal 
tr
 we 
tion acknowledges our limited understanding and 
co
ive 





. As an object both new and old, a hybrid 
o
f 
ansgressions.   
An ambivalent aesthetic embraces contradiction. Contradiction is not viewed as a 
byproduct of failed theory or flawed argument; instead, contradiction is re-cast as a 
challenge to totalizing and reductive systems of thought. Incompatible views become a 
valid response to the limits of language and perception. Contradiction may indicate
have reached the limit of conventional thought—we have arrived at a point where 
language fails to comprehend the complexity of experience. We are left with incomplete 
knowledge and partial truths. Contradic
unters epistemological arrrogance.  
Recognizing the limits of understanding provides a space for detachment. We perce
contradictions within and without and recognize the humor in our subjective position. 
This opens the way for self-deprecation and a sense of play. We note the absurdity of 
our passions and habits. An ambivalent aesthetic often addresses 
himsical way. It recognizes the humor in complicated situations. 
An ambivalent aesthetic highlights uncertain boundaries and unstable combinations.
argues that action occurs through a mixture of individual and collective effort. We are 
both independent and interdependent. Ambivalence embraces multiplicity and hybri
and suggests that unrelated parts are actually related. Hybridity’s intimate union o
discrete components challenges our ontological assumptions. At the same time, 
hybridity recalls the components’ original state
scillates between merger and dissolution.8  
An ambivalent aesthetic welcomes the complications of affiliation. This looser form o
hybridity requires close collaboration—it combines several into an unbounded whole. 
 8
Affiliation questions clear-cut boundaries and tidy solutions and asks us to re-imagine 
established taxonomies. The walls between humans and nonhumans become porous—
subject-object boundaries are blurred. Affiliation brings together different perspectives 
and multiple truths. Subjective positions are in flux. Deleuze and Guattari see affilia
in the interactions of animal packs and in the making of a truffle—a delicacy made 
possible through the loosely coordinated action of a tree, a fly a
tion 
nd a pig.9 There are also 
e
nt 









lements of affiliation in symbiotic and parasitic relationships. 
Affiliation acknowledges our intersubjectivity. Rather than acting only as independe
agents, we often achieve our goals through cooperation—we work through human, 
animal, and machine associations. We also respond to context, reacting to material 
restraints and social interactions. In the process, Bruno Latour suggests we become 
liaisons between humans and nonhumans, go-betweens negotiating th
ature, culture and discourse and creating new networks of activity.10 
Finally, an ambivalent aesthetic welcomes irresolution. Ambivalent theory-practic
open-ended and resists closure. It houses multiple and irreconcilable motivations, 
acknowledges incompatible desires, and invites us to participate in indeterminate 
where rules and strategies are temporary and flawed. It encourages dissonance, 
activating forgotten compromises and liminal tensions. Conflicts remain u
eping the dialectics as well as human-nonhuman participants in play. 
The ambivalent animal project promotes irresolution through open-ended works in 
variety of media. This dissertation mixes writing and making and mingles ideas and 
discourse with materials and craft. This mixture of disparate items creates ephemeral 
experiments that are evolving and incomplete. The work generates as many question as 
answers.  
Employing an ambivalent aesthetic creates moments of doubt and confusion which in 
turn gives us time to pause and ask questions that are often overlooked or undervalued.
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This aesthetic welcomes a temporary delay to implementation—it slows down our ru
to conclusion and encourages us to contemplate the possible consequences of our 
action. This is a chance to ask complex questions and an opportunity to rethink our 
assumptions. Moments of doubt or uncertainty create the potential for change; at such 
moments we may invent new animal, human and machine machine affiliations and also
sh 
 
reject protocols that require the animal to be an instrument of anthropocentric needs.  
 
 






e represents a different kind of 
co
 
1.5 Ambivalent Alba 
Eduardo Kac’s 2000 GFP Bunny11 project helps illustrate the ambivalent aesthetic 
along with the framework of the three dialectics. Kac's bio-art project features Alba, a
transgenic rabbit developed in the labs of France’s Institut National de la Recherche 
Agronomique (INRA). INRA created Alba by transferring the phosphorescent gene of a 
jellyfish into a rabbit zygote. The insertion of the phosphorescent gene makes Alba’s
eyes and skin glow green under blue light.12
reated by research labs around the globe. 
In some ways Kac’s GFP Bunny project aligns itself with the art tradition of adopting 
new materials. During the 20th century artists moved beyond canvas, fabrics, clay, woo
metal and stone to experiment with plastics, plants, mass-produced objects, film and 
video, and computer technologies. Seeking out new methods and materials became
and parcel of artistic practice. Kac’s work follows this tradition but also breaks new
ground in the use of "live" materials. Plants, animals and humans often appear in 
artworks but rarely are they the final object of creative output. And Alba is not an 
ordinary “live” material— outside the world of biotech research laboratories, she is an
unconventional combination of rabbit and jellyfish. Sh
rporeality made possible by genetic modification.  
The first dialectic, irreducibility and procedurality, is touched on by Kac in an interview
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in which he differentiates between the methods of science and art. For Kac, science’s 
truth is established by creating a hypothesis, testing it out, and validating results. The 
process of validation requires repeatable tests. “It’s really ultimately the sharing of that 
evidence that forms the idea of truth.” Kac suggests that art, on the other hand, is ab
idiosyncratic, non-repeatable experiments: “I as an individual, subjectively produce












13 Kac’s own work, at the 
intersection of art and science, contains both procedural and irreducible elements. On 
the one hand, Alba’s body is viewed as pure code, an informational body that is altered 
by inserting an extract of jellyfish DNA code. As such, Alba is the result of a procedural 
innovation employed by labs around the globe. At the same time, Alba is a unique body
born at a particular time and framed within Kac’s art context. Kac introduces Alba at a
moment when biotechniques are unfamiliar to many outside the field of biology. The 
project’s timing is critical to Alba’s reception—she is seen as a novelty in part because
the general public is unaware of the proliferation of trans-species animals created by 
biotch lab
oment. 
The GFP Bunny project also vacillates between embodiment and discourse. The 
authorship or conception of Alba remains unclear. While Kac states he “commissioned” 
Alba, INRA has refuted his claim, stating instead that Alba was one of many transgenic 
rabbits it created at the turn of the 21st century. INRA initially agreed to loan the rabbit to
Kac for an art exhibit, but later withdrew its offer, possibly fearing political backlash a
time when mad-cow disease had called into question untested manipulations of an 
animal’s diet and body. Kac countered that INRA promised to release Alba to his car
When INRA refused Kac’s request to take Alba home, he fought back with a “public 
campaign” in Paris designed to promote his claim on Alba.14 In his interactions with 
INRA and the press, Kac realized his project extended far beyond the limits of Alba's
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body. The bunny project piqued the curiosity of a global media community, and Kac 
happily took on the role of media provocateur. Paradoxically, the project moved in a 
discursive direction because of Alba's embodiment. If Alba was a transgenic bacteriu
instead of a furry mammal, the discursive interest in Alba might not have emerge















The second dialectic of autonomy and integration is manifest in the myths of 
modernism and postmodernism. Modernism’s myths frequently side with autonomy. 
They portray a starving artist indifferent to financial concerns, suffering for the cause of 
art. This artist is viewed as a cultural prophet, ahead of her time, required to forecast and 
implement the socio-cultural future. In this salvific role, the artist fights against socia
economic corruption.16 In its most extreme form, the art-prophet myth
idactic excess: art zealously seeks to uplift the degraded masses.  
If modernist myths exaggerate detachment, postmodernist myths overemphasize
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integration. We lose the art prophet but are left with the art marketeer. In this ne
conception of cultural production, the artist is one node in a network of cultural 
production. Her work is promoted and preserved by established institutions, galleries 
and museums, and is bought and sold as a precious commodity. Art caught in this m








 is also aligned in part with 
ins
s 
here the dominant discourse 
. 
17 The dialectic of autonomy and integration seeks to keep both modern and 
postmodern myths in play. Artists are simultaneously detached and complicit—they 
participate in the art market but also pursue non-instrumental action. They continue to 
carve out spaces of semi-auto
nd the culture they inhabit.   
Kac’s GFP Bunny project engages this dialectic of autonomy and integration. Kac us
Alba to raise cultural, ethical and scientific questions about bioengineered animals. I
the process he detaches from the commercial concerns of corporate research. But 
because Alba is created by a research arm of the state, Kac’s
titutional interests. Kac explains his middle-path position:  
Since artists do not have a stake in corporate biotechnology, and neither do they 
blindly oppose the presence of new technologies in the larger social context, artist
are in a unique position to create subtle ambiguity w
oscillates between extreme pro or con positions.18 
Kac argues for an ambivalent artist, one both integrated and autonomous. It seems 
possible that a conflicted artist, drawn to new materials and techniques but detached 
from a market-driven agenda, may be able to create unconventional transgenic projects
These artworks may also generate public discourse about the ethics of biotechnology, 
as Kac’s GFP Bunny project did. But Kac may be overstating the artists’ autonomy when 
he writes: “artists do not have a stake in corporate biotechnology.” It is the success of 
institutional research that supports his material investigations. If artists can maintain an 
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ambivalent, critical view of their methods, they may be able to walk a fine line between 
autonomy and integration. The balancing act, though, is difficult to maintain. Artists, like 
most people, may simultaneously support and subvert the status quo. Just as scientists
sometimes fail to recognize the consequences of their research, artists enamored with 
the powe
 













Autonomy and integration also interrogates the myth of non-instrumental art. Most 
artists rarely think of their work as solving problems. Instead, they pursue their own 
inclinations, sometimes generating new problems in the process. This work app
can be experimental and non-pragmatic. Not all artists, however, pursue such 
independent methods. Art activists have clear political problems in mind they hope to 
address. Other artists happily create cultural commodities designed to appeal to an art 
market. Indeed the economic survival of most artists requires some form of engagem
with the economy they inhabit. The myth of non-instrumental art, however, remain
strong. And when artists associate with instrumental pro
sources, their artistic intentions may be questioned.   
This seems to be the case in the reception of Alba. Using bio-techniques for an art 
project generated anger and anxiety.19 While research labs routinely manipulate th
genes of animals, the work is typically framed as a search for a medical cure. The 
culture generally supports biotech projects that promise to alleviate human suffering; 
genetic manipulations that have utilitarian outcomes tend to engender less co
than impractical bio-artworks. When art takes up the technique of transgenic 
manipulation, though, what is mundane for scientists becomes transgressive for artists. 
Animals altered for expressive effect carry far more charge t
odified for instrumental purposes.  
Issues of aura and abjection also emerge in Kac’s project. Kac’s fame as an artist rose
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as he played the role of outsider fighting to win back Alba from an implacable research 
institute. That is, his influence soared as he played the part of marginalized “other.” Alba
also performs auratic and abject roles. As one of many phosphorescent rabbits created 
by INRA, she does not qualify as a unique creation. Yet Alba is the only INRA rabbit w
a name (the other rabbits are numbered) and is also the only rabbit at the center of a 
custody battle. The fight between Kac and INRA and the associated media attention 
ultimately give Alba the aura of fine art. Despite her fame, though, she remained an 
ambivalent creature. She spent the rest of her life caged with the other INRA rabbits, 
eventually dying in the lab, far fr
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cipation in ongoing changes in human and nonhuman identity and 
corporeality. 
nd for an iconic work of art.     
Kac’s GFP Bunny project resonates because of the oscillations between individual and 
institution, organic and artificial, embodiment and discourse, art and science. Kac’s wor
sets in motion irresolvable conflicts that explore political and cultural questions. As w
engage with his art, w
uman interactions. 
Throughout this work, I’ll be using the three dialectics to explore the animal’s 
complicated status and examine a range of texts and artifacts. I’m seeking out 
irresolvable tensions that arise when the animal engages with human privilege and 
cultural-economic-technological mechanisms. Issues of epistemology, ontology, and 
materiality are present in each chapter. These issues are explored through the varyin
roles of cyborg, clone, chimera and shapeshifter. As I move through these roles, the 
dialectics remain in place but are also distorted by the insights of changing persp
and focus. Examining the ambivalent animal makes more apparent the limits of 

















of oscillation, and its amplitude. These we 
tried to analyze as we should analyze a mechanical or electrical system 
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s as different as biology, psychology, and 
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1 Norbert Wiener documents examples of feedback loops in both machine and an
chanisms as well as the animal’s early association with cybernetic systems:  
This time we decided to take a nervous problem directly from the topic of feed-
back, and to see what we could do with it experimentally. We chose the cat 
our experimental animal, and the quadriceps extensor femoris as the muscle to 
study. We cut the attachment of the muscle, fixed it to a lever under known 
tension, and recorded it contractions isometrically or isotonically. We also use
an oscillograph to record the simultaneous electrical changes in the muscle itself
We worked chiefly with cats, first decerebrated under either anesthesia later 
made spinal by a thoracic transection of the cord. In many case strychnine was 
used to increase the reflex responses. The muscle was loaded to the point wh
a tap would set it into a periodic pattern of contraction, which is called clonus i
the language of physiologist. We observed this pattern of contraction, paying 
attention to the physiological condition of the cat, the load on the muscle,
frequency of oscillation, the base-level 
exhibiting he same pattern of hunting. 
Machine (New York: Technology Press, John Wiley & Sons, 1947), 28. 
2 Virtual Reality pioneer Jaron Lanier in an essay on the influence of cyberneti
argues that contemporary investigations into bio- and nano-technology are the dire
result of cybernetic processes. Biotechnology makes “flesh into a computer,” 
nanotechnology “
techniques designed to make “the body, and the material world at large…more
Jaron Lanier, “One-Half of a Manifesto,” WIRED, 8:12, De
Katherine Hayles also notes the reach of cybernetics: 
When the body is revealed as a construct, subject to radical change and 
redefinition, bodies of knowledge are similarly apt to be seen as constructs
more inevitable than the organic form that images them. At the same time,
cybernetics was reconfiguring the body as information system, it was also 
presenting itself as a science of information that would remap intellectual 
terrains. Branching out into discipline
traditionally disciplinary boundaries. 
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Andrews, voiceover: From blood vessels to muscle tissue, Atala [Anthony Atala, 
believe, in theory, anything inside the body can be grown outside the body.  
tasy, the field of 
regenerative medicine is on the verge of unimagined breakthroughs. Scientists 
rs 
need to do, is isolate those cells and coax them to grow. 
Andrews, talking to researcher: You’re using heart cells in an ink-jet printer? 
r to cure your disease, your physician will order a 
replacement organ or body part which will be custom made for you using your 
is 
Nichtberger: In regenerative medicine, I think it’s similar to the semi-conductor 
in-
 (http://articles.latimes.com/2001/jul/16/business/fi-22886). 
 Brain Handwerk, “Mice with Human Brain Cells Created,” National Geographic News. 
(http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/12/1214_051214_stem_cell.html) 
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N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature and Informatics (Ch
3 Donna J. Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New 
York: Routledge, 1991), 16
yatt Andrews, “Growing Miracles,” Part One, CBS Evening News, February 6, 200
hlights from the report: 
regenerative medicine researcher] and his team at Wakeforest University 
Atala: We are making body parts that we can implant right back into patients. 
Andrews, voiceover: Once considered a Frankenstein fan
believe every part of the body has cells capable of regeneration, all researche
Researcher in Atala’s lab: Yes, yes. 
Andrews, voiceover: In this lab, they’re making the heart of a mouse. A heart 
they grew layer by layer by spraying the cells with a printer.  
Andrews, voiceover: In orde
own cells. For the tens of thousands of patients who need organ transplants, th
technology brings hope…. 
industry of the 1980s. You don’t know where it’s going to go, but you know it’s 
big.  
Dr. Steven Nichtberger, CEO, Tengion. Tengion is a start-up company that creates 
vitro bladders and hopes to soon mass produce blood vessels and kidneys. 
5 Marc Ballon, “Animal-Tissue Values at Heart of Edwards’ Success.” Los Angeles 
Times, July 16, 2001
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lie Kristeva notes abjection’s connection to the animal: 
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ically works. Art doesn’t work that way. Art is essentially individual. 
Art is a singularity. I as an individual subjectively produce something that I cannot 
 duplicate that, that’s usually called 
ommunication 




The abject confronts us, on the one hand, with those fragile states whe
strays on the territories of animal. Thus, by way 
threatening world of animals and animalism, which were imagined as 
representatives of sex and murder. 
Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 19
8 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, M
Harvard University Press, 1993) 57 
9 Gill Deleuze and
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10 Latour, 138-9. 
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Bio Art and Beyond (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005),
12 Christopher Dickey, “I Love My Glow Bunny,” WIRED, 9:04, April 2001 
(http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/9.04/bunny.ht
iz Kahn, “One on One: Eduardo Kac,” Al Jazeera English, February 23, 2008.
ereviewed on Kahn’s television show: 
Kahn: What are, in your opinion, the boundaries between science and art?... 
Kac: …We have come to a level of specialization of the disciplines. Art is in fact 
quite distinct from science. Science is based on a hypothesis, that goes thro
a series of tests. And then you arrive at a proof. Meaning that your hypothes
has been demonstrated through these steps. And if that proof that you arrive a
and those methods that you employ can be replicated by others, no matter 
where, then the notion of truth is built, is constructed and shared. It’s really 
ultimately the sharing of that evidence that forms the idea of truth. That’s how 
science bas
repeat, nor do I want to repeat. If others can
plagiarism. 
14 Kac, Signs of Life: Bio Art and Beyond, 170. 
15 Louis-Marie Houdine, “Dealing with difficult topics in public: A c
workshop focused on controversial issues in science,” European Molecular Biology 
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t realism’ in our century. 
This didactic-utilitarian conception, which assigns to the artist an avant-garde role 





 artists rebelled against 
modernism’s high-mindedness, after decades of postmodern domination, some artists 
te Between its 
000, 15.   
In the article, Kac responds to questions about his GFP Bunny project from students 
t Sparks Controversy," Petplace.com, September 
3, 2003 (http://www.petplace.com/Articles/artShow.asp?artID=1365; 
http://www.ekac.org/petplace.html).  
 
alinescu describes the constraining role of the avant-garde artist: 
…on the one hand, the artist enjoys the honor of being in the forefront of the 
movement toward social prosperity; on the other, he is no longer free but, on the
contrary, given—by the same political philosopher who so generously proclaime
him a leader—a whole program to fulfill, and a completely didactic one, at that. 
All of this definitely reminds us of the theory of ‘socialis
only to make of him a disciplined soldier or militant…  
Kitsch, Postmodernism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987),103. 
17 Johanna Drucker explores these issues in her book Sweet Dreams: Contemporary 
and Complicity. Drucker cogently criticizes the mindless acceptance of the salvific 
function of art. While I agree with many of Drucker’s insights into contemporary art, I 
worry that Drucker replaces the art-prophet myth with an embedded-artist myth. Artists
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the culture industry and the marketplace. This minimal detachment gives some of th
most powerful contemporary art works a resonance that is difficult to find in many 
culture-industry products. Also, it’s worth noting that just as
now seek new methods to escape the myth of complicity.  
18 “Behold, Alba: Genetically Modified Glow Bunny Sparks a Deba
Creator, SAIC Professor Eduardo Kac and Students,” F-News, student newspaper at 
The School of the Art Institute of Chicago. November 2
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Technological marvels of the 20th century are now common objects in our everyday 
lives. Machines routinely process information, communicate with each other, and some 
are said to learn and think. These active machines inspire questions like: What is 
cognition? What is agency? What is autonomy? What does it mean to be human? And, 
perhaps, more fundamentally, what is life? Donna Haraway writes: “Our machines are 
disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert.”1 
We have a complicated relationship with technology. We celebrate our innovations, 
cherish the latest gadget, take comfort in never-ending flows of data, and find solace in 
the feedback loop. At the same time, our reliance on integrated technologies makes us 
uneasy. High-tech, highly mediated environments attempt to respond to our immediate 
needs, but they also require us to conform to their protocols and are increasingly able to 
track and document our every move. 
The pleasure and pain of technological development is illustrated by the cyborg. He is 
embedded in complex networks and his identity is caught up in the actions of sentient 
and inanimate beings. His tight integration of real and virtual, natural and artificial, 
organism and machine challenges traditional subject-object boundaries. In this chapter, 
most of my examples highlight animal-machine integration; humans are seen as 
secondary characters in my portrayal of the cyborg. Nonetheless, humans are always 
present when cyborgian animals appear. Humans facilitate the integration of animal and 
machine and their anthropocentric desires shape the nonhuman cyborg's capabilities.  
A cyborgian animal is a familiar presence in the research and practice of art, 
agriculture, industry and science. Ethologists collect streaming video data from cameras 
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attached to animals. Automated mechanisms support farm-animal labor. Lab animals 
are fitted with brain interfaces that let them maneuver robotic limbs. Animal movement 
generates data visualizations and acoustic arrangements. And a pet’s health and social 
interaction are traced with sensors, data scanners and online software. This mingling of 
animals and technology increases knowledge and enhances animal behavior but also 
engenders new forms of abuse. A cyborg has access to altered perceptions and insights 
and she is sometimes coddled by technological innovations, but she is also regulated by 
the mechanisms of cybernetic control. These cyborgs are simultaneously liberated and 
repressed, supported and surveilled, monstrous and banal. 
2.1 Irreducibility & Procedurality 
2.1.1 Cybernetic Totalism 
Cybernetic systems routinely frame our understanding of the world. Simulations 
explain and predict complex phenomena. Augmented reality systems overlay information 
on physical objects and spaces. Data-mining procedures highlight anomalies and 
emerging trends. The speed and agility of these systems expand our epistemological 
reach. Yet these systems are influenced by culture and economics and their insights are 
often filtered through the ideologies of a particular place and time. Cybernetic systems 
excel at capturing and organizing vast amounts of information, but we should never 
forget their editing abilities. Our simulations and augmentations always elide data and 
often produce reductive, distorted experiences of reality.2 
The reductive character of cybernetic systems stems in part from a privileging of 
information over materiality. Katherine Hayles argues that post-WWII cybernetic models 
stripped a system’s informational message of its meaning, materiality and context. She 
traces the foundational moves of Claude Shannon and Norbert Wiener as they develop 
a theory of information. The first step is to make probability of message the measure of 
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information. This definition of information removes the ambiguities of meaning from the 
concerns of information theorists. With meaning gone, information theory can be applied 
to a wide array of contexts.3  
Wiener’s theory of cybernetics is derived from his assessment of both biological and 
mechanical systems. Information stands apart from medium; it is detached from its 
physical instantiation. Eugene Thacker notes: 
When information is regarded as information, no matter what medium “carries” it, it 
then becomes a universal, disconnected from the material-technical necessities of 
the medium, the processes, and the context. It is this universalizing and 
decontextualizing of information the enables Wiener to conceive of machines and 
organisms as the same from the perspective of cybernetic systems operating 
through feedback loops.4 
Information detached from materiality and context privileges pattern over presence.5 
Presence is thought to be based in information—matter dissolves into pattern. Roboticist 
Hans Moravec sees life’s informational essence as the key to overcoming corporeal 
limits—he imagines transcending materiality through cybernetic enhancements that 
eliminate scarcity, disease and death. Immortality can be achieved through uploading a 
coded version of human consciousness into a computer.6 Thacker notes a conservative 
streak in the optimistic visions of cyberneticists like Moravec. They maintain an essential 
human core—an essence informed by the Enlightenment’s values of autonomy and 
agency—even as the human is radically altered. Such scenarios ignore the effects of 
tightly integrated human-nonhuman interaction; they fail to acknowledge the distributed 
agency and altered boundaries that new techniques bring.7 Consciousness that resides 
inside a computer creates a different kind of subjectivity—a subjectivity that does not 
easily align with the Enlightenment’s idea of individualism.  
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Computer scientist Stephan Wolfram interprets the rise of pattern over presence as 
evidence of life’s computational basis. Wolfram argues “that programs based on simple 
rules can produce behavior of great complexity.”8 He sees these simple programs as the 
basis for a variety of natural and social phenomena. The world becomes a giant 
computer program made up of many smaller programs that implement relatively simple 
algorithmns. Wolfram extends his computational approach to a range of disciplines 
including mathematics, physics, biology, social sciences, computer science, philosophy, 
art and technology.9 Computational processes become the foundation for a unifying 
theory of reality. 
Jaron Lanier, Virtual Reality pioneer, notes that dematerialized information and 
computational models of life and matter are inflected with an ideology he calls 
“cybernetic totalism”—a system of thought that suggests “people are no more than 
cybernetic patterns” and that corporeal knowledge and experience are secondary to 
these patterns.10 Cybernetic totalism equates idealized models of the world with the 
physical world. Thus Moravec is able to equate encoded consciousness with embodied 
consciousness.  
Lanier argues cybernetic totalism extends the influence of cybernetics to biology and 
physics "resulting in life and the physical universe becoming mercurial; achieving the 
supposed nature of computer software."11 Lanier counters this idealized view of easily 
programmable material with his own experience of creating software. He sees cybernetic 
systems are far from idealized systems and highlights instead the “brittleness” of 
software. Despite advances in hardware—increased chip speed, memory and storage—
software development remains a difficult task. Cybernetic systems suffer the effects of 
legacy code, have difficulty processing ever-larger data sets, and unevenly integrate the 
components of large-scale applications. As programmers scramble to keep up with 
hardware innovations, they often create inefficient and flawed code.12 Cybernetic 
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totalists imagine perfectly integrated cybernetic configurations, but Lanier reminds us of 
the material and cultural constraints that shape our contemporary technologies.  
Cybernetic totalism argues for a dramatic epistemological change in the way we 
understand the world. Computational models are seen as underpinning real-world 
phenomena. The dialectic of irreducibility and procedurality acknowledges the power 
and potential of abstracted models but argues that procedurality by itself fails to grasp 
the complexity of embodied experience. Our models generate new insights, but they 
remain reductive snapshots of the physical world.  
2.1.2 Cyborg Animals 
2.1.2.1 Wild Cyborgs 
Just as we mistake dematerialized computational models for real-world phenomena, 
we also equate mediated data with embodied experience. Issues of mediation and 
embodiment arise when ethologists employ mechanized systems that track wild animal 
behavior. These ethologists attach a lightweight, wireless camera to an animal’s body 
and capture streaming video recorded from the animal's viewpoint. The technology 
allows researchers to document animal behavior from afar, observing intimate details of 
animal life without encroaching on the animal’s territory. The wild animal who carries the 
camera becomes a cyborg embedded in a feedback loop that includes the animal, 
equipment and human observer. 
Crittercam is emblematic of the behavior-recording devices used by ethologists. In the 
last fifteen years, Crittercam inventor Greg Marshall has attached cameras to sharks, 
whales, turtles, penguins and seals. Recently, he adapted the technology to the land-
and-water habitat of Alaskan grizzly bears. Many ethologists are enthusiastic about 
these mediated records of animal behavior. They witness new behaviors that were 
previously unknown.13 But the technology is not without its complications—it may permit 
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observation of animal behavior with minimal human intrusion, but the camera becomes 
an intrusive piece of equipment.14 Engineer Rob MacIntyre attached a miniature camera 
to a peregrine falcon to record her stoop—a moment of high-speed chase that occurs as 
the peregrine dives and catches prey in midair. Even microelectronic augmentation, 
however, proved cumbersome for the falcon. The camera's size, shape and weight 
altered the aerodynamics of the bird, creating awkward attempts at flight before she 
eventually adjusted to her new payload.15 In another study, attaching a camera to an 
elephant matriarch required chasing, isolating and sedating the animal. This procedure 
separated matriarch from her calf and herd and caused considerable stress for the entire 
group of elephants. When the camera equipment was removed and the matriarch 
released, her herd appeared nervous as she approached them and hesitantly accepted 
her return.16  
Not only is the mounting and extracting of equipment stressful to animals and 
sometimes dangerous for researchers, but the imagery captured is often poor quality. 
The grizzly-bear Crittercam transmits claustrophobic, jittery video. Researchers describe 
the video footage as seeing through the animal’s eyes,17 but such rhetoric ignores the 
footage’s limited view. Cameras are generally attached in ways that ignore the animal’s 
eye-line. The elephant’s camera sits on top of her head, the grizzly bear’s camera hangs 
from her neck, and the falcon’s camera protrudes from her back. The view from the 
grizzly bear’s neck may contribute to the Crittercam’s claustrophobic aesthetic—the 
camera is angled toward the ground and reveals only a small slice of the bear’s visual 
field. More troubling, though, is the elephant’s straight-ahead camera view. An 
elephant’s eyes are positioned on the side of her head. This configuration provides 
elephants with wide-angle side views and limited frontal views. Such views protect 
elephants from predator attacks—they can detect animals approaching from behind. In 
the case of the “elecam,” media conventions rather than elephant phenomenology 
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determine the camera’s viewpoint. A better view of the elephant’s perspective would 
require two wide-angle lenses pointing sideways instead of forward. This panoramic 
view would be unfamiliar to humans—we, like most predators, have our eyes oriented to 
frontal views and as media consumers are accustomed to single-camera perspective—
but would provide biologists with a better sense of elephant perception.  
Perhaps more phenomenologically accurate views will have to wait for technological 
improvements. For now, researchers seem pleased with the insights they gain from 
augmented animals. They view Crittercam footage as an intimate and detailed record of 
animal behavior. But lessons learned from media studies should make biologists less 
confident in the data they record; the tools and technology we employ filter and distort 
our knowledge.18 Crittercams’ streaming video is far from an immediate experience. 
(Although perhaps the poor quality image, eye-line mismatch, and limited visual field are 
read as signs of “real life” views.) Just as we alter our behavior to adapt to increasingly 
mediated environments, animals may also alter their behavior when they find cameras 
attached to their bodies. A sentence from National Geographic’s web site highlights and 
hides the subtle shifts that Crittercams engender: “Some animals, especially female 
seals, show initial interest in the package they are carrying, but soon resume their day-
to-day life in the wild.”19 This statement alludes to many important questions that remain 
unanswered: Do different species and different animals within species respond to 
Crittercam in different ways? How do these technologies alter an animal’s behavior? 
What are the effects of mounting and extracting equipment from an animal? How does 
augmentation affect an animal’s sociability? How is video data different from more 
traditional in-field observations? And when we track animals in packs or tribes, do we 
miss important group dynamics when we emphasize data collected from a single 
animal? 
To view an animal cyborg as no different than any other animal ignores the effects of 
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mediation. A cyborgian mix of flesh and machine creates new perceptions and alters 
phenomenology. Perceiving a cybernetic system as an objective representation denies 
the influence of culture and the reductions of code. Cybernetic systems introduce a 
certain amount of noise. A device like Crittercam facilitates a dialogue between animal, 
human and machine that is simultaneously immediate and mediated. Our knowledge of 
the animal other is enhanced, but our view of animal behavior and phenomenology 
remains incomplete. 
2.1.2.2 Domesticated Cyborgs 
Domesticated animals are also enlisted to participate in cybernetic projects. Dutch 
company Lely is an innovator in the automation of farm labor. The company's products 
include mobile and stationary robots, specialized sensors, and networked software 
applications. Dairy cows require consistent, daily care and are a prime target of Lely’s 
labor-saving devices. Lely’s Astronaut, a robotic milking station, and Juno, a mobile 
robot “feed pusher,” are two of Lely’s offerings.20 The marketing materials for these 
products recount the difficulties of dairy production and showcase the advantages of 
Lely’s cybernetic solutions. An excerpt from Juno’s promotional material notes the 
mobile robot’s ability “to provide cows with fresh feed 24 hours per day”: 
The Lely Juno contributes to the welfare of your herd by stimulating the cows to 
approach the feeding fence more often. The cows have a better roughage intake 
and the herd is calmer and more tranquil. Low ranked animals will now also have 
sufficient access to fresh feed.21 
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2.1 Lely's Austronaut22 
 
Lely’s tract argues that Juno’s regular distribution of feed compensates for the 
injustices of bovine social hierarchies—even the weakest members of the herd have 
access to food after dominant herd members are satiated. The robot continually delivers 
food, a time-consuming and tedious task that humans would be unwilling or unable to 
do. Lely’s automated milking machine, the Astronaut, also caters to bovine needs. The 
robotic milker is available at all hours—the cow simply enters the milking stall when she 
is ready to be milked. Before automation, cows were milked at fixed times twice a day; 
the cow’s body accommodated the farmer’s schedule. With Lely’s equipment, the 
machine accommodates the cow’s body. Lely also manufactures systems that clean 
barn floors and massage cows’ backs. These products are designed to promote healthy 
and productive cows. 
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With increased automation there are inevitability some trade-offs. A cyborgian cow has 
better access to food, enjoys frequent back rubs, and milks at her convenience, but farm 
labor replaced by robotic labor creates more refined methods of regulation. Each cow 
has an RFID inserted in her ear, permitting the Astronaut milker to record and track her 
milk production. The milk’s quality is assessed through chemical sensors and discarded 
if deemed unfit. A cow’s long-term productivity is tracked through visual graphs available 
to the farmer online.  
Lely’s cybernetic attention both accommodates and regulates the cow’s body. Before 
automation, dairy farmers named the members of the herd. After shifting to Lely’s 
system, many farmers distinguish cows by number instead of name. This new 
abstraction may alter in subtle ways the farmer’s perception of her herd. When milk 
quality and quantity can be tracked, day by day, and charted over months and years, 
how does the animal’s status shift? Are cows primarily defined by the quantity and 
quality of their milk? Is productivity the ultimate measurement of bovine labor? And do a 
few pieces of data provide an accurate assessment of productivity? One could imagine a 
less productive cow who nonetheless contributes in unquantifiable ways to the herd’s 
health. What happens to the least productive animals now that they are easily tracked? 
Do they become expendable? Or does the system encourage farmers to quickly address 
health concerns within the herd? Lely’s procedural abstractions generate material 
consequences. The cow is reframed (and enframed) by these cybernetic mechanisms. 
Her success as an animal laborer is measured through the mediation of Lely’s system.  
As the farmer is distanced from the daily ritual of milking, she is also distanced from a 
certain type of knowledge. Cybernetic visualizations and chemical sensors provide a 
different kind of knowledge than hands-on interactions between farmer and herd. These 
cybernetic systems focus the farmer’s attention in ways that expand and restrict her 
understanding of the herd. In Lely’s view, human labor is best focused on specialized 
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managerial tasks—monitoring productivity trends and making high-level decisions. For 
some farmers, this may be a welcome relief. For farmers who enjoy the complexities of 
material engagement and animal-human interaction, this managerial role may require 
difficult adaptations. 
Another commercial product creates canine cyborgs. Social Networking in Fur (SNiF) 
monitors a dog’s social life and activity levels. The system’s main hardware component 
is a networked, accelerometer-enabled dog collar. The collar, like traditional collars, 
identifies the dog but also tracks the dog’s movement and records encounters with other 
SNIF-collared dogs. Collar data is uploaded to SNiF servers and fed into social 
networking/health-monitoring software. Dog guardians can enter pet profiles and upload 
canine pictures. They can set up “doggy dates,” arranging to meet other dogs for walks 
or to play. The amount of time a dog interacts with other SNiF dogs is displayed online, 
giving guardians a sense of dog-to-dog interaction and compatibility. Early designs of the 
system allowed custodians to rate the interactions of their pet with other SNiF dogs. The 
guardian simply pressed a “negative” or “positive” button on the dog’s leash to rate the 
compatibility of the two dogs.23 Since SNiF captures each dog’s unique ID, dogs who 
are deemed too aggressive could be tagged and future encounters avoided, protecting a 
pet from potential fights or injuries. 
Guardians monitor the dog’s activity level online, viewing exercise patterns throughout 
the day. SNiF charts the amount of time a pet is “inactive, low activity, walking, trotting or 
galloping.” SNiF software also lets a guardian compare her dog’s activity with dogs of 
the same breed or dogs living in a particular zip code. Guardians are encouraged to use 
the activity data to regulate the dog’s diet—a sluggish canine may find his portions cut.24  
Like Lely’s systems, SNiF both accommodates and regulates its animal cyborgs. It 
adds interest to a pet’s domesticated life, encouraging social encounters and exercise. 
At the same time, it enables a caretaker’s most controlling instincts. The system 
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provides a dog’s guardian with new tracking tools and impressive data visualizations—a 
dog’s every move and encounter can be displayed online. Measuring a dog’s activity or 
sociability against dogs of the same breed or neighborhood enforces normative 
behavior—a dog is judged by a standard that may or may not align with his own 
corporeal and social needs. SNiF’s quantifications of health and sociality determine a 
dog’s optimal behavior. Yet despite SNiF’s surveillance capabilities and normative 
regulations, the product challenges the traditions of human-centered design. An animal 
tagged as “inactive” is likely to induce caretaker guilt which in turn may result in more 
frequent walks and play activities—an outcome many dogs would enjoy. SNiF’s 
disciplinary mechanisms likely alter human behavior as much as dog behavior. The 
system mingles human and animal desires and requires moments of compromise and 
adjustment for both guardian and pet. A SNiF dog’s corporeal needs are highlighted and 
social life expanded, and at the same time his habits are scrutinized and his character 
define by taxonomies and measurements of a cybernetic system.  
2.2 Autonomy & Integration 
Technological augmentation not only affects ways of knowing and behaving, but the 
cyborg’s tight coupling of animal and machine creates a new kind of subjectivity. 
Katherine Hayles notes that cybernetics establishes boundaries along the inputs and 
outputs of a system. If “flow of information” becomes a binding thread, then humans, 
animals and machines become components in an assemblage. This integration 
challenges the Enlightenment’s notion of autonomy. The cyborg redraws our corporeal 
boundaries by incorporating anything that resides within the feedback loop. Hayles 
recounts that Gregory Bateson asked graduate students to consider the effects of tools 
and technologies that assist our understanding of the world. Bateson gave as an 
example the cane carried by a blind man. He asked if “a blind man’s cane is part of the 
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man?” From the perspective of cybernetic systems that “are constituted by flows of 
information…the cane and man join in a single system, for the cane funnels to the man 
essential information about his environment.”25 Hayles notes: 
Of all the implications that first-wave cybernetics conveyed, perhaps none was 
more disturbing and potentially revolutionary than the idea that the boundaries of 
the human subject are constructed rather than given. Conceptualizing control, 
communication, and information as an integrated system, cybernetics radically 
changed how boundaries were conceived.26 
Donna Haraway also highlights the cyborg’s invention of new boundaries. Haraway’s 
cyborg challenges traditional identity and proposes new political alliances. She calls for 
“pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in their construction.”27 
“So my cyborg myth is about transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous 
possibilities which progressive people might explore as one part of needed political 
work.”28 
Haraway re-imagines the cyborg’s mix of animal, human and machine as an 
empowering metaphor. The cyborg may be a dangerous byproduct of the military-
industrial complex, but she also invents a new way of being: “…a cyborg world might be 
about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship 
with animals and machines, not afraid of the permanently partial identities and 
contradictory standpoints.”29 
For Haraway, the cyborg’s impurity—her endless, promiscuous mingling—counters 
Western narratives of wholeness and completion. From a feminist viewpoint, a cyborg 
becomes an emblem of metamorphosis that frees herself from the rigid roles imposed by 
patriarchal power. A woman need not attach herself to masculine authority in a quest for 
completion.30 And a cyborg rejects the Christian concept of a fallen subject restored to 
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God through obedience to deity’s commandments. The cyborg is impure from birth; she 
has no loss of innocence to overcome:31 
…there are also great riches for feminists in explicitly embracing the possibilities 
inherent in the breakdown of clean distinctions between organisms and machine 
and similar distinctions structuring the Western self. It is the simultaneity of 
breakdowns that crack the matrices of domination and opens geometric 
possibilities.32 
Haraway’s cyborg also questions established binary oppositions. She argues that 
these oppositions have placed the minority other in a subordinate subjective position. 
These “dualisms” have “been systemic to the logics and practices of domination of 
women, people of color, nature, workers, animals—in short, domination of all constituted 
as others, whose task is to mirror the self.” 
Chief among these troubling dualisms are self/other, mind/body, culture/nature, 
male/female, civilized/primitive, reality/appearance, whole/part, agent/resource, 
maker/made, active/passive, right/wrong, truth/illusion, total/partial, God/man. The 
self is the One who is not dominated, who knows that by the service of the other; 
the other is the one who holds the future, who knows that by the experience of 
domination, which give the lies to the autonomy of the self. To be One is to be an 
illusion, and so to be involved in a dialectic of apocalypse with the other. Yet to be 
other is to be multiple, without clear boundary, frayed, insubstantial. One is too few, 
but two are too many.33 
Haraway argues that the Enlightenment’s notion of an autonomous individual was 
always an exclusive subjective position. The Enlightenment may have extended agency 
and autonomy to a wider range of white, Western males but refused to grant the same 
level of subjectivity to all races, ethnicities, genders, classes and sexualities. Hayles 
comes to a similar conclusion in her analysis of the posthuman: 
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But the posthuman does not really mean the end of humanity. It signals instead 
the end of a certain conception of the human, a conception that may have 
applied, at best, to that fraction of humanity who had the wealth, power, and 
leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings exercising their will 
through individual agency and choice. What is lethal is not the posthuman as 
such but the grafting of the posthuman onto a liberal humanist view of the self.34 
Hayles argues this posthuman subjectivity emerges in the interactions of discourse, 
culture, technology, and embodiment: 
The chaotic, unpredictable nature of complex dynamics implies that subjectivity is 
emergent rather than given, distributed rather than located solely in 
consciousness, emerging from and integrated into a chaotic world rather than 
occupying a position of mastery and control removed from it. Bruno Latour has 
argued that we have never been modern; the seriated history of cybernetics—
emerging from networks at once materially real, socially regulated, and 
discursively constructed—suggests, for similar reasons, that we have always 
been posthuman.35 
The cyborg exaggerates these posthuman tendencies. Her corporeal and ontological 
boundaries are difficult to untangle. She acts by coordinated and collaborative means 
and integrates flesh and data, software and hardware, animals, humans and machines. 
Bruno Latour’s writing on modernity adds to this examination of altered subjectivity. 
Latour argues that the material and social transformations of modernity arise through 
establishing divisions between nature, society and God (in a secular society, discourse 
is substituted for deity).36 Modernity separates humans from nonhumans, spirit from 
materiality, and nature from culture. The moderns account for the complexity of lived 
experience by considering nature and culture to be “transcendent” in some contexts and 
“immanent” in others. Nature is within our grasp in the research lab but beyond our 
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reach in the universal laws of physics. We elect a government with our individual votes, 
yet historical movements are beyond our political control. Our world is described by 
switching back and forth between transcendent and immanent modes while maintaining 
the distinct divisions between culture, nature and discourse. This epistemology becomes 
the undeclared “Constitution” of modernity.37 
By playing three times in a row on the same alternation between transcendence 
and immanence, the moderns can mobilize Nature, objectify the social, and feel 
the spiritual presence of God, even while firmly maintaining that Nature escapes 
us, that Society is our own work, and that God no longer intervenes.38 
In pre-modern cultures, Latour asserts the boundaries between nature, culture and 
discourse are less clear. Humans and nonhumans are closely connected, nature is not 
easily objectified, and cultural traditions remain secure. The moderns “purification” 
process permits a “mobilization” of nature and a new scale of material manipulation, 
social organization and technical exploration. Paradoxically the modern divisions 
generate an array of hybrids; the process of “translation,” bridging the gap between 
nature, culture and discourse, results in a rich network of intermediary concepts, 
procedures and artifacts.  
For Latour the rise of hybrids emphasizes the interconnectedness of nature, society 
and discourse. Isolating the human from this web of connection risks losing subjectivity 
altogether.39 Latour echoes in part the sentiments of Hayles and Haraway. By 
incorporating the effects of technology—acknowledging the active agents that constitute 
contemporary identities—we are able to re-think the divisions of society, nature and 
discourse. Rather than completely abandon the Enlightenment’s agency and autonomy, 
Latour ask us to expand our concept of subjectivity to include a mixture of humans, 
animals, machines, and ideas. In so doing, we modify our subjectivity and expand our 
discourse: 
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…the human, as we now understand, cannot be grasped and saved unless the 
other part of itself, the share of things, is restored to it. So long as human is 
constructed through contrast with the object that has been abandoned to 
epistemology, neither the human nor the nonhuman can be understood.40 
Latour argues that subjectivity is restored when the individual is redefined as the go-
between of what was once considered human and nonhuman groups—this new subject 
mediates the divisions of nature, culture and discourse. To be human is to be “a weaver 
of morphisms;”41 continually creating and navigating intermediary networks. “The human 
is in the delegation itself, in the pass, in the sending, in the continuous exchange of 
forms.”42 
The cyborg embodies the altered subjectivities proposed by Hayles, Haraway and 
Latour. Latour’s mediator, Hayles posthuman and Haraway’s politically engaged cyborg 
imagine alternatives to the Enlightenment’s autonomous subject. Each theorist 
celebrates new human-nonhuman intimacies that challenge our sense of identity. From 
this perspective, the human is less central and the assemblage of human, animal and 
machine comes to the fore. 
2.3 Aura & Abjection 
2.3.1 Auratic Cyborg 
Haraway’s empowered cyborg is re-imagined in the form of James Auger and Jimmy 
Loizeau’s conceptual design piece Augmented Animal. The project proposes cybernetic 
systems and technological enhancements that focus on animals' needs. Each integration 
of animal and machine enhances an animal’s status. Auger and Loizeau imagine 
technologies that assist squirrels in finding food, protect rodents from predators, and 
help dogs adapt to the restrictions of domestic life.43 Auger and Loizeau’s comment on 
domestication is emblematic of their approach:  
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When animals are domesticated they enter an uncertain territory between the 
natural and the artificial. They must live within human terms and conditions, 
dislocated from their original environment, often leading a frustrating life. Many 
animals have developed ingenious mechanisms of defense, and with the help of 
technology they can overcome evolutionary shortfalls.44  
In one Augmented Animal scenario, a dog’s tail signals emotional and physical state 
with the enhancement of LED text. Phrases like “I’d like my dinner” or “I really love you” 
appear when the dog wags her tail. In another scenario, a squirrel records the GPS 
location of a buried nut using a device attached to his wrist. When he needs to retrieve 
the nut, a red light on his device blinks to indicate the exact position of his stash. A third 
scenario gives night vision goggles to a rodent, helping her avoid predators that hunt in 
low light.45  
 
 
2.2 James Auger and Jimmy Loizeau, Augmented Animal46  
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While Augmented Animal is part tongue-in-cheek, the serious side of the work aims to 
diminish animal-human miscommunication and human-driven regulation. Human 
concerns are minimized and animal desires privileged. Augmented Animal proposes an 
auratic animal cyborg, an animal who is enabled through cybernetic systems.   
Cyborgian animals play starring roles in several art performance and installations. 
Joseph Beuys’ 1974 Coyote: I Like America and America Likes Me is a human-animal 
performance that serves as a precursor to contemporary animal-machine performances. 
Beuys sequestered himself in a gallery space for three days with a wild coyote. The 
performance’s central tension is the animal’s unknowable reaction to being housed in 
close quarters with a human. While Beuys describes the performance as a symbolic 
working through of the unresolved abuses of Native Americans, the piece also resonates 
for its investigation of social interactions in general. The display of conflicting human and 
animal desire is key to the project’s enduring power. An iconic image of the performance 
shows Beuys hunched over wrapped in a felt blanket and the coyote biting and pulling 
on the blanket’s edge. The image resembles the play fighting of human and domestic 
dog, but Beuys’ recollection of the performance suggests the image captures a struggle 
for control. In the closed-off gallery space, human dominance was no longer assured. 
Beuy’s notes: “the roles [between animal and human] were exchanged immediately.”47 
Contemporary art-and-technology projects continue Beuys’ interest in unpredictable 
animal behavior except that these works replace human performer with machine. Tiffany 
Holmes’ art project Follow the Mouse tracks mouse movements to generate a variety of 
abstract, screen-based drawings.48 In a similar fashion, Natalie Jeremijenko’s Ooz Inc. 
uses animal movement to trigger cybernetic procedurality. Jeremijenko’s Amphibian 
Architecture places custom-made buoys in the Hudson River that glow and provide 
blood-cleansing fish food whenever fish swim near by. The buoys, arranged in close 
proximity, create light trails that reveal the dance of aquatic life hidden beneath the 
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water. And Jeremijenko’s Whitney Biennial project, titled For the Birds, broadcasts 
messages about biodiversity into the Whitney Museum when birds land on sensors 
embedded in bird perches attached to the museum’s exterior.49 Jeremijenko considers 
the aesthetic experience of the animal performers—she places miniature replicas of 
artworks alongside the bird perches, giving the animals a survey of the art concealed by 
the Whitney Museum's walls.50 In another version of For the Birds installed on the roof of 
Postmaster’s Gallery, Jeremijenko enlisted the help of architects, designers and artists 
to create a housing development for Manhattan’s birds. The birdhouse architecture 
experimented with a variety of forms and colors in an effort to satisfy the birds' aesthetic 
and social desires. The development also included gardens, waste facilities, a concert 
hall and shopping mall as well as food and water for the birds.51 These are relatively 
auratic animal cyborgs that perform when they please and are free to enjoy or ignore the 
attempts of humans to draw them in. 
Vicky Isley and Paul Smith of Boredom Research also create a permissive space with 
minimal performance requirements for their cyborgian snails. Their project Real Snail 
Mail enlists snails in the delivery of email messages. To transmit an email by snail mail, 
you enter a message and recipient email address at Boredom Research’s web site. Your 
message is queued, awaiting pick up and delivery by actual snails housed in a 
customized tank in Bournemouth, UK. Each snail has an RFID tag and wireless 
antennae attached to his shell and their tank houses message pick-up and sending 
stations. When a snail passes by a pick-up station, a message’s ID is encoded in the 
snail’s RFID tag. When a snail enters the sending station, the message’s ID is read and 
the pending “letter” is sent on its way over the internet. The snail’s movement between 
pick-up and sending stations determines the length of time it takes to deliver a message. 
Isely and Smith highlight the uncertainly of snail mail delivery—they note an email 
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message may never reach its final destination given the snails’ unknowable movements 
within the tank.  
 
 
2.3 Boredom Research, Real Snail Mail52 
2.3.2 Abject Cyborg 
Not all animal cyborgs are free to perform as they wish. Haraway’s hope that the 
cyborg might destabilize entrenched hierarchies remains more political wish than reality. 
When animals are incorporated into cybernetic systems, human interests are served 
more than animal concerns. Even in open-ended art projects, animals serve as 
entertainer or spectacle for a human audience. Perhaps Haraway’s human-nonhuman 
hybrids are empowered because the human is the most important component of the 
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human-animal-machine mix. When we focus on animals incorporated into these 
assemblages, the cyborg’s status becomes less certain.   
An animal’s diminished subjectivity likely contributes to his circumscribed role. Animal 
status is often indistinguishable from machine status. At the dawn of modern science—
as tools evolved into machines—Rene Descartes viewed animals and machines as 
equivalent. Descartes noted the regular patterns of migrating birds and the instinctual, 
automatic behavior of dogs and cats. From these observations he characterized the 
animal as a soulless biological machine. Descartes’ animals act without cognitive 
abilities or human emotions.53  
By aligning the animal with the machine, Descartes’ sought to disambiguate the status 
of animals and make human-nonhuman divisions more certain. The autonomous human, 
standing apart from and above the nonhuman, is able to exploit the animal with impunity. 
We objectify animals in our breeding, farming and hunting practices and coerce animals 
in our training regimens. John Berger highlights abusive farming techniques that exceed 
Descartes’ conception of animal as machine:  
In the first stages of the industrial revolution, animals were used as machines. As 
also were children. Later, in the so-called post-industrial societies, they are treated 
as raw material. Animals required for food are processed like manufactured 
commodities.54 
As machines continue their 21st century rise, some animals appear to be falling below 
machine status. Factory farming methods have brought beef cattle to new levels of 
abjection. To ensure fast weight gain, cattle are prevented from exercising, given corn-
based diets (instead of grass), and injected with growth hormones. Many cattle succumb 
to immune system and digestive track difficulties because of crowded conditions, limited 
mobility and modified diet. Farmers administer medicine to counter the effects of factory-
farming techniques. The result is cheap but fat-and-chemical-filled beef, a poor quality 
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substitute for the beef produced by cattle who roam fields and feed on grass.55 Similar 
methods are applied when raising chickens and pigs. Animals destined for the human 
plate are poorly maintained meat machines. 
When nonhuman, living beings are enmeshed in technological mechanisms, the 
resulting mix of animate and inanimate material can turn into new levels of abjection. 
Though technically not an animal-machine combination, a new fusion of bacteria and 
silicon illustrate the nonhuman cyborg’s degraded status.  
Long before the invention of cyborgs, animals and bacteria lived in intimate if 
unrecognized association. Bacteria are the bane and blessing of mammal life. They both 
sicken and nourish us. These microscopic organisms live on our skin and in our mouths, 
stomachs and intestines.56 If it were possible to extract them from our bodies, they would 
weigh over two pounds.57 The bacteria we host play a crucial role in helping us break 
down food and convert it into nutrients and energy. 
The abundance of bacteria and their ability to reproduce in a variety of environments 
makes them an object of interest for bio-engineers. The emerging clean-energy industry 
hopes to enlist bacteria in the production of biofuels. Bacteria are also included in 
cybernetic systems. The Cellborg, a highly accurate humidity sensor, relies on the 
unique corporeal characteristics of bacteria. The sensor is created by covering a silicon 
chip with live Bacilus cereus bacteria. The chip-bacteria combination is then immersed in 
“a solution containing tiny gold particles, each one about 300 nanometers across.” The 
gold particles attach to “hair-like proteins” on the bacteria, turning the gold-plated 
bacteria into a circuit that conducts electricity. When humidity levels rise, the bacteria 
swell, diminishing the gap between them and consequently increasing electron flow 
through the circuit. Changes in conductivity, caused by expanding and contracting 
bacteria bodies, allow unusually precise humidity measurement. The Cellborg’s 
sensitivity exceeds that of purely mechanical sensors.58  
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2.4 Cellborg humidity sensor.59 
 
The bacteria die within two days, but their bodies continue to respond to humidity 
fluctuations for months. Bacteria caught in cybernetic mechanisms—immobilized and 
used for the minute expansions and contractions of their bodies—seem particularly 
abject cyborgs. Even in death, they are unable to escape the system’s control. The 
Cellborg’s measurements of humidity are achieved through instrumentalized living-dead 
biological matter. 
Laboratory animals are also transformed into abject cyborgs. Andrew Schwartz heads 
a research project at the University of Pittsburgh, School of Medicine that tests brain 
interfaces on monkeys. 96 electrodes are inserted into a monkey’s brain in order to read 
motor cortex signals. The electrodes become a direct interface to neurons that fire when 
the monkey tries to move his arms. A prosthetic robot arm is connected to the electrode 
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inputs and the monkey’s arms are restrained in plastic tubes. The monkey 
accommodates his new phenomenology by using his motor-cortex interface to maneuver 
the robotic arm. With his arms immobile, his robotic arm delivers food to his mouth.  
Schwartz notes that the placement of electrodes and the algorithmic interpretation of 
motor movement do not need to be very precise. The monkey conforms to the 
constraints of the cybernetic system: his “brain actually adapts its neural signal to be 
closer to the algorithm.”60 The monkey’s body also adapts to his cyborgian 
transformation. When the monkey’s arms are first restrained, they “twitch” with the 
expectation of grabbing food, but after a day of restraint, his arms become limp, without 
any anticipatory motion.  
 
 
2.5 Augmented Monkey, University of Pittsburgh.61 
 
These research efforts are promoted as experiments that someday may restore lost 
mobility to human paraplegics. Such research could improve the lives of many people. 
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But the animals incorporated in these experiments seem particularly abject—a monkey, 
fully capable of movement, is required to submit to invasive surgery, house cranial 
implants, and accommodate unwieldy augmentation. Some online images of the 
cyborgian monkey carefully crop out the animal’s restrained arms and all images 
conceal the multi-electrode brain interface. These promotional photographs seem 
designed for popular media consumption—they diminish the monkey’s corporeal 
modifications and foreground the spectacle of animal-machine integration.  
Outside the laboratory, cyborgian animals find their bodies similarly modified to serve 
human needs. Zapped!, a project developed by the art collective Preemptive Media, 
enlists cockroaches in a fictional attack on Wal-Mart’s RFID-enabled inventory system. 
Preemptive Media sees RFID technology as a serious threat to individual privacy—some 
RFID tags can be encoded and decoded simply by being in close proximity to an RFID 
reader. This gives unscrupulous institutions the ability to secretly monitor, update and 
track RFID-tags carried by a person or animal. To frustrate the adoption of RFID 
technology in Wal-Mart's inventory system, the collective imagined a scenario in which 
they attached RFID tags encoded with bad data to cockroaches and set the roaches 
loose in a Wal-Mart warehouse. With a little luck, the roaches' bad data would be 
scanned and transferred into Wal-Mart's inventory system.  
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2.6 Preemptive Media, Zapped!62 
 
The project provides an amusing image of cyborgian animal frustrating corporate 
command-and-control technologies. The lowly roach disrupts the latest procedural 
innovation. Yet, the collective’s take on technology is at times reductive: technology’s 
ambiguous mix of light and dark is lost in their enthusiastic negation. And the cockroach 
is coerced into serving the needs of propaganda. Permanently gluing an RFID tag to a 
roach radically alters his mobility. For the project to succeed, the roach needs to freely 
scuttle around Wal-Mart’s warehouse. The collective appears unconcerned that RFID 
augmentation might inhibit roach movement. The cockroach’s body is just another 
material employed for artistic effect. 
2.4 Conclusion 
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Cyborgian animals reveal the complicated nature of intimate human-animal-machine 
assemblages. Cybernetic systems promise enhanced cognition and performance, yet 
what they deliver is far more complex. Technologies like Crittercam gather new 
information about animal behavior, but they also alter an animal’s embodiment and 
possibly his behavior. These technologies promote their immediacy—we almost see 
through the animal’s eyes—but we gain this immediacy only through a high degree of 
mediation. Hours of video footage may generate new knowledge, but they also miss 
important details of the animal’s world. A single camera cannot fully convey embodied 
experience or the social dynamics of a pack or herd; our mediated methods may hide as 
much as they reveal.  
Cyborgs not only alter the way we see and know, they also change our sense of 
subjectivity. Haraway highlights the cyborg’s political potential. The fusion of animal and 
machine challenges binary oppositions and presents the possibility of altered identities. 
The animal cyborg, however, seems less empowered than Haraway’s human cyborg. 
Some cybernetic systems accommodate animal concerns—Lely and SNiF, for example, 
design products that support animal health—but these systems also discipline their 
animal participants. In general, animals serve human priorities when they are 
incorporated into cybernetic systems. Cyborgian animals become instruments in the 
pursuit of profit, propaganda, aesthetic experimentation and entertainment. Rarely do 
cybernetic systems focus primarily on animal concerns; an auratic cyborg is hard to find. 
Even when an animal is the central spectacle of a cybernetic system, he remains 
strangely peripheral—he is the main performer, but his status is uncertain. Animal 
cyborgs find their desires both acknowledged and denied. They are simultaneously 
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The three dialectics—procedurality and irreducibility, autonomy and integration, aura 
and abjection—bring the ambivalent status of the clone to the fore. These dialectics 
frame key questions that are invoked by the clone’s arrival: What is life? What is 
subjectivity? And what is identity?  
Genetic essentialism argues that life is primarily governed by information. An 
ambivalent approach emphasizes the importance of materiality and context along side 
code. Cloned animals both support and refute the claims of an informational body. 
These animals illustrate the influence and limitations of genetics.  
Animals that participate in biotechnology’s innovations claim an ambiguous 
subjectivity. Their bodies are elevated to human-like status—an animal's body acts as 
proxy for the human body; we assume a successful technique applied to mouse or ape 
can be applied to humans. At the same time, animal bodies are seen as less than 
human. They suffer the effects of imperfect and often violent biotech procedures. At one 
moment they are equivalent to the human, and at the next moment they become 
subhuman objects.   
Finally, the clone is an emblem of identity’s stability and contingency. The clone’s 
perceived informational perfection promises continuity—the ability to achieve immortality 
through replication. An alternative view sees the clone as a way to generate new 
possibilities. Hidden multiplicities and unrealized “becomings” can be tested out with 
each instantiation of the code.  
 
3.1 Irreducibility & Procedurality 
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3.1.1 Genetic Essentialism and Material Variation 
Before the age of genetics, a clone was an exact replica of an existing body. In the 
cultural imagination, a clone matched the original in form and character. Contemporary 
biotech clones, however, house a copy of the original’s genome. DNA sequences rather 
than corporeal resemblance determine clone status. A clone may or may not reproduce 
the original’s appearance and behavior, but his genetic code must match the original’s 
code. Life becomes a product of information—alter the information and change life; copy 
the information and create a clone. Genetic essentialism follows in the wake of an 
idealized, informational body—genes define identity and presence, genotype is 
privileged over phenotype. With genetic codes at the center, biological matter becomes 
plastic. Flesh is a new medium to explore.  
Despite the clone’s association with genetic essentialism, he is also aligned with the 
contingency of materiality. A clone is a new body born at a particular moment—his 
biology, experience and behavior are separated from the original’s body and history. A 
clone inhabits a new context and responds to a changing environment. He is like the 
original but still different, attached yet distinct. When a clone matches and deviates from 
the original, he simultaneously supports and refutes the power of genetic codes. Gilles 
Deleuze’s celebrates the difference that each repetition of form brings. He emphasizes 
identity’s fluidity. Extending Deleuze’s philosophy to the clone argues that each 
instantiation of DNA code generates unexpected desires and innovations. The clone 
becomes something other than a copy; he explores an alternative identity.  
This conflicted clone is both quantifiable code and uncertain material “becoming.” He 
represents an epistemological clash. At one moment, he suggests idealized codes are 
the essence of corporeality. At the next moment, he argues that code can never capture 
the complexity of life. He is a copy created through procedural innovation but also an 
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individual with contingent corporeality and unrepeatable experience. He joins idealism 
and materiality in an uneasy alliance.  
The debates of idealism and materiality are long-standing. In ancient Greece, Plato 
following Socrates proposes that “pure knowledge” is detached from the bias of sense-
based interpretations. The highest forms lie outside bodily perceptions; ideas precede 
material instantiation. Our earthly attempts to create beauty, maintain justice or discover 
truth are based on pre-existing abstractions of beauty, justice and truth.1 Plato seeks out 
immutable essences that he calls Forms. These Forms are eternal, existing above and 
beyond our earthly attempts at beauty, justice or truth. The material world and our 
sense-based knowledge are unsubstantiated opinions when compared with 
transcendental Forms. For Plato, the material world provides a partial knowledge; Forms 
contain the ultimate truth. If Deleuze celebrates the difference that each copy of Form 
engenders; Plato sees variation as evidence of degradation. Our attempts to create 
beauty, justice or the good always fall short of the ideal Forms of Beauty, Justice and the 
Good.2 
Plato promotes a priori knowledge as the surest knowledge. Aristotle, former student 
of Plato, rejects his teacher’s Forms in favor of an a posteriori understanding of the 
world. Materiality not idealism underpins Aristotle’s philosophy. We develop universal 
truths through inductive and deductive reasoning based on our experience of the world. 
Aristotle’s emphasis on materiality lays the groundwork for a “demonstrable” science that 
seeks generalization through studying specific instances. 3 The particular is no longer a 
degraded copy of the Forms, but becomes a important object of inquiry. Aristotle 
explains his material approach: 
‘But,’ it might seem to some, ‘it is better to get to know the Idea with a view to 
the good that we can possess and pursue action; for if we have this as a sort of 
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pattern, we shall also know better about the goods for us, and if we know about 
them, we shall hit on them.’ 
This argument does indeed have some plausibility, but it would seem to clash 
with the sciences. For each of these, though it aims at some good and seeks to 
supply what is lacking, proceeds without concern for knowledge of the Idea; and 
if the Ideas were such an important aid, surely it would not be reasonable for 
craftsmen to be ignorant and not even to look for it. 
Moreover, it is a puzzle to know what the weaver or carpenter will gain for his 
own craft for knowing the Good Itself, or how anyone will be better at medicine or 
generalship from having gazed on the Idea Itself. For what the doctor appears to 
consider is not even health [universally, let alone good universally], but human 
beings’ health, even more than that, presumably, this human being’s health, 
since it is particular patients he treats.4 
The philosophical differences of Plato and Aristotle are explored anew in the age of the 
Enlightenment. This time rationalists promote transcendence and empiricists argue for 
immanence. Rene Descartes replaces Plato’s Forms with an analytical mind. Like Plato, 
Descartes distrusts external sensory perceptions, favoring instead interior reason.5 
Descartes’ truth resides in the purity of mathematical models and introspective thought. 
Form is quantified and elegant abstractions ground the messiness of the physical world. 
6 David Hume counters Descartes rationality with an understanding of the world that 
arises in observation and inductive experimentation. Hume argues that the sense 
experience determines our understanding of the world; a priori hypotheses do not 
transcend experience but rather emerge from our material interactions in the world.7  
Biology combines both material and idealistic methods. Darwin’s theory of evolution 
rejects an idealized human form created in the image of a transcendent God. Humans 
are no longer mortal copies of God’s eternal Form, instead they are mutable animals 
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altered by environmental changes and biological mutations. When evolution is 
supplemented by genetics, biology reclaims an idealism lost in Darwin’s material 
observations. Gregor Mendel’s analysis of inheritance follows a mathematical logic; 
recessive and dominant genes trade places as if obeying binary operators. The 
abstractions of Mendel’s model underpin Darwin’s material metamorphoses. Genetics 
provides an informational origin to evolution’s variation. The body begins to look as if it 
may be formed by the logic of code. 
The idealized, informational side of biology is expanded through the influence of 
physics and chemistry. 8 These disciplinary interactions create molecular biology and set 
the stage for the discovery of DNA’s double helix structure.9 Once DNA is established as 
the coding script of life, decoding DNA sequences becomes a central concern of 
research. By the end of the 20th century, the entire human genome is documented. This 
new book of life promises to reveal our past, present and future. Medicine and 
bioengineering promote soon-to-appear gene therapies and already-available diagnostic 
tests. Reading an individual’s genome reveals his ancestral roots10 and predicts his 
tendency to succumb to a particular disease. Code circumscribes the body. DNA 
sequences, like a Form, exist before the body is fully developed and determine 
embryonic growth and postnatal state; information underpins bodily form and function. 
Yet biology’s embrace of idealism does not mean that materialism is entirely 
discarded. Genetic sequences may be inspired by Cartesian abstractions but they are 
validated through material manipulations.11 Body and environment continue to exert 
influence on genetic code. Plato’s Forms and Aristotle’s materiality reside side by side in 
biotech labs. The clones created in these labs are the products of idealized code and 
contingent materiality. Contemporary cloning procedures are far removed from the 
abstractions and rhetoric of genetic essentialism. Clones are born only after tremendous 
effort and great waste. Often the copy deviates from the original’s form and behavior. 
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Each material instantiation of DNA reveals complex interactions of code, flesh and 
environment.  
3.1.2 Biotech’s Transcendence and Immanence 
Biotech employs procedures that are both transcendent and immanent. Eugene 
Thacker argues that the interactions between cybernetics and biology during the last 
century combined “nature and artifice” to the point that “there is no extratechnological, 
preinformatic biology. All biology is informatic from the beginning.” This new 
informational body, however, is always tied to materiality: 
…it is a primary strategy of the biotech industry to insist on a dual aspect of ‘life 
itself’: biology is at once the ‘stuff of life’ and essentially informatic. Not only is 
biology accounted for via informatics, but informatics is always qualified by 
biological materiality.12 
Thacker notes that biotech’s informational manipulations are always directed at 
material transformations. DNA’s genetic sequence can “stand in for the subject” but at 
the same time “all information derives from and culminates in some form of biological 
materiality, such as lab-grown tissues, cell cultures, or genetically engineered 
plasmids.”13 
Biotech’s cloning process also participates in this mingling of idealized code and 
physical flesh. In 1996, Ian Wilmut led a research team that cloned the sheep Dolly, the 
first mammal to be cloned from an adult cell. Creating Dolly required patience, attention 
to detail, and a certain amount of luck. Dolly was born only after hundreds of 
unsuccessful attempts.14 The physical process of cloning—combining adult cell with 
unfertilized, nucleus-free egg, triggering cell grow, and implanting the resulting 
blastocyst into a surrogate mother—is more art than automated process. For most 
species of animals, every successful clone birth requires a hundred or more failed 
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attempts.15 Producing a copy of an informational body is far removed from the elegance 
of mathematical models or the computational processes of copying and pasting. Instead, 
cloning procedures tend to be complicated and uncertain. Biologists working in labs 
know only too well the material constraints of informational bodies. Their successes are 
often hard won and difficult to explicate and proceduralize. Eckhard Wolf notes the 
mysterious nature of the mechanism that reverts somatic cell to pluripotent status in the 
cloning of cows: 
After nuclear transfer, something fascinating happens that we reproductive 
biologists have not yet fully understood. The nucleus that heretofore had been 
totally specialized to take over the function of a mammal gland cell is 
reprogrammed. It is rejuvenated and transformed into nuclear cell able to activate 
the programming for all potential organ functions.16 
Wolf reveals the limits of contemporary biotechnology knowledge but also promotes a 
biomechanical and informational view of the body. He invokes the metaphors of 
programming while acknowledging the mystery of nuclear DNA metamorphosis.  
The difficulty of turning cloning procedures into efficient and consistent methods is 
illustrated by the fortunes of Genetic Saving and Clone (GSC), the first company to offer 
commercial cloning of domestic cats. After cloning just a few cats, the company shut 
down in 2006. It never became a profitable company despite charging $50,000 for each 
cloned cat. GSC found cloning pets difficult to commercialize: complex lab procedures 
never achieved assembly-line efficiency and demand for cloned pets failed to 
materialize. The idealized vision of perfect biological copies confronted the complexities 
of materiality and markets.  
Genetic Saving and Clone encountered another material complication when it set out 
to clone dogs. John Sperling and Lou Hawthorne founded GSC with the goal of cloning 
Hawthorne’s mother’s dog, Missy.17 This goal was hampered by species-specific 
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difficulties—cloning a dog is a particular complex task.  
General procedures for mammal cloning involve removing the nucleus from an ovum 
and injecting into the ovum the nucleus of a cell taken from an adult animal.  The ovum 
and nucleus are fused and encouraged to begin cell growth with an electrical shock or 
chemical stimulant. The ovum grows in vitro before being implanted in a surrogate 
mother. A dogs’ estrus cycle—her fertility cycle—is infrequent and inconsistent. 
Unpredictable ovulation makes ovum extraction difficult. Most mammal ovaries release a 
mature egg; canine ovaries send out an ovum that is not fully developed—it matures 
while descending the fallopian tube. Extracting the ovum at exactly the right moment is 
more difficult when there’s a possibility the egg is not fully mature. Even if an ovum is 
extracted at the right moment, the egg is viable only for two or three hours after reaching 
maturity. The cloning process is further complicated by the physical properties of dog 
ovaries. Most mammalian ovaries are translucent. Canine ovaries, however, are 
opaque—a dark lipid obstructs the researcher’s view to the cell’s interior elements.18 
This small window of viability, irregularity of estrus cycle, and opacity of the ovum 
requires a skillful dance between lab workers, biological materials, and canine donors 
and surrogates. In 2005, almost a decade after Dolly was cloned, researchers at Seoul 
National University finally succeeded in creating Snuppy, the first dog clone. 
GSC closed its doors in 2006 without creating a clone of Missy. Some of the 
company’s employees migrated to BioArts International, a company that primarily clones 
livestock but recently added pet-cloning services to its offerings. BioArts with the help of 
Sooam Biotech Research Foundation was able in 2007-8 to create three Missy clones. 
GSC’s starting goal was finally achieved but only with the expertise of outside 
researchers and a total investment by John Sperling of around 20 million dollars.19  
Beyond the material hurdles of creating clones, the cultural conception of a clone is 
challenged by contemporary cloning procedures. A clone is thought to be a perfect 
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genetic copy of the original, but the clone’s genetic makeup is not an exact copy of the 
original. A clone could be created from a single donor—if both ovum and somatic cell are 
donated by the same animal—but often a clone is a product of three animals: somatic 
cell donor, egg donor, and surrogate mother. This mixed parentage makes the clone 
more of a hybrid than pure copy. At the genetic level, the clone combines nuclear DNA 
from the parent and mitochondrial DNA from the ovum. The surrogate mother’s health 
and diet also affect the clone’s body.20 Ian Wilmut hints at this hybridity when he notes 
that Dolly is “(almost) genetically identical” to the donor-cell parent: 
So Dolly and the ewe who provided the original nucleus have identical DNA but 
they do not have identical cytoplasm…although the cells in Dolly’s body are 
descended from a cell which mainly contained Scottish Blackface [breed of 
donor-cell parent] cytoplasm, that cell also contained some Finn-Dorset [breed of 
egg donor] cytoplasm surrounding the donor nucleus.21  
Wilmut is describing Dolly’s mix of nuclear DNA and mitochondrial DNA. Dolly’s 
nuclear DNA comes from the somatic cell donated by the sheep we think of as her 
double. Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is provided primarily by the ovum that houses the 
double’s nucleus. In Dolly’s case, the ovum and nucleus are donated by different sheep. 
A mammal is considered a clone when nuclear DNA is replicated; duplication of 
mitochondrial DNA is not viewed as necessary to attain clone status. The role of mtDNA 
in the functioning of an organism may not be as critical as nuclear DNA, yet it does affect 
corporeal characteristics. A clone created with the original’s mitochondrial and nuclear 
DNA would require a female donor who provides both ovum and somatic cell. A male 
clone would be impossible to create using contemporary cloning techniques. mtDNA’s 
inconsequential status—copying this particular genetic sequence is not required to be 
considered a clone—suggests the category of clone is culturally rather than genetically 
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defined. The clone as a close-but-not-exact genetic copy of her double reflects the 
material and cultural conditions of biotech labs.  
The above examples illustrate the complicated mix of code, culture and materiality that 
contribute to biotech procedures. Bioengineering keeps the tension of materiality and 
idealism in play. Thacker argues that a key difference between genetic and cybernetic 
idealism is that cybernetics tends to dematerialize the body while biotechnology places 
the body front and center. “Instead of being focused on disembodiment and virtuality, 
biotech research’s approach to informatics is toward the capacities of information to 
materialize bodies.” Information undergirds and drives the material, but the material is 
always the end goal.22 These interactions between code and body are critical to our 
understanding of the cloned animal. The dialectic of irreducibility and procedurality 
argues for a tempered view of the informational body, a view that embraces genetic 
code but also acknowledges the influence of environment and unrepeatable experience. 
This is a clone who engages with issues of transcendence and immanence and 
highlights the interdependence of information and body.  
3.2 Autonomy & Integration  
3.2.1 Human, Nonhuman Subjectivity 
A clone not only asks us to examine our ways of knowing and defining life, she also 
challenges our sense of subjectivity. She can never claim the original’s full autonomy 
and agency; the original has already charted that terrain. Yet she is a new body born at 
a different moment and as such maintains a degree of individuality. She is both attached 
to and separated from the original—this is her ambiguous status. In some ways, the 
clone’s diminished individuality echoes the limited subjectivity ascribed to animals. The 
human is individuated and the animal is an indistinct other. The human acts and the 
animal reacts. This division between human and nonhuman creates the central conflict 
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of several film versions of Jack Finney’s novel, The Body Snatchers. In each film a clone 
is viewed as something less than human. The first film, Invasion of the Body Snatchers, 
released in 1956, is set in Santa Mira, a fictional Californian suburb. The film’s 
protagonist Miles Bennell struggles to maintain his human identity when Santa Mira is 
taken over by alien life forms. This an unusual alien invasion that occurs through a 
process of cloning—large pods hidden in the homes of Santa Mira’s residents transform 
themselves into copies of the townspeople as they sleep. A resident’s memories and 
abilities are transferred to the clone, but his ego and emotion are removed during the 
duplication process. When the corporeal copy is complete, a clone emerges from the 
pod and the original human body is destroyed. 
Lacking human ego, the clones share a communal subjectivity. And without human 
emotion, they are eerily impassive, unable to express fear or anger. Harmony and 
cooperation instead of individualism and competition are the organizing principles of 
their culture.  
The template of The Body Snatchers is re-worked over the next fifty years in three 
Hollywood remakes: Invasion of the Body Snatchers, 1978; Body Snatchers, 1993; and 
Invasion, 2007. 23 The films are united in their depiction of a protagonist’s struggle to 
maintain his or her identity. And this struggle renders the alien other subhuman, a life 
force to be feared and destroyed. The ’90s copy of Body Snatchers illustrates the 
cheapness of alien life. Marti Malone, a teenage army brat, keeps her human identity by 
shooting her father and tossing her younger brother from a helicopter as it takes off. 
Both family members are expendable because they have become alien clones. Malone 
maintains her subjective position only by purging the alien others from her family. 
The most recent copy of Invasion released in 2007 is less certain of human superiority 
over alien life forms. The pull of alien communal culture is stronger than before. When 
aliens invade, human wars and terrorist attacks cease and unstable dictators relinquish 
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their power. The alien replacements halt the global flow of violence. Ben Driscoll, best 
friend of protagonist Carol Bennell, converts to alien status and tries to persuade Bennell 
to give up her human identity and integrate with the aliens: 
Have you seen the television? Have you read the newspapers? Seen what’s 
happening here, what we’re offering? A world without war, without poverty, 
without murder, without rape. A world without suffering. Because in our world, no 
one can to hurt each other or exploit each other or try to destroy each other, 
because in our world there is no other. 
Bennell is almost persuaded but continues to resist after she learns that her son, who 
is immune to the alien virus, would be destroyed if the aliens' invasion succeeds. A 
human’s innate selfishness has no place in alien culture.   
At the end of the film, after humans successfully challenge the invasion, war and 
conflict between humans begins anew. In the final scene, Bennell sips morning coffee 
while Driscoll, who has regained his human identity, reads aloud a newspaper report of 
fatalities in Iraq. As Driscoll’s words fade into the background, Bennell recalls the cynical 
opinion of a Russian diplomat she met before she battled alien invaders: 
In the right situation we are all capable of the most terrible crimes. Can you 
imagine a world where this was not so? Where every crisis does not result in new 
atrocities? Where every newspaper is not full of war and violence? This is to 
imagine a world where human beings cease to be human.24 
The human victory with its associated return to global violence questions the privileged 
position of human subjectivity. The film’s ending creates a moment of hesitation, a 
moment of doubt. This hesitation aligns with the sensibility of ambivalence. We are less 
certain of the inherent superiority of one life form over another; less confident that 
human subjectivity should be the central subjectivity. 
The body-snatcher films replay the desperate act of Western philosophy to privilege 
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humans over all other living entities. The human alone is truly autonomous; all other life 
forms are subject to our will. The foundational assumptions of our philosophies separate 
and distinguish human life from nonhuman life. The animal plays a critical role in this 
process. Aristotle’s scala naturae maps out the divisions in organic life. The first dividing 
line in his subject-object hierarchy is drawn between animated and inanimate objects—
there are rocks and then there are plants, animals and humans. Mobility increases one’s 
status; a rooted plant is ranked below ambulatory animals and humans. A wide range of 
activity and sophisticated sensual capabilities are traits of distinction in the animal 
kingdom. Unsurprisingly, the philosopher proclaims his own species the teleological 
zenith of nature. Humans inevitably take the top position in the hierarchy.25 Rene 
Descartes also makes clear distinctions between humans and animals. He views the 
animal as a soulless, biological machine. Animals act, according to Descartes, on 
instinct, manifesting neither cognitive insight nor human emotion.26 The human alone is 
worthy of subjectivity. 
This philosophical tradition, so critical to our understanding of human subjectivity, is 
challenged by contemporary cultural and technological changes. The informational body 
plays a part in our shifting sense of subjectivity. Biotechnology argues that animal bodies 
are equivalent to human bodies. Animals are used as human-body proxies; they play a 
critical role in the testing of pharmaceutical and gene therapies. Researchers assume a 
therapy that works on animals may also be effective for humans. Genomics also relates 
the animal other to the human. Popular discourse emphasizes the striking similarities 
between human and animal genomes. A chimpanzee, our closest genetic relative, differs 
from us in chromosomal code by less than two percentage points.27 The close 
association of animal and human bodies is evident in the political reaction to Dolly, the 
first mammal to be cloned from an adult cell. After Dolly’s birth, governments around the 
globe quickly moved to implement legislation that banned cloning of humans. This ban 
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makes apparent the cultural links between human and animal bodies—alterations to 
animal bodies are seen as foreshadowing soon-to-be human transformations.28 
Yet even as the animal’s informational body is aligned with the human, animal bodies 
are denied the status of human bodies. The same article that equates human and animal 
genomes often goes out of its way to note that minor genetic differences have profound 
effects. That is, despite similarities between species, the human retains unique—
meaning superior—qualities.  
The divide between animal and human bodies appears in the level of violence and 
suffering tolerated in the biological manipulations of animals. Death hangs over cloning 
procedures; contemporary techniques require significant waste. In many animal species, 
only one or two percent of cloning attempts result in viable clones. Along the way, eggs, 
embryos and newborn animals are sacrificed in the drive to replicate the original.  Ian 
Wilmut, lead researcher of the team that cloned Dolly, notes that “it is surely inhuman to 
think of doing this [cloning] with a human being.”29 Wilmut argues that the culture could 
not accept the level of destruction required to create human clones.  
The restrictions on human cloning and general acceptance of animal cloning illuminate 
the division between human and animal subjectivity. Derrida examines this division as 
he thinks through the animal "other." He highlights the anthropocentrism that influences 
the binary oppositions of Western thought. These oppositions are based on established 
hierarchies that promote one side at the expense of the other. The long-standing divide 
between humans and animals is driven by this binary logic.  
Derrida expands Saussure’s insight that the sign derives its meaning from its 
relationship to other signs. Difference is constructed in these relationships; that is, what 
a sign is not determines its signification. Derrida’s focus on difference leads him to 
imagine that the center could be replaced by the margin. This transfer of power, 
however, is temporary; one hegemonic system is not substituted for another. Instead 
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Derrida seeks out alternative subjectivities and ontologies that maintain the tension 
between opposing hierarchical systems. 30   
This approach acknowledges that the gap between human and nonhuman cannot 
easily be bridged by making animals and humans equivalent. Making the “other” a 
subject does not erase the limits of subjectivity; the subject, after all, is created through 
submission to a higher authority. Not to mention that leveling animal-human hierarchies 
ignores the differences between man and beast.31 And such a move would also suggest 
that human subjectivity is the only kind of subjectivity that counts.  
Leonard Lawlor, reviewing Derrida’s conception of the animal, argues for a new kind of 
human and animal subjectivity that holds in tension “biological continuism”—animals and 
humans are the same—and “transcendental separatism”—humans are essentially 
different (or superior) to nonhumans. Lawlor’s approach acknowledges difference while 
limiting animal suffering. Both he and Derrida speak of “twist[ing] free of Platonism,”32 
escaping the limits of a transcendental soul housed only by human bodies. Yet at the 
same time, they avoid a mere reversal of Platonism; they do not promote a biological 
equivalency that erases difference. Derrida explains this complex ontological terrain: 
I was dreaming of inventing an unheard-of grammar and music in order to make 
a scene which is neither human nor divine nor animal, with a view to denouncing 
all discourses of the so-called animal, all the anthropo-theomorphic or anthropo-
theocentric logics and axiomatics, philosophy, religion, politics, law, ethics, with a 
view to recognizing in them animal strategies, precisely, in the human sense of 
the term, stratagems, ruses, and war machines, defensive or offensive 
maneuver, search operations, predatory, seductive, indeed exterminatory 
operations as part of a pitiless struggle between what are presumed to be 
species. As if I were dreaming, I myself, in all innocence, of an animal that didn’t 
intend harm to the animal.33 
 68
The clone as both subject and object plays a part in this “unheard-of grammar.” He is 
both self and other; simultaneously he and me. When we confront the clone, we also 
confront the hierarchies and divisions of subjectivity. When the other is so much like me, 
can he remain the other? Who is the I who is also He? Even if I manage to reassert a 
unitary, independent subjectivity—quickly separating myself from the clone other—I’m 
likely to have a moment of doubt. My autonomy and agency are less certain. And like the 
characters in Invasion, I am less confident of the superiority of one life form over 
another. 
3.3 Aura and Abjection: Multiplicity 
Jean Baudrillard examines the altered presence of replicated objects. He argues that 
the simple act of creating a duplicate changes the status of both original and copy. As an 
example, Baudrillard points to a replica of Lascaux cave—a Lascaux copy built to protect 
the original from the damage of tourist traffic. “One glances through a peephole at the 
authentic cave, and then one visits the reconstituted whole.” But the copy not only 
preserves the original, it alters the famous cave. Creating a copy of the cave “suffices to 
render both [original and copy] artificial.”34 
Seeing the copy as a threat to authenticity is part of a long-standing tradition of cultural 
and philosophical discourse. Walter Benjamin’s examination of aura in an era of mass 
production addresses a cultural object’s changing status as it expands from one to 
many. For Benjamin, early artistic practice emerges from ritual—from sacred rites that 
encapsulate the values and aspirations of a particular culture. In a secular age, art is no 
longer consciously associated with the sacred, but its ritual aura remains. An artwork’s 
aura is linked to both its uniqueness and presence. An artwork’s path across space and 
time, its particular history and its current physical presence, give it aura. And for 
Benjamin, this history and presence bestow authenticity on the artwork.35  
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Benjamin writes that commodity culture detaches an artwork from its aura. “To pry an 
object from its shell, to destroy its aura, is the mark of a perception whose ‘sense of the 
universal equality of things’ has increased to such a degree that it extracts it even from a 
unique object by means of reproduction.”36 I’m interested in connecting Benjamin’s ideas 
of mechanical reproduction to some of the conceptual and technological shifts in biology. 
Programmable flesh creates a similar “universal equality” of biological material. Genetic 
sequences are extracted from an individual and replicated in a clone’s body. And a clone 
copy, like a photograph of a great work of art, is separated in time and space from the 
original—the clone engages with a different historical moment. Given Benjamin’s 
framework, the clone copy should appear as less authentic and auratic than the original. 
Yet central to such a framework is an unwavering belief in an essential and genuine 
identity. In the process of replication, this essential quality is threatened. 
Bolter, MacIntyre, Gandy and Schweitzer argue that Benjamin’s particular view of aura 
is tinged with loss. Benjamin describes nature’s aura as “a mountain range on the 
horizon or a branch which casts it shadow over you.” This aura is “a unique phenomenon 
of distance, however close it may be.” 37 Nature’s detached presence contrasts with the 
cheap availability of modern media. Bolter et al note: 
Benjamin’s nature analogy is heavy with nostalgia. Benjamin, an urban scholar of 
the twentieth century, chooses to describe aura as a moment of communing with 
nature in the absence of any media technologies. When Benjamin calls aura a 
feeling of distance however near, he is not only describing a desire for 
immediacy; he is also acknowledging that that desire cannot be fulfilled in an age 
of mechanical reproduction.38 
Benjamin’s longing for a more authentic identity and experience is countered by a 
Deleuzian view that privileges “becoming” over essence; difference determines identity 
rather than fidelity to an idealized template. Repetition in this framework becomes a 
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chance to explore new terrain. A clone can test out new roles. And with difference as the 
defining term, the clone(s) and original respond to each other, differentiating in the 
process. In this context, the clone does not invoke artificiality—there is no authentic self 
to restore—he simply participates in the play of multiplicity.  
The clone as an opportunity to explore hidden difference is the theme of the film 
Mulitplicity. Michael Keaton plays Doug Kinney, a harried contractor unable to keep up 
with the demands of work and family. Kinney meets a scientist who offers to reduce his 
stress by making a clone of Kinney. The clone would take on Kinney’s work 
responsibilities, giving Kinney more time to spend with his family. Kinney resists the 
scientist’s offer at first, but eventually decides to have a clone made. The clone that 
emerges is not a newborn child, but rather a copy that matches Kinney’s physical 
attributes as well as houses his memories and abilities. Yet this clone is not an exact 
copy; he is a more aggressive version of Kinney.  
At first the arrangement works well, Kinney finds time for his family and also his golf 
game. The clone goes to work and hides out at night in Kinney’s garage apartment. The 
clone soon tires of his all-work-and-no-play life and decides to have another clone made 
to keep him company. This clone explores another facet of Kinney’s personality—he 
plays the role of nurturer. The clone of the clone tends to domestic matters; cooking for 
the first clone and helping around the house. Eventually a third clone is created, and 
again the copy deviates from the original; the final clone is mentally challenged. 
The comedy and conflict of the film emerges as each clone engages with the world in 
ways that deviate from Kinney’s character. The aggressive clone fires a long-time 
coworker. He is unconcerned that the worker needs to support a family since he has no 
familial obligations himself. And Kinney’s wife is surprised at the enthusiasm the 
nurturing clone brings to domestic chores. Kinney's perceived erratic behavior—really 
the behavior of four different personalities—causes him to lose his job and nearly lose 
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his family. By the film's end, the clones help restore household harmony and leave 
Kinney’s care to pursue their own lives in another city.  
The films denouement could be seen as a tidy resolution to multiplicity’s complexity—
the many others are sent off to another city, returning Kinney to his unitary subjectivity. 
But despite this unexceptional ending, Multiplicity does challenge us to think of repetition 
as something other than a return of the same; repetition generates difference. Deleuze 
pursues a similar theme in his interpretation of Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence. Nietzsche 
proposes an alternative to linear time, he argues for each moment repeating itself, time 
folding back on itself. For Deleuze this is not an endless cycle but instead something 
closer to variation on a theme. Difference for Deleuze is the foundational principle 
shaping identity and repetition creates new "becomings": 
That identity not be first, that is exist as a principle but as a second principle, as a 
principle become; that it revolve around the Different: such would be the nature 
of a Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having its 
own concept, rather than being maintained under the domination of a concept in 
general already understood as identical. Nietzsche meant nothing more than this 
by eternal return. Eternal return cannot mean the return of the Identical because 
it presupposes a world (that of the will to power) in which all previous identities 
have been abolished and dissolved. Returning is being, but only the being of 
becoming. The eternal return does not bring back "the same," but returning 
constitutes the only Same of that which becomes. Returning is the becoming-
identical of becoming itself. Returning is thus the only identity, but identity as a 
secondary power; the identity of difference, the identical which belongs to the 
different, or turns around the different. Such an identity, produced by difference, 
is determined as "repetition." Repetition in the eternal return, therefore, consists 
in conceiving the same on the basis of the different.39 
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True to Deleuze’s insight, when the clone is perceived as repetition of the same, he 
often disappoints. The first cloned cat, Cc, resulted in a public relations fiasco for 
Genetic Savings and Clone. Cc was born a stripped tabby; the donor-cell adult, 
Rainbow, had orange calico fur.40 Cc’s failure to resemble the original called into 
question the cloning procedures. For multi-colored cats, fur patterns are determined by a 
combination of genetic and environmental factors: the genes required for orange 
markings were dormant in the donor cell used to make Cc;41 coat patterns are also 
affected by the position of the embryo in the womb.42 Variation emerges in the 
interactions of nature and nurture.  
Deleuze argues that generality is composed of two parts: “the qualitative order of 
resemblances and the quantitative order of equivalences.” Cc’s stripped fur falls into the 
“qualitative order” and her genome into the “quantitative.” Yet Deleuze argues that 
repetition is not generality—and Cc shows that the clone should not be thought of as a 
generalization of an idealized Form. Deleuze notes: 
Repetition as a conduct and as a point of view concerns non-exchangeable and 
non-substitutable singularities. Reflections, echoes, doubles and souls do not 
belong to the domain of resemblance and equivalence; and it is no more possible to 
exchange one’s souls than it is to substitute real twins for one another.43 
Eugene Holland contrasts Deleuze’s mutable repetition with the fixed repetition of 
Freud. If Deleuze sees the potential for new “becomings” in repetition, Freud argues that 
excessive repetition leads to neurosis. Holland sees this as the difference between 
materialist and metaphysical repetition. Deleuze’s materialist tendencies open up 
repetition to the singularities of each new instantiation. Freud’s metaphysical repetition 
seeks to return to the same. Holland notes that "repetition of the same constitutes a 
static neurotic form of pleasure fixed on the past, the repetition of difference takes 
pleasure in variation, ramification, improvisation.”44 
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When metaphysical filters frame materialist “becomings,” unexpected oscillations and 
contradictions emerge. The case of a cloned bull illustrates these effects. Ralph and 
Sandra Fisher run a show-animal business in Texas. They hire out their horses, cattle 
and armadillos to theme parties, conventions, commercials and parades.45 The star of 
their menagerie was a Brahman bull named Chance—an unusually sociable and gentle 
bull. Before Chance died, the Fishers had some of Chance’s cells frozen and stored at a 
Texas A & M cloning lab (the same lab that created Cc for Genetic Savings and Clone). 
After Chance’s passing, the Fishers persuaded the lab to create a clone of their 
deceased bull. They named Chance’s double Second Chance.  
At first, Second Chance seemed an uncanny duplicate of Chance. When the Fishers 
brought Second Chance home, the calf immediately went to Chance’s favorite spot in 
the front yard and lay down there. The original’s habitual resting place was occupied by 
the copy without any prompting, something the Fishers found a little “spooky.” Second 
Chance also inherited Chance’s unusual eating style—both bulls raised their heads and 
closed their eyes when chewing their food. And the cloned calf was instantly fond of 
Ralph Fisher. Ralph states: “I thought it was the same animal. I would say…'We got him 
back.'” 
The happy “reunion” lasted a while, but on Second Chance’s fourth birthday, the bull 
attacked Ralph. Ralph’s shoulder was dislocated, and he narrowly avoided serious 
injury. A year and half later a second attack occurred, this time Ralph was seriously 
injured and required hospitalization. Despite the attacks, Ralph still believes that given 
time Second Chance will acquire Chance’s gentle nature. He bought Chance when the 
bull was seven years old and speculates that Chance may have been aggressive in his 
youth; he argues that many animals settle down as they age. If Second Chance’s 
aggression continues past the age of seven, then, and only then, will Ralph concede that 
the cloned bull is different than Chance.  
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Mark Westhusin, researcher at the Texas A & M lab, understands the desire of pet 
owners to bring back to life their favorite animal. But he emphasizes the difference 
between original pet and cloned animal: “People want to believe that it is resurrection 
sometimes. And it is in fact not resurrection. It’s just…it’s reproduction.” Westhusin 
explains that a clone is the equivalent of an identical twin; it’s genetically similar but may 
not look or act the same as the original.46  
Ralph Fisher’s belief in the power of genetic codes blinds him to the possibility that 
Second Chance may never be the same as Chance. Baudillard states that “when the 
double materializes, when it becomes visible, it signifies imminent death.”47 For 
Baudrillard this is not death of the original body but rather death of a ghostly double. 
“Everyone can dream, and must have dreamed his whole life, of a perfect duplication or 
multiplication of his being, but such copies only have the power of dreams and are 
destroyed when one attempts to force the dream into the real.”48 Second Chance’s 
violent attacks suggest that Chance’s soul cannot be revived—genetic codes do not 
completely capture the presence of Chance. For now, Ralph Fisher continues to believe 
that the genes transferred from Chance to Second Chance make both bulls identical. He 
clings to a fixed metaphysical repetition and ignores the materialist “becoming” of 
Second Chance. Following Deleuze, the clone is not more of the same—though at times 
the copy may be strikingly similar to the original. The clone represents instead a 
repetition founded on difference, a return with variation. Each material instantiation 
provides the potential to explore a new kind of existence.   
3.4 Conclusion 
The clone dances between the forces of idealism and materialism. He serves as 
evidence of life’s informational underpinning and also as emblem of the contingency of 
biological manipulations. The idealized procedures of biotechnology imagined in popular 
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culture omit the material messiness of the cloning process. Material and cultural 
constraints temper the effects of information's dominance. 
The clone challenges human and animal divisions. Animal clones incorporate biotech 
procedures that may one day be transferred to human bodies. As a result, human and 
animal flesh become equivalent. Yet despite this close affiliation, animal subjectivity is 
denied. Animals remain expendable objects that suffer the violence of biological 
manipulation. Derrida argues that the suffering of animals calls for a rethinking of human 
and animal subjectivity. This new subjectivity neither ignores the differences between 
species nor extends a transcendental essence to the human. Instead it seeks to weaken 
the power of binary oppositions and imagine less violent human-animal interactions.  
As a copy, the clone may be viewed as artificial or secondary. From a Freudian view, 
he could be seen as a corporeal symbol of neurotic fixation. Yet the clone need not be 
more of the same. The influence of materiality and context argue that a clone explores a 
new kind of “becoming.” The clone's repetition of genetic code may lead to variation. In 
this Deleuzian framework, the clone is re-imagined as an opportunity to explore hidden 
multiplicity. The clone participates in the possiblity of becoming. 
The projects of Derrida and Deleuze challenge in part the foundations of Plato's 
philosophy. Deleuze argues that "[o]verturning Platonism, then, means denying the 
primacy of original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and 
reflections."49 The clone participates in this challenge to the traditions of identity and 
subjectivity. It represents both continuity and change and blurs the line between subject 
and object. The clone argues for new kinds of ontologies—ways of being, seeing, and 
thinking that do not easily conform to the oppositions of idealism and materialism or 
autonomy and integration. A framework of ambivalence seeks to hold these dialectics in 
tension while welcoming the clone's alterity. 
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CHAPTER 4  
CHIMERA 
Integration of difference is an everyday occurrence in contemporary culture. The urban 
centers of most industrialized nations are lively multiethnic spaces. Global manufacturing 
produces a variety of products formed from transnational capital, labor and materials. In 
the humanities and sciences, disciplinary fields overlap and blend together to create new 
domains of knowledge like bioinformatics, astrophysics and comparative literary and 
cultural studies. Cultural production also foregrounds eclectic combinations—food 
(fusion cuisine), fashion (contemporary vintage), architecture (Calatrava’s sculptural, 
biomorphic buildings), music (trip-hop) and art (Takeshi Murakami’s anime-inspired fine 
art) all promote unusual juxtapositions and mergers.  
This hybrid sensibility is often noted as a distinguishing trait of postmodernity—a 
movement that discounts modernity’s essentialism and embraces the dynamism of 
fusion and multiplicity. Postmodern hybridity is driven by contradictory desires. 
Welcoming the outsider into the fold can be both progressive and patronizing. The 
dominant culture seeks new signs, tastes, experiences and knowledge and finds them in 
the marginalized “other.” This celebration of difference sometimes leads to productive 
transformations—the civil rights movement illustrates the possibility of slow but real 
material and cultural change. At other times, the mixing of difference does little to disrupt 
the status quo; the outsider is integrated to serve the interests of the dominant culture. 
Witness the rapid metamorphosis of Hip Hop from oppositional music to mainstream 
pop-music success. Or, note the co-option of punk-rock style detached from its anarchic 
roots and marketed by the fashion industry to affluent teenagers.1   
The chimera is at home in the contradictory space of postmodernity. Oscillating 
between rebellion and submission, the chimera is simultaneously a triumph of Deleuzian 
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becoming and a pawn of Foucauldian biopower. He represents unbounded and 
unconventional alterity but also succumbs to—perhaps even celebrates—social and 
economic imperatives. In biotech research, the chimera breaks species barriers and 
challenges the hierarchies of human culture. The biotech chimera promotes the concept 
of a universal flesh; he possesses an unconventional body that integrates nonhuman 
and human genes and transcends traditional biological barriers. At the same the chimera 
demonstrates the reach of power. His corporeal and subjective innovations are designed 
to serve the economic interests of multinational capital. His arrival subverts the divisions 
between humans and animals, yet he is primarily born to serve human needs and 
desires. Though the chimera shares biological mechanisms with the human, he is 
always restricted from full participation in human subjectivity. These contradictions make 
the chimera an ambiguous symbol. He represents liberation, innovation and rebellion but 
also abuse, conformity and maladapted abjection. 
4.1 Irreducibility & Procedurality: Informational Bodies 
Humans have long altered animals through domestication, breeding and behavior 
modification. These practices require extensive human and animal cooperation and tend 
to be slow moving and uncertain endeavors; selective breeding and training regimes 
may or may not produce the desired outcome in a consistent or timely manner. The 
arrival of the biotech chimera signals a change in the scale and scope of human-lead 
modifications to animals. It also represents a shift in biology’s view of the body. 
Contingent methods to modify animal bodies and behavior give way to quantifiable, 
code-driven techniques. This new biology perceives information as the essence of life; 
all flesh is underpinned by genetic codes. Flesh is reduced to genetic sequences, those 
sequences are spliced and rearranged, and new flesh is created through the 
reconfigured code.  
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Informational biology hopes to achieve speedy, precise and repeatable methods of 
corporeal manipulation. These info-techniques are aligned with the market objectives of 
agriculture, energy and medicine. They promise innovations in food, bio-fuels and health 
while also expanding markets and increasing profits. But beneath the utopian visions of 
biotechnology, dystopian possibilities lurk. Perceiving the body as decodable-encodable 
information ignores the irreducibility of lived experience. The complexity and richness of 
life is subsumed under the logic of genetic code. And increasingly refined and intimate 
bioengineering techniques make the body susceptible to new forms of regulation and 
abuse. Political, social and economic imperatives threaten to shape the form and 
function of these bio-innovations. Informational biology’s procedural methods 
encapsulate the best and worst tendencies of technology and capital.  
The effects of informational biology can be seen in a variety of genetically modified 
plants and animals. Biotechnology aims for a new kind of corporeal plasticity. Traditional 
species barriers are routinely breached; researchers combine human, animal and plant 
genes to create chimeric novelties. The GloFish®, a genetically modified Zebra Fish, 
serves as an example of biotechnology’s efforts. In the wild, Zebra Fish are black and 
silver, GloFish®, however, are marked with saturated red, orange or green streaks. Their 
atypical coloring is the result of inserting sea anemone or jellyfish genes into Zebra Fish 
zygotes. The genes produce fluorescent proteins that alter the hatched fish’s color. Once 
the fish are genetically modified, they produce offspring that inherent their parents’ 
fluorescent colors. The transgenic fish sell for five times the cost of non-modified Zebra 
Fish.2 Genetically modified mice serve as another example of chimeric innovation. Mice 
embryos are altered to include human neurons as well as human immunological cells.3 
Knock-out mice have specific genes removed from their genome to help researchers 
determine the effect of a particular gene on phenotype. These transformations of the 
mouse’s genome serve the interests of medical research—the mouse is often at the 
 85
forefront of bioengineering experiments designed to test remedies for human cancer and 
disease. Millions of mice and other rodents are enlisted in the research of labs around 
the globe.4  
4.1.1 Informational Biology’s Alliance with Cybernetics 
Transgenic creatures are often developed with the assistance of sophisticated 
cybernetic systems that analyze, store, manipulate and reproduce genetic codes. 
Cybernetics’ association with biology is nothing new. Norbert Weiner’s foundational 
writings on cybernetics never limited the logic of feedback loops to machines. His vision 
always included biological and mechanical systems: “We have decided to call the entire 
field of control and communication theory, whether in the machine or in the animal, by 
the name Cybernetics…”5 Wiener used the body’s mechanisms as a template for the 
components of cybernetic systems: “It has long been clear to me that the modern ultra-
rapid computing machine was in principle an ideal central nervous system to an 
apparatus for automatic control; and that its input and output need not be in the form of 
numbers and diagrams, but might very well be, respectively, the readings of artificial 
sense-organs such as photo-electric cells or thermometers, and the performance of 
motors or solenoid.”6 The body’s structure—its central nervous system, sense organs, 
and musculature—inspire the computation, sensor inputs and actuators of cybernetic 
systems. 
As computational cybernetic systems matured, they not only borrowed from biological 
mechanisms but also influenced the research of biologists. The embodied concerns of 
Weiner’s cybernetics were often surpassed by an interest in the computer’s ability to 
store, sort and retrieve data, generate models of real-world processes, and assist in the 
automation of genetic manipulations. Mapping something as complex as the human 
genome—3.4 billion base pairs—requires a series of labor-saving tools and procedures. 
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One such procedure is capillary electrophoresis, a method of recording DNA sequences 
that uses laser beams to detect florescent dyes attached to nucleotides. The color codes 
are read and translated into DNA sequences with the help of computers. DNA chips also 
assist in the analysis of genetic data. These chips are inspired by microchips that pack 
millions, sometimes billions, of transistors on a silicon wafer. DNA chips house hundreds 
to thousands of single-strand DNA sequences arranged in a grid pattern. The genetic 
material being studied is denatured (the double helix structure is broken into single 
strands) and tagged with fluorescent markers. When a denatured strand lines up with a 
known genetic sequence attached to the DNA chip, the denatured strand’s florescent 
maker is detected by scanners. Since the genetic material’s sequence is the 
complementary code of the known DNA strand on the chip, it can be easily decoded.7 All 
of these procedures require a certain degree of material manipulation—particularly in the 
preparation of biological materials before analysis—but these material processes are 
complemented and often framed by the capabilities of digital applications. 
Biotechnology’s focus on genetic code requires sophisticated data processing—digital 
technologies scan, read, sort and store massive amounts of genetic data. Biology 
accesses the hidden information of the body through the tools and techniques of 
cybernetic systems.  
4.1.2 Platonic Forehand 
The alliance of cybernetics and informational biology extends beyond hardware and 
software affinities. Both fields have a tendency to view underlying codes as the essence 
of materiality. An informational body is closely tied to the mechanisms and logic of 
cybernetic systems. Eugene Thacker argues that the conceptual foundations of 
biotechnology are aligned with the framework of cybernetics. He notes: “The common 
notions of a genetic ‘code’ derive from a tradition in molecular biology (indeed, a tradition 
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that is molecular biology) of appropriating concepts from cybernetics and information 
theory into the biological sciences.”8 
The influence of code suggests that the complexity of life emerges in biology’s genetic 
data or in cybernetics’ programmable rules. Katherine Hayles’ examination of Artificial 
Life (AL) research sheds light on the bottom-up approach that inspires both informational 
biology and cybernetics. AL research models evolutionary scenarios using computer 
simulations. Often virtual creatures “mate” and “mutate” as part of an algorithmic natural 
selection process. These simulations test out biological mechanisms by condensing time 
and reducing material complexity. The slow results of natural selection in the physical 
world are replaced with sped-up transformations of virtual creatures and environments. 
Despite a variety of AL mediums—wetware, hardware and software—Hayles notes that 
each approach “shares[s] the sense of building life from the ‘bottom up.’” Software AL 
projects “begin with a few simple rules and then, through structures that are highly 
recursive, allow complexity to emerge spontaneously.” The living things of AL are born 
and modified through algorithmic procedures. 
Hayles points out that the rhetoric of AL often equates algorithmically generated data 
with material life. The ontologies and associated naming conventions as well as 
contextualizing narratives of AL equate virtual life with biological life. Virtual creatures—
sometimes represented only by a limited sequence of binary numbers—are described as 
entities with autonomy and agency. Writing about Tierra, an AL program directed by 
Thomas Ray at the Santa Fe Institute, Hayles states: 
For them, genotype and phenotype amount to the same thing; the organism is the 
code, and the code is the organism. By representing them as phenotypes, visually 
by giving them three-dimensional bodies and verbally by calling them ‘ancestors,’ 
‘parasites,’ and such, Ray elides the difference between behavior, properly 
restricted to an organism, and execution of a code, applicable to the information 
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domain. In the process, our assumptions about behavior, in particular our thinking 
of it as independent action undertaken by purposive agents, are transported into the 
narrative.9 
These AL programs illustrate an overarching theme of Hayles’ research into cybernetic 
culture. Hayles argues that the logic of cybernetic systems encourages a new view of 
presence that privileges algorithm over material, code over embodiment. In the most 
extreme cases, the human subject is seen as a program built “to run on the cosmic 
computer.”10 “In the AL paradigm, the machine becomes the model for understanding 
the human.”11  
Hayles describes cybernetics’ bottom-up, rule-based approach as Platonic forehand. 
Theorists traditionally generalize through observation and experimentation in the 
physical world (Platonic backhand); they abstract from the “world’s noisy multiplicity.” 
Platonic forehand, however, inverts this approach, creating the complexity of everyday 
life from abstracted rules. This approach is made possible through the use of powerful 
computers—it “starts from simplified abstractions and, using simulation techniques such 
as genetic algorithms, evolves a multiplicity sufficiently complex that it can be seen as a 
world of its own.” 12 
The two moves thus make their play in opposite directions. The backhand goes 
from noisy multiplicity to reductive simplicity, whereas the forehand swings from 
simplicity to multiplicity. They share a common ideology—privileging the abstract 
as the Real and downplaying the importance of material instantiation. When they 
work together, they lay the groundwork for a new variation on an ancient game, 
in which disembodied information becomes the ultimate Platonic Form. If we can 
capture the Form of ones and zeroes in a nonbiological medium—say, on a 
computer disk—why do we need the body’s superfluous flesh?13 
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Hayles argues that divorcing information from its materiality alters the way we interpret 
the world. Once informational paradigms are applied to a range of disciplines, existence 
is defined as a “pattern rather than a presence.” That is, what is real (or valuable) is no 
longer a book, newspaper, web page or even a body, but an encodable/decodable 
pattern that can be applied across mediums and materials. Hayles sees our perception 
of reality shifting from a framework of absence and presence to pattern and 
randomness.14 Viewing our bodies as genetically defined patterns aligns with this 
paradigmatic shift. 
Yet despite the rise of pattern, biotechnology remains firmly attached to material 
presence. Eugene Thacker sees this as a defining contradiction of biotechnology:  
Modern biological thought always makes two demands of “life itself”: that it be 
essentially information (or pattern) and that it also be essentially matter (or 
presence). The tensions in this dual demand often lead to contradictory positions 
within the biotech industry.15 
As an example of this contradiction, Thacker points to the process of patenting 
biological materials. To be able to patent genetic sequences or modified organisms, a 
research company argues that these entities are artificial and constructed; they are 
“new, useful and nonobvious.” At the same time, to successfully market its products, the 
company promotes the natural, organic properties of their discoveries. The products 
developed by biotechnology are portrayed as both natural and artificial.16  
4.1.3 Synthetic Biology 
This unfamiliar oscillation between artificial and natural, pattern and presence, is 
evident in the rhetoric and research of biologists who hope to resuscitate the extinct 
mammoth. A recent discovery in the Siberian permafrost of a well-preserved mammoth 
corpse led some to speculate that mammoths might be brought back to life through 
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biotechnology. A National Geographic article describes four bio-techniques that might 
reanimate the species. The first two procedures are primarily material—they employ 
artificial insemination, cross breeding and cloning. These procedures combine preserved 
mammoth cells with living elephant cells and bodies, creating chimeras that merge 
extant and extinct species.  
The article suggests two other methods that have synthetic starting points. These 
Platonic forehand procedures generate genetic codes rather than extract biological 
material. The first synthetic method relies on the work of researchers at Pennsylvania 
State University who mapped 70 percent of the mammoth genome. The genome map 
was constructed using mammoth hair samples. The samples were too fragmented to 
provide a full genome sequence, so unreadable sections of the mammoth genome were 
supplemented with information from the elephant’s genome, the mammoth’s closest 
living relative. Researchers speculate that a complete mammoth genome could be 
recreated by modifying elephant DNA. Modifying the elephant’s chromosomes to match 
the mammoth’s would not be an easy task; the procedure requires inserting mammoth-
specific sequences at approximately 400,000 points in the elephant’s genome.  
The other synthetic method is possible only after the mammoth genome is fully 
documented. In this scenario, researchers create from scratch mammoth DNA strands, 
shape them into chromosomal structures, and house them in an “artificial nuclear 
membrane.” After modifying or constructing a genome sequence, both synthetic 
approaches employ the material methods of cloning—insert genetic material into 
elephant ovum and rely on a surrogate elephant to bring the mammoth embryo to 
term.17 And, as noted in the previous chapter, these material procedures are often 
fraught with complications. They require the trail-and-error process of getting all material 
elements to coalesce into a successful pregnancy and birth.  
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These synthetic procedures expand the informational frontier of biology. Researchers 
are interested in bottom-up, informational approaches in part because they promise 
greater control, efficiency and precision. Researchers describe these procedures by 
making analogies to the fields of mechanical and software engineering. MIT’s Tom 
Knight is creating BioBricks—snippets of genetic sequences—that can be inserted into 
cells to alter DNA. Knight views the invention of BioBricks as analogous to the 
development of standardized parts introduced in the middle of the 19th century. And J. 
Craig Venter of Synthetic Genomics aims to create “an operating system for biologically-
based software”—“a plain genetic platform able to direct the basic functions of life” that 
can be modified with “DNA modules.”18 Venter’s research team recently developed the 
first fully synthetic bacterial genome.19 Venter hopes to use this discovery to create 
rudimentary bacteria—bacteria with just enough genetic material to sustain life—that can 
be modified to perform a variety of tasks by adding specific genes.20 The stripped-down, 
synthetic bacteria become operating systems; the genes inserted into the bacteria 
function as software programs that extend the bacteria’s metabolic abilities. 
More important than incorporating the speed and precision of digital tools and 
standardized parts, synthetic DNA promises to literally make flesh programmable. In the 
process, synthetic DNA research hopes to alter the scale of biotechnology. A 
Washington Post article describes the change in this way: “Unlike conventional 
biotechnology, in which scientists induce modest genetic changes in cells to make them 
serve industrial purposes, synthetic biology involves the large-scale rewriting of genetic 
codes to create metabolic machines with singular purposes.”21 This is a reworking of life 
from the ground up, designing new genetic sequences that conform to the needs of 
science and industry. This is a biotechnology that is not simply enhanced by the tools of 
information technology and cybernetic systems but is also inspired by the methods of 
software engineering. Biologists become programmers. 
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4.1.4 Biopower 
A body viewed as an operating system that can accommodate a variety of genetic 
modules provides a new way of framing life. Synthetic biology aspires to create hyper-
plastic organisms that mimic the dynamic systems of digital media. This desire to 
remake life at the molecular level takes on new complexity when it is framed by the 
socio-political drives of biopower, a term coined by Michel Foucault to describe the 
state’s interest in maintaining a healthy and productive population. Foucault’s analysis of 
biopower and power in general highlights the affirmative regulation of society, politics 
and technology. Bodies made available to genetic manipulation can be shaped in ways 
the support the interests of powerful institutions. The ability to control informational 
bodies down to minute genetic sequences promises material advances and insights but 
also harbors the potential for exploitation and catastrophe. Increasingly refined methods 
of material control—methods that are underpinned by the logic of information—not only 
promise new abundance but also forebode enhanced social manipulation.  
Foucault argues that socio-material disruptions alter the methods of social regulation. 
After the 18th century revolution in France, power slips from the sovereign into the hands 
of the bourgeoisie. This change in power engenders new disciplinary mechanisms to 
control the liberated masses. The sovereign ruled with a spectacle of terror—acts 
considered an attack on the sovereign’s authority were met with public executions and 
torture. In post-revolutionary France, the law and court promotes social integration rather 
than public retribution. Prisons become training sites, places to reform the criminal’s anti-
social character. The criminal is disciplined through isolation, regulated schedule, forced 
labor, and moral and vocational education.22 The sovereign publically punishes the 
criminal; the bourgeoisie’s political apparatus sequesters and reforms the criminal.   
Disciplinary action expands beyond the prison’s walls. The ruling merchant class 
employs a variety of methods of social control. These are methods that can coexist with 
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the concept of a liberated individual. Under sovereign rule the masses were ignored; 
under the rule of the business class, the masses become a central concern.23 An array 
of institutions combine to ensure behavioral norms—the school, judiciary, military, 
prison, factory and hospital produce a productive and orderly citizenry.24 Foucault 
argues that the police force pays particular attention to the details of social order: 
It is an apparatus that must be coextensive with the entire social body and not 
only by the extreme limits that it embraces, but by the minuteness of the details it 
is concerned with. Police power must bear “over everything”… it is the dust of 
events, actions, behavior, opinions – “everything that happens”; the police are 
concerned with “those things of every moment”, those “unimportant things”…25 
Foucault sees disciplinary mechanisms in the regulation of health and life. In his 
description of a 17th century plague-stricken village, we can see traces of Foucault’s 
theory of biopower. The infected village is first quarantined; guarded to ensure no one 
enters or leaves. Households are isolated; families are locked in their homes. A syndic 
monitors each home by calling occupants to appear at an exterior window of their house. 
The inhabitants, one by one, verify their health through personal account as well as 
corporeal presence. The syndic reports his findings to a supervisor who in turn passes 
the information on to a magistrate. This hierarchy manages the medical care of the town 
by isolating, recording, and monitoring its inhabitants.26 As villagers submit to the daily 
ritual of appearing before the syndic they learn to adopt the appropriate signs of vigor. 
Foucault sees similar mechanisms designed to curb chaotic or subversive behavior in 
contemporary culture. Productive, healthy citizens conform to culturally sanctioned 
codes of hygiene, attire, speech, gait, posture and gesture.27 
In the History of Sexuality, Foucault argues that biopower is transformed in ways that 
echo the shifts in France’s post-revolutionary justice system. The sovereign’s biological 
control is “exercised mainly as a means of deduction, a subtraction mechanism.”28 The 
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sovereign can take property and possessions and extinguish life. But as the state 
replaces the sovereign, “deduction” diminishes and regulation of life comes to the fore. 
Biopower becomes a productive tool, a power that molds citizens; “a power bent on 
generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to 
impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them.”29 
The control of citizens is closely tied to economic and political imperatives. Bodies 
need to be optimized for labor while also remaining submissive to power. The rise of 
biopower incorporates life “into the order of knowledge and power, into the sphere of 
political techniques.” The “norm” is privileged over the law. Life becomes the central 
concern of political struggle.30 Sexuality is made available to state control. And here, too, 
Foucault argues that control is administered in a positive way. Power does not limit or 
curb sexuality but instead forms an alliance with the forces of sex. It calls forth sexuality 
in its productive potential. Foucault argues that our pursuit of sexual liberation is aligned 
with the priorities of biopower: 
We are often reminded of the countless procedures which Christianity once 
employed for centuries to make us detest the body; but let us ponder all the 
ruses that were employed for centuries to make us love sex, to make the 
knowledge of it desirable and everything said about it precious. Let us consider 
the stratagems by which we were induced to apply all our skills to discovering its 
secrets, by which we were attached to the obligation to draw out its truth, and 
made guilty for having failed to recognize it for so long. These devices are what 
ought to make us wonder today.31 
Biopower always extends beyond prohibition. The most effective—some might say 
pernicious—power does not repress but rather entices, shapes, calls forth, and draws in. 
Positive power seeps into everyday biological processes. Biopower goes beyond the 
desire to break the body down into smaller parts and refined mechanisms. It aims to 
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reconstruct the body, build the body anew. The molding force of biopower is expanded 
through the techniques of biotechnology. This type of biopower transcends traditional 
regulating mechanisms—training, monitoring, and tracking populations—by re-writing 
the body’s molecular code. The population is optimized by new means.  
While the manipulations of synthetic biology are still in the beginning stages, 
researchers have already altered animal behavior by modifying specific genes. “Social 
behavior genes” affect the personalities and interactions of animals. A slight variation in 
the way a gene is expressed can dramatically change an animal’s behavior. 
Promiscuous meadow voles were transformed into monogamous companions by 
modifying a gene that regulates the production of the hormone vasopressin. And the 
level of aggression in rhesus macaques was altered through adjustments to a gene that 
affects serotonin.32 These types of experiments illustrate informational biology’s alliance 
with biopower; they propose genetic manipulations that may soon be able to reform 
nonhuman and human behavior. 
Yet these sophisticated bio-techniques may also improve health and increase 
longevity; many people would embrace such benefits of biopower even if the techniques 
enhance state control. As always, the innovations of science and technology generate 
ambivalent gains. Each utopian dream contains the seeds of dystopian nightmares. As 
the body is defined as programmable flesh, we are likely to see unexpected corporeal, 
social and technical complications.  
The totalizing view of biopower presupposes a highly fluid, informational body exposed 
to unrestrained bio-techniques. If biologists become programmers—designing a variety 
of hyper-efficient yet submissive new organisms or optimizing the genetics of existing 
organisms—they are likely to run into the technical, material and cultural constraints 
posited by Lanier in the Cyborg chapter. In a similar vein, Hayles argues that the 
pervasive power proposed in Foucault’s writings may be more theoretical than real. She 
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writes that Foucault’s abstraction of power misses the complexities of specificity, “it 
diverts attention away from how actual bodies, in their cultural and physical specificities, 
impose, incorporate, and resist incorporation of the material practices he describes.”33 
Fissuring along lines of class, gender, race and privilege, embodied practices 
create heterogeneous spaces even when the discursive formations describing 
those practices seem uniformly dispersed throughout society.34 
In theory, disciplinary mechanisms are all encompassing; in practice, they break down, 
ignore details, misinterpret and mistranslate, are avoided and sometimes subverted. In a 
critique of Foucault’s disembodied panoptic gaze, Hayles suggests that embodiment 
permits a level a resistance missed in Foucault’s conception of a universal body. It 
seems likely that embodiment and messy materiality will alter and perhaps diminish 
some of the effects of informational biology.  
At this early stage of synthetic and informational biology, it’s hard to tell if the radical 
manipulations envisioned by biotechnologists will be quickly realized. It seems likely that 
idealized procedures will encounter stubborn materials and cultural/conceptual 
constraints. Biologist Tom Gilbert echoes this uncertainty as he discusses the possibility 
of reviving the extinct mammoth. In an interview about the decoding of the mammoth’s 
genome, Gilbert states he doubts that new genetic data will lead to a physical 
instantiation of a mammoth. He sees the research as most useful to scientists studying 
the evolutionary history of elephants. They can trace the adaptive discrepancies 
between elephants and mammoths and speculate on the effects of genetic difference. 
Yet Gilbert offers a caveat given the shifting terrain of his field: “I should warn up front I 
have a history of saying it’s not possible, and then within months some technological 
breakthrough comes through that makes me revise my opinion.”35 Time will tell if 
mammoths or mammoth-elephant hybrids become the latest curiosities to emerge from 
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research labs. For now, the idealized promises of informational bodies built from scratch 
are often more rhetorical than real.  
4.2 Autonomy & Integration  
The chimera is not simply an emblem of biopower and its affirmative and at times 
alarming potential, it also symbolizes a blurring of traditional ontologies. Combining the 
genetic information of humans, animals and plants challenges the division between 
humans and nonhumans. A chimera argues that traditional species’ boundaries may not 
be as fixed as once imagined. As the boundaries between species are transgressed, 
human exceptionalism is less sure. Our close affiliation with the animal becomes 
evident. 
Both animality and the abuse of power are key themes in H. G. Well’s novel, The 
Island of Dr. Moreau. The novel’s Pacific island hosts a variety of animal-human hybrids 
watched over by humans. The island’s chief researcher, Dr. Moreau, is the creator of 
these chimeric creatures. He has surgically reshaped the brain and body of each animal, 
often combining disparate species into a single anthropomorphic shape. These 
reconstructed creatures walk on two legs and are able to speak as humans speak. To 
guard against a lapse into animalistic behavior, strict laws are imposed: the animal-
humans are forbidden to hunt, eat meat, lap-up water, scratch trees or walk on all fours.  
Moreau’s methods align with Foucault’s description of affirmative power. Not only does 
Moreau surgically re-shape the animal-humans, he also continually molds their behavior. 
The novel’s narrator, Edward Prendick, has heard the chilling cries of animals suffering 
the effects of Moreau’s surgery, but he writes that the violence of surgery pales in 
comparison with the long-term psychological suffering of social regulation:  
Before they had been beasts, their instincts fitly adapted to their surroundings, 
and happy as living things may be. Now they stumbled in the shackles of 
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humanity, lived in a fear that never died, fretted by a law they could not 
understand; their mock-human existence began in an agony, was one long 
internal struggle, one long dread of Moreau…36 
In an introduction to a recent edition of the novel, Alan Lightman notes the human 
characters are far more “beastly” than their animal-human counterparts. “Men get drunk, 
they act foolishly, they cheat, they leave each other to die, they tell lies, they prowl and 
sneak about.” Though the animal-humans have latent wild-animal instincts, the humans 
on the island “are the real beasts.”37  
Prendrick’s experience on the island alters his sense of subjectivity. Both Moreau and 
his assistant are killed by the animals, and Prendrick is left alone for many months with 
the animal-human hybrids before he is able to escape the island. With Moreau gone, the 
disciplinary mechanisms falter and the chimeras revert back to their instinctive behavior, 
hunting and walking on all fours. Predrick also undergoes some changes—his clothes 
become tattered and hair is unkempt. And he begins to develop an animal-like 
quickness: “I am told that even now my eyes have a strange brightness, a swift alertness 
of movement.”38 
After his returned to England, Prendrick’s island experience affects his perceptions of 
humans in general. The division between animal and human is no longer so distinct for 
him. He writes: 
…I could not persuade myself that the men and women I met were not also 
another, still passably human, Beast People, animals half-wrought into the 
outward image of human souls; and that they would presently begin to revert, to 
show first this bestial mark and then that.39 
Prendick’s association with chimeras alters his view of human and animal subjectivity. 
The chimera’s integration of animal and human elements challenges the biological and 
cultural divisions between humans and nonhumans. A chimera transgresses bio-social 
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boundaries. As an in-between species, she can claim neither human nor animal 
subjectivity. Her body collapses the hierarchal distinctions of species. Yet this challenge 
to hierarchy in the realm of real-world laboratory remains unrealized. Biotech’s 
transgenic animals may reveal the close ties of humans and nonhumans, but they are 
sold as commodities. Transgenic animals are primarily created to alleviate human 
suffering or enhance human consumption. The human’s agenda, his sense of 
superiority, instrumentalizes the chimera. The chimera is intimately tied to the human but 
remains a detached object. She casts doubt on human superiority but also supports the 
privileging of human concerns.  
Utility Pet,40 a speculative design project created by Elio Caccavalle, explores this 
complicated relationship between human and animal-human hybrid. The project is 
inspired by a bio-technique called xenotransplantation—a developing technology that 
takes organs from one species and implants them into another. The current medical 
practice of organ transplantation is frustrated by a limited supply of donor organs and the 
potential for a patient’s body to reject a new organ. As a result, many people die before 
receiving a transplant; others suffer long hospital stays, sustained by artificial means, 
hoping the right organ becomes available. Biotechnologists address these issues by 
proposing an alternative to human donor organs: they argue animals could be 
genetically modified to make them suitable donors for human patients. By altering the 
animal’s biology to directly match a patient’s, the animal’s organ can be transplanted into 
a patient and the possibility of rejection is diminished. And re-conceiving the animal as 
an organ donor makes available a cheap and abundant supply of organs for human use. 
The domesticated pig is the animal most likely to become a future transgenic organ 
donor.  
Caccavale is a Design Interactions student at the Royal College of Art and his Utility 
Pet concept is influenced by the work of RCA professors, Anthony Dunne and Fiona 
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Raby. Dunne-and-Raby projects imagine near-future scenarios informed by the practices 
of product, information and industrial design. These projects examine the complicated 
social consequences of cultural and technological interactions. They also tend to have a 
particular tone—they are slightly off key. The work is neither utopian nor dystopian; 
instead it creates imperfect solutions to techno-cultural problems and embraces 
conflicting desires.41 Dunne describes his approach: 
The kind of pleasures you get from reading a book or watching a film, I think 
are the kinds of things we’re trying to explore in relation to products. How can 
you design products that provide complex and complicated pleasures? 
I guess we’re attracted to the bad side of people. The side that is complicated, 
contradictory, irrational. And we’re really curious if you filled up a room or a 
space with objects that reflected those values, how that material world would look 
different from the material world that surrounds us now.42 
Caccavale’s project aligns with Dunne and Raby’s aesthetic. He imagines a difficult 
scenario without easy resolution. Caccavale places himself in the position of a transplant 
recipient. From this position he examines the day-to-day experiences leading up to and 
following his organ transplant operation. His approach is small-scale and personal—he 
avoids the spectacle of technical wizardry and the violence of surgery. Instead, 
Caccavale personalizes medical procedures by foregrounding the interactions between 
human patient and genetically modified pig. That is, Caccavale focuses on the new 
relationships and altered subjectivities that emerge in the process of xenotransplatation. 
Caccavale complicates the interaction between human and animal by proposing a 
scenario in which the chimeric pig is adopted as a household pet. The pig is welcomed 
into his home to ensure that he, and, by extension, Caccavale’s future organ 
replacements are well cared for. The pig as a domestic pet requires a series of 
accommodations. Since Caccavale smokes, he worries the pig’s health may be harmed 
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by second-hand smoke. Consequently, he designs Smoke Eater, a filtering mask 
shaped like a pig’s snout, that he wears when enjoying a cigarette. Caccavale’s is able 
to smoke and the pig’s respiratory system is protected. He also creates Toy 
Communicator, a device similar to a baby-monitor radio, that lets him hear the pig’s 
activity when the animal is in another room.  
Both devices, Smoke Eater and Toy Communicator, address the concerns of a doting 
pet owner. They indicate concern for his pig’s welfare. But these products are also 
motivated by the commodity value of the pig—this is not an everyday pig, he houses 
human-ready organs. The mixed motivations that inspire Smoke Eater and Toy 
Communicator reveal the pig’s equivocation between subject and object. If the pig 
attains full subjectivity, Caccavale moral dilemma increases—to extend his life, 
Caccavale must slaughter his pet pig; to spare the pig’s life, Caccavale risks his health. 
The biotechnologists’ tidy solution generates new complications. We place ourselves in 
Caccavale’s position and work through his difficult decision. Would we kill the pig for his 
organs? Would we risk our health to maintain our position as protective custodian? 
Would we lose our ability to objectify the pig? Each potential trajectory leaves us 
ambivalent, uncertain of our choices. No choice is without damning consequences.    
A sense of loss permeates Caccavale’s fictional world. Death hangs over the project. 
This is not only the end of the pet pig, but also the death of human identity. By housing 
pig organs, we become something other than human. And a pig with organs genetically 
matched to our own no longer conforms to our concept of farm animal. Traditional 
categories are blurred; both human and animal identities are uncertain. The 
transgression of human and animal corporeal boundaries challenges psychological and 
philosophical conventions. If bodies can be so easily merged, perhaps the human mind-
body does not stand apart from the animal mind-body.  
Caccavale creates two more objects to accommodate the breakdown of human and 
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animal boundaries. The first, Memento Service—the tip of a pig snout encased in 
polyurethane—becomes a desktop memorial of the pig’s life and sacrifice. The other 
object, Comforting Device, is the preserved pig’s snout attached to a plastic rod. 
Caccavale holds the Comforting Device up to his face while looking in the mirror. The 
mask assures Caccavale that he is still very much a human after incorporating pig 
organs in his body. Yet the mask could also remind Caccavale of his altered subjectivity. 
He is no longer the human he once was—his life is made possible only through 
becoming a pig-human mixture. The mask confirms Caccavale’s human identity but also 
reminds him of his altered status. 
While Caccavale’s project examines the complications of subjectivity that arise in the 
mixing of human and nonhuman flesh, the project ultimately privileges human identity. 
Though some of Caccavale’s artifacts protect the pig from harm, the devices are 
designed to maintain the value of Caccavale’s investment. Caccavale’s devices could be 
read as optimizing rather than accommodating the pig’s corporeal needs. And the moral 
dilemma that Caccavale faces—risk his health to save his pet pig or slaughter the pig to 
extend his life—ends with the death of the pig. The human body trumps the animal body; 
the pig is sacrificed for Caccavale’s health. The difference in human and nonhuman 
status remains quite clear.  
Derrida in his writing challenges our habitual privileging of human concerns. He sees 
anthropocentrism as a critical thread that runs through much of Western philosophy.43 
This human-centered view ignores the ethical issues raised when animals are sacrificed 
for human needs. Derrida interrogates the tradition of sacrifice by examining the Old 
Testament account of Abraham and Isaac. In this biblical tale, Abraham is asked by God 
to sacrifice his son, Isaac, as an act of faith. Abraham accepts God’s command, binds 
his son and places him on a sacrificial alter. Just before Abraham is about to kill his son, 
an angel’s voice prevents the murderous act. A ram caught in a thicket becomes a 
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substitute for Isaac; the animal is sacrificed in Isaac’s place.  
Judeo-Christian-Islamic religions see Abraham’s near sacrifice of Isaac as the ultimate 
manifestation of faith. Christians view the story of Abraham and Isaac as foreshadowing 
the New Testament sacrifice of Christ. Others view Abraham’s action less favorably. 
Philosopher Susan Neiman contrasts the actively engaged Abraham who negotiates 
with God to save Sodom and Gomorrah with the passive Abraham who unquestioningly 
prepares to sacrifice his son. Neiman sees Abraham’s faith as mindless adherence to an 
unjust, murderous decree.44 Derrida’s interpretation of the Abraham-Isaac story is more 
complex. He sees Abraham’s moral dilemma as emblematic of the paradox of morality’s 
simultaneous specificity and generality. When Abraham acquiesces to God’s command, 
he upholds his “absolute responsibility” to the “absolute other,” his God. In the process, 
Abraham abandons his duty to the ethical traditions of his community. “The absolutes of 
duty and of responsibility presume that one denounce, refute, and transcend, at the 
same time, all duty, all responsibility, and every human law.”45 This is the moral tension 
between the universal and specific; the difficulty of balancing the needs of the particular 
against the needs of community. Derrida sees the sacrifice of Isaac as something 
“monstrous” but also suggests that a rigid, universal morality is an impoverished 
morality.46 No ethical decision can be easily resolved; each choice is torn between the 
general law and the specific situation. 
Derrida argues that our devotion to the singular other inevitably sacrifices the needs of 
the many others. “I cannot respond to the call, the request, the obligation, or even the 
love of another without sacrificing the other other, the other others.”47 And he further 
states that we can never fully justify our choice in responding to a particular other:  
What binds me to singularities, to this one or that one, male or female, rather 
than that one or this one, remains finally unjustifiable (this is Abraham’s hyper-
ethical sacrifice), as unjustifiable as the infinite sacrifices I make at each moment. 
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These singularities represent others, a wholly other form of alterity: one other or 
some other persons, but also places, animals, languages. How would you ever 
justify the fact that you sacrifice all the cats in the world to the cat that you feed at 
home every morning for years, whereas other cats die of hunger at every 
instant?48 
Our response to the particular brings joy and sadness; joy in satisfying the demands of 
the one and sadness in denying the needs of so many. 
Derrida’s reference to cats in the above quote suggests a broader sense of otherness 
than the Old Testament account of Abraham and Isaac. The biblical tale highlights the 
tension between the demands of God and man. The animal in the story—the ram 
slaughtered in Isaac’s place—is a marginal figure quickly silenced by sacrificial death. 
Derrida’s account of otherness includes the animal other; he constructs a more fluid 
hierarchy of otherness that welcomes anyone or thing. He argues that “God, as the 
wholly other, is to be found everywhere there is something of the wholly other.” That all 
others participate in the otherness of the “absolute other”: “everyone else, each other is 
infinitely other in its absolute singularity, inaccessible, solitary, transcendent, 
nonmanifest, originarily nonpresent to my ego…every other (one) as every bit other.”49 
Our responsibility to the other is not simply to the most powerful other. Instead Derrida 
extends otherness beyond God or humanity to the nonhuman, the animal others who are 
“even more other others than my fellows.”50 With this expansion of the other, we may be 
able to see more clearly the very real and often “monstrous” sacrifice of the animal other. 
Like the Christian savior, the animal is called on to suffer and die in order to diminish 
human suffering. The animal is removed from our land, killed for our food, and subjected 
to scientific experiments for our health. In countless examples the animal suffers to 
diminish human suffering. 
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This animal suffering could be seen as the necessary consequence of devotion to the 
particular at the expense of the many. Such a dismissal of animal suffering continues the 
tradition of animal exclusion from the group of others that matter. It ignores the intimate 
ties between humans and animals and also denies the pleas of the animal other. Derrida 
addresses this issue of animal suffering by turning to Bentham’s question “Can they [the 
animals] suffer?” Derrida argues that Bentham’s query proposes a new ethical 
framework. No longer does language determine the animal’s status; no longer are 
“power and capability and attributes” the foundation on which human privilege rests. 
Bentham’s simple question encourages us to focus on animal sentience.51 Derrida 
suggests that animals feel pain52 and that humans have a responsibility to diminish 
animal suffering.53 Derrida warns, though, that liberating or protecting the animal may 
generate unexpected consequences. Coercing humans to honor the sentience of 
animals may encourage new forms of hierarchy and violence as well as diminish 
“difference or alterity.”54 Rather than create totalizing mechanisms to liberate the animal 
from human dominion, Derrida argues for a response to animal suffering that does the 
least damage.  
Leonard Lawlor calls this kind of response a “weak response.” Here “weak” is not used 
as a pejorative but as a less direct response to violence that avoids new forms of 
coercion. Lawlor contrasts the “worst” response with a “weak” response:  
The worst is a superlative, is the most suicidal, the most autoimmune, since in 
the name of purity it threatens to contaminate everything, in the name of life it 
threatens to kill everything…55 
The worst consists in appropriating what is other, making the two identical, or it 
consists in separating the two, making the one be the negation of the 
other.…The worst is the worst abuse of power. Although we are not able to make 
a response that is not violent, that is not evil even in a radical way, we are 
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seeking a response that is the least violent, the least evil, the least powerful, a 
response that is weak.56 
For Lawlor this “weak” response calls us to “ratchet down” “the property by which man 
separates himself from animals.”57 In a practical sense, Lawlor’s argument for a “weak” 
response would “alleviate animal suffering by changing their conditions on farms, by 
changing their conditions in laboratories.”58 A “weak” response also encourages less 
violence in the way we eat. This doesn’t necessarily mean adopting a strict vegetarian 
diet or imposing a meatless diet on others, but instead demands a more conscious way 
of eating. We become aware of the life that is lost in the support of our own. Lawler 
argues one way to do this is to give the animal a name; an animal with a unique name 
alters the relationship between the animal who is eaten and person who that eats the 
animal. He summarizes his weak response in this way: 
With this idea of the least violence, with this idea of a more sufficient response, 
what I am trying to do (and I think this is something that Derrida himself has done) 
is occupy a space between undecidability and prescription. I am trying to occupy a 
space between saying almost nothing…and saying too much (laws for the 
treatment of animals, laws of vegetarianism, for example). I do not know if this 
space in between exists. But what I have done is construct a kind of “recipe”—how 
can we eat well, that is, in the least evil way?—for the more sufficient response. 
The “recipe” is a bet on human psychology as it is viewed by common opinion. The 
central idea lies in the naming of the animals, which metaphorically “eats” them; 
naming each and every one of them (naming as we do a child who is coming) will 
engage our passions, will make us feel differently, and our passion will make us 
think differently and act differently; naming them, the hope is, will change the way 
we ‘literally’ treat and eat the animals.59 
Both Derrida and Lawlor argue for unconventional human and animal interactions that 
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avoid anthropocentrism. They seek to re-negotiate long established divisions between 
humans and animals. They argue that the animal should not be abused and discarded to 
satisfy the desires of humans. Derrida views “every other (one) as every bit other” and in 
the process expands our responsibility to the other beyond the human. In this view, the 
animal also participates in the status of the “absolute other.” At the same time, Derrida 
recognizes our limited ability to accommodate and assist the other: our focus on a 
particular other is at the expense of all others. Derrida’s philosophy simultaneously 
expands and contracts our perception of the other; the other extends beyond the human 
to “places, animals, languages” but is also an individuated other—a specific and unique 
other that we engage while ignoring the many others. Our interactions with the other are 
both generous and impoverished. Through his investigation of the animal other, Derrida 
proposes that human desires need not always be central. He challenges the assumption 
that human concerns be privileged above all other concerns. This rethinking of ethics 
argues for an alternative way of being human. The human is de-centered as human 
subjectivity becomes one of many subjectivities.  
4.3 Aura & Abjection 
Human subjectivity in transition echoes the chimera’s ambiguous status. As strange 
mixtures, chimeras present an opportunity to re-imagine animal subjectivity. Chimeras’ 
unfamiliar fusions suggest new “becomings.” They challenge our assumptions of purity 
and reveal the tenuous divisions of species. At the same time, chimeras can be ordinary 
symbols, everyday hybrids in a world of informational bodies and continual cultural and 
material exchange. Chimeras raised in global research labs can be thought of as one 
more example of the influence of multinational capital. The chimera is a material 
anomaly—an impure mixture—but also a material banality—an everyday emblem of the 
vast economic, cultural and technology processes of late capitalism. A chimera 
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simultaneously subverts and supports the cultural and economic status quo. He 
transgresses biological boundaries but also conforms to the mechanisms of industry and 
commerce. He questions our concepts of life and defies our ontological expectations. 
But, he is also a commodity shaped by demands of powerful institutions that enlist the 
his corporeality to sustain and expand their global reach.  
Fredric Jameson in his seminal writing on postmodernism argues that the formal 
investigations of postmodernism are closely aligned with the material demands of 
multinational, consumer-oriented capitalism. In Jameson’s view, late capitalism is the 
driving force behind the technological innovations of the last half of the twentieth century. 
He concurs with Earnest Mandel’s three-stages of capitalism—monopoly, imperial and 
postindustrial—and maps these stages to Mandel’s three periods of mechanization—
“steam-driven motors since 1848; machine production of electric and combustion motors 
since the 90s of the 19th century; machine production of electronic and nuclear-powered 
apparatuses since the 40s of the 20th century.”60 Jameson views the contemporary 
period of late capitalism as an expansion of capitalism’s reach:  
Mandel’s intervention in the postindustrial debate involves the proposition that 
late or multinational or consumer capitalism, far from being inconsistent with 
Marx’s great nineteenth-century analysis, constitutes, on the contrary, the purest 
form of capital yet to have emerged, a prodigious expansion of capital into 
hitherto uncommodified areas. This purer capitalism of our own time thus 
eliminates the enclaves of precaptialist organization it had hitherto tolerated and 
exploited in a tributary way. One is tempted to speak in this connection of a new 
and historically original penetration and colonization of Nature and the 
Unconscious…61 
As an example of capital’s “penetration and colonization of Nature,” Jameson points to 
the Green Revolution—a mechanization of farming techniques that includes new 
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configurations of farm equipment, irrigation, modified crops, and more effective 
pesticides and fertilizers. Writing fourteen years after Jameson, Eugene Thacker 
proposes new examples of capital’s expansive agenda. Profit-maximizing labor can now 
be extracted not just from humans and machines but also from biological processes. 
Thacker notes that biotechnology relies on a “specific type of labor performed routinely 
by cells, proteins, and DNA…the ‘naturally occurring’ processes of biology at the 
molecular and genetic levels can be enframed in such a way so as to transform them 
into an instrument, a technology.”62 
Marx argues that the financial imperatives of capital create alienating, highly 
specialized work as well as economic exploitation. The easiest way to maximize return 
on investment is to drive down labor and raw-material costs and create hyper-efficient 
but highly structured work environments. Such methods often result in physically, 
socially and economically strained workers. Capital in a biotech age solicits new workers 
who are less likely to register discontent. Thacker argues that the work of biological 
processes create “unhuman production” and “labor power [that] is cellular, enzymatic 
and genetic.” This is a labor force that operates at the foundational level of biological life. 
In this new work environment, Thacker asks: “if there is no human subject or wage, is 
there still exploitation and/or alienation?”  
Thacker highlights two transgenic animals as emblems of biolabor: oncomouse and 
“mammalian bioreactors.” The oncomouse is a genetically modified mouse designed to 
develop breast-cancer cells—a mouse born to test the efficacy of breast-cancer 
remedies. Mammalian bioreactors are genetically altered animals designed to supply 
bioproducts for human medial use. Thacker’s specific example of a mammalian 
bioreactor is a transgenic goat whose milk produces a “blood-clotting protein” used by 
heart patients.  
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While Thacker’s main concern is to introduce new labor practices that employ cellular 
and molecular processes, my primary interest is to foreground the effects of 
biotechnology on animal bodies. And here the effects of exploitation or alienation may be 
more severe than those generated by biolabor produced through low-level chemical 
reactions. In addressing labor issues, we are required to confront the question of animal 
subjectivity. Research labs experiment on millions of animals each year. Increasingly 
these animals are modified to incorporate genes from other animals and plants. These 
chimeras are optimized for lab experiments: some have genes removed to test the effect 
of the missing gene, others are modified to better mimic human biology, still others are 
modified to enable them to produce medical products. These experiments on animal 
bodies are designed to serve human interests.63 The research supports human medical 
industries—better medicine, better diagnostics, better treatments for humans. The 
animal accommodates human priorities.  
Donna Haraway argues for a different kind of morality in our interaction with animals. 
Haraway promotes research and breeding practices that encourage animals to “flourish.” 
According to Haraway, practices that ignore the animal’s development should be 
abandoned. This framework of “flourishing” might involve some animal labor and even at 
times exploitation, but the framework ultimately brings the animal from the margin to the 
center.  
Haraway notes that biologist Marc Bekoff asks himself, “Does the research benefit the 
animals?” when he considers using animals in his research.  Haraway emphasizes the 
importance of Bekoff’s question:  
In light of the history of the reduction of lab animals to machine tools and 
products for big pharma (the technoscientific pharmaceutical research-industrial 
complex), agribusiness, cosmetics, art performances, and much else, that 
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question has particular force. Not asking that question seriously is, or ought to 
be, outside the pale of scientific practice.64  
Yet asking this question raises new complexities. Haraway suggests that the 
“entangled assemblages” of human and nonhuman make ontological distinctions 
difficult; the question of who will benefit is not always clear. Helping the animal “flourish” 
may not necessarily lead to freeing animals from research labs or shifting to a vegan 
diet. Such moves could paradoxically lead to destruction of animal populations that are 
excluded from human-animal “assemblages.”65 But helping the animal flourish does 
require foregrounding animal concerns, keeping the animal front and center, and 
diminishing the instrumental use of animals. “Ways of living and dying matter.”66 In the 
rush to expand human knowledge the animal’s life and death are never unimportant 
details. Haraway argues that animal suffering should be “minimal, necessary, and 
consequential.”67 
Haraway notes that deciding “which historically situated practices of multispecies living 
and dying should flourish” is a complex question without easy answers. The decisions 
we make affect humans and nonhumans in unexpected ways. Making these decisions 
requires acknowledging the consequences for all participants, even if all consequences 
are never “fully calculable.” “Staying with the complexities does not mean not acting, not 
doing research, not engaging in some, indeed many, unequal instrumental relationships; 
it does mean learning to live and think in practical opening to shared pain and mortality 
and learning what that living and thinking teach.”68   
With Haraway’s framework of “flourishing” in mind, we can return to the complexities of 
late capitalism’s materiality. Like Haraway, Jameson emphasizes our encounter with 
complex issues should not result in retreat or inaction. Though socio-economic changes 
may be disorienting and at times overwhelming, Jameson argues for an engagement 
with the logic of late capitalism; we need to “regain a capacity to act and struggle” even 
 112
as we “hold to the truth of postmodernism”—“the world space of multinational capital.” 
Jameson does not propose a return to a simpler time, a precapitalistic era, but instead 
looks for ways to transform the capital we have inherited.69 This process requires a 
difficult, contradictory stance: in the same moment, we recognize late capitalism’s 
potential for good but also acknowledge its exploitative tendencies. Jameson describes 
this method of critique: 
In a well-known passage Marx powerfully urges us to do the impossible, namely, 
to think this development positively and negatively all at once; to achieve, in 
other words, a type of thinking that would be capable of grasping the 
demonstrably baleful features of capitalism along with its extraordinary and 
liberating dynamism simultaneously within a single thought, and without 
attenuating any of the force of either judgment. We are somehow to lift our minds 
to a point at which it is possible to understand that capitalism is at one and the 
same time the best thing that has ever happened to the human race, and the 
worst. The lapse from this austere dialectical imperative into the more 
comfortable stance of the taking of moral positions is inveterate and all too 
human: still, the urgency of the subject demands that we make at least some 
effort to think the cultural evolution of late capitalism dialectically, as catastrophe 
and progress all together.70 
Such dialectical thinking may open new ways to consider the pop-culture chimera. The 
complexities of capital and chimeric subjectivity are examined in the 1989 sequel film, 
The Fly II. In the preceding 1986 film, The Fly, scientist Seth Brundle invents a 
teleporter—a technology that dematerializes flesh in one location and rematerializes it in 
another. While testing the teleporter on his own body, Brundle fails to notice a fly has 
entered his transport chamber. Both scientist and fly are transported to a second 
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chamber and in the process their molecules become intermingled. As a result, Brundle 
slowly transforms into a human-fly hybrid.  
The Fly II opens with the birth of Martin Brundle, the product of a union between 
Brundle and Veronica Quaife, a journalist who tracked the developments of Brundle’s 
teleporter. Seth Brundle dies at the end of the first film, the result of a lab accident and 
mercy killing by Quaife. Quaife dies in childbirth at the beginning of the sequel, leaving 
her son to the care of Bartok Industries, the sponsor of Brundle’s research.  
Jameson would likely note the marked material difference between the two Fly films. 
The first film shot in Toronto exudes a dark, urban presence. Seth Brundle works alone 
in an abandoned warehouse, a mad genius following his own idiosyncratic vision. The 
second film, shot on the west coast of Canada, replaces an urban backdrop with bucolic 
scenery. The campus-like research center is protected by security guards and detached 
from the city. The center houses teams of scientists clad in lab coats who support the 
research ambitions of Bartok Industries, a multinational corporation.  
The contrast between the two films extends beyond material environment. In the first 
film, Seth Brundle is both protagonist and villain; he starts as amiable scientist and ends 
as monstrous chimera. His villainy emerges in his denial or disregard of his human 
identity. In this complicated role, he becomes the central character around whom all 
other characters orbit. In the second film, Brundle’s son, Martin, lacks his father’s 
charisma. Often the villain, Anton Bartok, head of Bartok Industries and false father 
figure to Martin, proves the most compelling personality. Ultimately no character can 
compete with the film’s bloody spectacle. Director Chris Walas, best known for his make-
up–and–monster special effects, litters the screen with modified and mutilated bodies.  
The protagonists in both films also differ in their acceptance of altered subjectivity. In 
the first film, Seth Brundle eventually embraces his transformation into insect-human 
hybrid; he abandons his human identity and accepts his alterity: “I’m an insect who 
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dreamt as a man, but now the dream is over and the insect is awake.” In the film’s 
climax, Brundle solicits Quaife, now pregnant with their child, to merge with him in an 
untested fusion of fly-man-woman-son. The new mix may dilute the insect’s genetic 
influence but transgresses anew species, gender and familial boundaries. In the second 
film, Martin never fully accepts his hybrid status. Instead he seeks to rid his body of 
contaminating insect genes. His ambition is to reclaim human identity. If Fly explores 
corporeal transgression, Fly II affirms the cultural norm. 
Despite privileging human identity, Fly II portrays the complications of human-
nonhuman power relations. The treatment of lab animals is a subtheme of the film. 
Martin becomes a symbol of the nonhuman body exploited in research’s quest for 
knowledge and profit. Martin grows up in the research center’s sequestered space, 
essentially a prisoner of a long-term research project. His behavior and body are closely 
tracked, and he suffers daily medical treatments. Martin’s situation is echoed in the film’s 
portrayal of a lab dog. Martin befriends the dog when he stumbles upon him in a 
“specimen” sector of the research facility. This dog is later used to test teleporter 
equipment originally invented by Martin’s father. The test goes badly. The dog’s 
molecular structure is scrambled, and he emerges from the experiment a painfully 
deformed creature. Martin witnesses the dog’s mutilation and screams out in shock. 
Bartok assures Martin the dog was humanely put to sleep, but later Martin discovers that 
the dog is alive, isolated in a holding pen and monitored by researchers. Martin sneaks 
into the pen and ends the dog’s suffering by euthanizing him. The film’s closing 
sequence returns to the same holding pen that now houses a newly formed chimera. 
This time the imprisoned specimen is Bartok who has been mutated by a modified 
teleporter that intermingled the molecules of Bartok and Martin. Martin emerges from the 
interchange fully human. Bartok, like the dog, is horrifically deformed. In the film’s final 
shot, Bartok painfully crawls toward a bowl and attempts to lap up the container’s mushy 
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contents. Researchers document Bartok’s status, viewing his movements from the 
safety of an observation deck positioned high above Bartok’s cage.  
Beyond the motif of human abuse of the nonhuman other, the film also offers an 
opportunity to explore Jameson’s idea of multinational capitalism as the best and worst 
thing to happen to humans and animals. Bartok’s capitalistic view simultaneously 
exploits and protects the nonhuman other. At the beginning of the film, Bartok 
admonishes his researchers to treat Martin well: “Do not think of this child as a 
laboratory animal. I want you to take care of him as if he were my very own.” Though the 
laboratory is part prison for Martin, it also provides continual protection and intellectual 
stimulation for him. Martin’s chimeric genetic makeup causes him to rapidly age. Within 
five years, he advances from infant to adult. His intelligence is also exceptional; he 
quickly surpasses the expertise of his caretakers. A traditional home or school would be 
hard pressed to adapt to Martin’s unconventional development. The lab supports this 
precocious child in a way that few other institutions could. Bartok eventually gives Martin 
free reign to explore his engineering talents. This freedom—a false freedom perhaps 
that keeps Martin tied to the research center—ultimately proves Bartok’s undoing. Martin 
modifies his father’s teleporter, creating the gene splicer that deforms Bartok in the film’s 
climax.    
Bartok is not only a mindful guardian, he also embraces Martin’s unusual status. His 
market orientation allows him to see the potential of the chimera other. Martin, on the 
other hand, is horrified by his hybrid status. When his dormant insect genes are 
activated, and he transforms into a fly-human hybrid, he longs to return to his former 
human self. Bartok, however, is thrilled that that the metamorphosis is taking place: 
Bartok: Martin, you will soon be part of the most unique living creature on the 
face of the earth. There’s nothing you or I or anyone can do to stop it. 
Martin: You want this happen? 
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Bartok: Of course I want it to happen. You’re the pattern, the prototype for a 
whole new age of biological exploration. With you as the model, the teleport as 
the tool, Bartok Industries will control the form and function of all life on earth.  
After his transformation, Martin begins a killing spree, murdering his caretakers and 
security personnel. Even as the chimeric Martin threatens Bartok’s safety, Bartok tells 
his guards not to kill Martin. Bartok’s profit motive helps him see the monster’s 
subjectivity when all others see Martin as a mutated insect who must destroyed. For 
Bartok, Martin’s transformation is not a catastrophe but rather the realization of a dream. 
Bartok is a symbolic manifestation of capitalism’s paradox. Capitalism’s greed leaves it 
open to the transgressive other. Its desire for new markets welcomes the impurity of 
fusion. Its drive to power is so consuming that it renders hierarchies unstable. And 
sometimes, once in a while, its energy folds in on itself, destroying or re-making the 
status quo into something new.  
Beyond the world of film and fiction, Jameson’s dialectic insight can be brought to the 
material and social conditions of real-world research labs. Many labs exercise particular 
care over the animals that support their research objectives. Maintaining the animal’s 
health ensures the research project produces reliable data and successful trials. At the 
same time, many projects employ abusive practices—animals are caged, genetically 
modified, and mutilated, and many die during the research process. The lab oscillates 
between a safe haven that looks after the animal’s wellbeing and a brutal, abusive space 
that seeks knowledge through the suffering of animals. The ambiguity of animal research 
is perhaps best illustrated by a genre of research that explores animal behavior and 
cognition and often argues that animals exhibit an active intellectual, social and 
emotional life. This type of project documents dogs who are jealous, apes who have a 
sense of justice, and pigeons who acquire aesthetic taste. Such research grants a form 
of subjectivity to the animal long denied him. Animals become moral, socially conscious, 
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and capable of complex emotions and judgment. At the same time, the animals remain 
research objects. Though researchers acknowledge a level of animal subjectivity, the 
animals are captives of the research environment; they cannot end their participation in 
the research process. And the research is frequently framed by anthropocentric 
motivations. We study these animals to learn more about ourselves. Researchers justify 
these projects as ways to understand human evolution or cognitive processes. The 
framing of the research in this way both elevates and degrades the animal. The research 
implies that animals may be unexpectedly like us, but they nonetheless remain inferior 
subjects who are most useful when they help us reflect on our development.   
Jameson’s dialectic could also be applied to the biolabor described by Thacker. Labor 
performed at the metabolic level could be a new form of effortless and efficient 
production that generates abundance. It could also be involuntary and perpetual labor, a 
type of labor that can only be quit when biological life ends. Biolabor solves and 
exacerbates the problem of alienation. It promises highly integrated and intimate work 
processes but carries labor beyond the conscious efforts of body-mind into the body’s 
cellular functions. Capital’s reach expands to encompass molecular activity; it embeds 
itself in the building blocks of life. 
These practices of research and biolabor combine in the transgenic animal. When 
animals incorporate human genes, the barriers between human and nonhuman are less 
certain. When the milk of a transgenic goat produces a medicine, the division between 
labor and life is less distinct. The chimera represents the collapse of these biological and 
cultural barriers. Its arrival destabilizes our ontological traditions. He challenges 
anthropocentric views but also extends the reach of biopower and capital. He argues for 
increased animal subjectivity but also demonstrates the subhuman status of research 
animals forced to participate in risky and often painful laboratory procedures. This is the 
ambivalent chimera; a new kind of animal that challenges human supremacy but also 
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submits to human abuse. The best kind of chimera promotes human and nonhuman 
“assemblages” that cooperate and “flourish” in unfamiliar ways. The worst kind of 
chimera symbolizes the exploitative traits of late capitalism and socio-political power. 
The ambivalent chimera oscillates between these extreme visions—he simultaneously 
represents liberation and subjugation. 
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CHAPTER 5  
SHAPESHIFTER 
When Darwin published his theory of evolution in the Origin of Species, one of the 
most controversial aspects of the text was the common ancestry of all animal life. Darwin 
made the human connection to the animal explicit and threatened the longstanding 
division between human and nonhuman. The animal became our ancestor instead of 
merely our subordinate. The human, no longer formed in God’s image, became just 
another byproduct of the interactions of biology and environment. Essential human 
identity yielded to mercurial possibility. After Darwin, we became shapeshifters, the 
contingent result of millions of years of biological adaptation and mutation. We emerge 
from the vast expanse of microbial life and remain in flux, moving from what we once 
were into what we may become. The latest theories of evolution suggest species are far 
more mutable than Darwin ever imagined. Within a few generations significant changes 
can occur.1 Humans and animals become capable of metamorphosis.       
The cultural shapeshifter represents an even greater degree of plasticity than 
evolution’s multigenerational variation. In the myths of vampires and werewolves, 
humans suddenly transform into the animal other and express repressed violence and 
sexuality. Shapeshifting also occurs in less spectacular ways—scientists, theorists and 
artists explore alterity when they attempt to understand the world from another 
perspective. These shape shifters hope to bridge the gap between animals and humans. 
Empathic scientific studies of animals embrace new phenomenological possibilities; they 
welcome unfamiliar behavior, perceptions and culture. Shapeshifter biologists hope to 
inhabit the world of the animal other. Yet this metamorphosis is often filtered by 
anthropocentric phenomenology and epistemology; our understanding of the other is 
shaped by our corporeal and cultural bias. Our attempts at shapeshifting reveal the 
 126
difficulty of truly understanding the other; we guess and project as we encounter the 
complexities of human and animal interaction and frequently human-nonhuman divisions 
remain in place. 
Despite these anthropocentric limitations, the shapeshifter proposes new “becomings” 
and alternative subjectivities. Issues of identity arise when the shapeshifter appears. 
Human identity based on an exclusion of the animal other is often challenged by the 
shapeshifter’s denial of essential human behavior or traits. Each metamorphosis 
questions the centrality and stability of human culture and perspective. At the same time, 
these moments of transformation create unexpected restraints. New hierarchies can 
easily replace old; new alienations emerge in satiated desires. The shapeshifter tries on 
new skins and forms new alliances, but his experimentation may turn to abjection. 
Shapeshifters find themselves caught between human and animal cultures, unable to 
integrate into either community. This is the shapeshifter’s ambivalent role: she is both 
liberated and ensnared. She transcends the boundaries of human subjectivity but also 
encounters and creates new divisions within and between the human and nonhuman. 
5.1 Irreducibility & Procedurality 
A variety of media and art projects are inspired by the animal’s phenomenology. There 
are costumed performances, Crittercams, video games from an animal’s perspective, 
and wearables that re-create animal perceptions. Each artifact attempts to bring us 
closer to the animal other. Yet they also cut us off from the complexity of alterity. These 
works hint at alternative worlds but also make apparent the difficulty of understanding 
any “other,” human or animal. We may see the animal in new ways after experiencing a 
project or performance, but our attempts at mediated animality also create a false sense 
of understanding. We can never truly inhabit the body or perspective of another animal. 
We simply map a procedural view of the animal onto the conventions of human 
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perception. And our rudimentary efforts at animality often ignore the animal’s unique 
perceptions and inaccessible knowledge. As a result we omit important differences 
between humans and animals, erasing key variations within and between animal 
species. Sometimes these projects unexpectedly create new methods of corporeal 
regulation. They use alterity to elicit normative behavior. These mediated 
transformations oscillate between liberation and regulation, new awareness and false 
epistemological confidence. They simultaneously expand and restrict our understanding 
of the animal other.  
5.1.1 Multiple Worlds 
Altering our phenomenology can provide a moment of liberation; a chance to 
transcend familiar habits. The work of German artist Rebecca Horn explores this kind of 
alterity. In the 1970s, Horn began a series of projects that combined elements of 
costume design, performance and installation. One of her most famous pieces, Unicorn, 
attaches a large horn-like structure to a woman’s head using straps of fabric that 
surround the body. As the wearer moves, the secondary motion of the horn pulls on the 
fastening straps and provides sensual stimulation as well as modifies the wearer’s gait. 
Horn filmed a friend wearing only the unicorn costume walking around the countryside; 
stills from the film document the otherworldly yet elegant sensibility of her friend’s 
performance.2 In another piece titled Feather Fingers, Horn attached feathers to the 
fingers of her hand using metal rings. The feathers turned the hand into a wing-like 
extension. As Horn touched the unfeathered hand and arm with her feathered hand, the 
sensation of soft feathers on skin transformed the winged hand into an unfamiliar 
appendage.3 Horn describes her altered phenomenology: “it is as if one hand suddenly 
became disconnected from the other, as if they were two beings without anything in 
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common.”4 In these and other works, Horns asks the wearer and viewer to embrace new 
forms of embodiment; unfamiliar ways of seeing, moving and touching.  
In the realm of popular culture, altered embodiment is explored in Hip Games’ Dog’s 
Life. This video game follows the well-known formula of an adventure quest but instead 
of a human protagonist, the central avatar is a dog named Jake. Jake collects items, 
solves puzzles, and competes against virtual characters while trying to free a canine 
companion dognapped by the game’s villains. Animal avatars and quest games are not 
particularly unusual, but Dog’s Life explores new terrain in the way it represents Jake’s 
point of view. Players can switch between two camera modes—first person and third 
person. The third person view displays the virtual landscape from a camera angle just 
above Jake's body, providing an over-the-shoulder shot common to many games. The 
first person view, however, presents a different perspective. The camera angle is much 
closer to the ground, aligned with Jake’s eye line. The field of view is also diminished; 
our visual range is cropped in comparison to the wider view of third-person perspective. 
The colors are less saturated, mimicking the reduced color spectrum of canines. 
Perhaps most intriguing, Jake’s olfactory sensitivity is represented through 
“smellovision.” The scents of humans, animals and bones rise from the ground as 
brightly colored undulating waves. “Smellovision” also permits Jake to “sniff out” 
lingering footprints of human activity. Perceiving the world through Jake’s nose is critical 
to completing Jake’s adventure. Alterity becomes a key component of game play.  
Biologist Jakob von Uexkull’s research is a precursor to the creative experiments of 
Horn and Hip Games. Uexkull explored the intersecting yet disconnected worlds of 
humans and nonhumans. Philosopher Giorgio Agamben describes Uexkull’s approach 
as follows:  
Where classical science saw a single world that comprised within it all living species 
hierarchically ordered from the most elementary forms up to the higher organisms, 
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Uexkull instead supposes an infinite variety of perceptual worlds that, though they 
are uncommunicating and reciprocally exclusive, are all equally perfect and linked 
together as if in a gigantic musical score…5 
When multiple worlds overlap, the same space or same object engenders different 
associations. We metaphorically swim within a particular current, unaware of the 
streams of perceptions that surround us. Agamben continues: “Even a minimal detail—
for example, the stem of a wildflower—when considered as a carrier of significance, 
constitutes a different element each time it is in a different environment, depending on 
whether, for example, it is observed in the environment of a girl picking flowers for a 
bouquet to pin to her corset, in that of an ant for whom it is an ideal way to reach its 
nourishment in the flower’s calyx, in that of the larva of a cicada who pierces its 
medullary canal and uses it as a pump to construct the fluid parts of its elevated cocoon, 
or finally in that of the cow who simply chews and swallows it as food.”6 
Uexkull’s multi-world perspective challenges anthropocentric interpretations of the 
world. Human perceptions become one of many perceptions. When we foreground 
phenomenological diversity, we are less certain of our epistemology and ontology. The 
animal other we thought we knew so well may suddenly become a stranger. And the 
static world that grounds us may appear more fluid than before. 
5.1.2 False Sense of Understanding 
With Uexkull’s interconnected yet “uncommunicating” worlds in mind, the weaknesses 
of mediated simulations of animal perception become evident. Smellovision may 
recognize the olfactory importance of canine experience, but it portrays this unique 
feature of canine phenomenology through the human’s dominant sensory apparatus of 
vision. We never truly inhabit a dog’s world; instead, we play at being dog-like by relying 
on familiar sensory stimulation and are bound by the conventions of video-game 
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interface and equipment. Our experience of a dog’s world is always filtered through 
human perceptions; we retain our privileged position while claiming to see the world 
anew. Smellovision hints at but ultimately avoids the frustrating and possibly frightening 
experience of zoocentric alterity.  
A similar false sense of intimacy occurs with we claim to see an animal’s world by 
attaching cameras to an animal’s body. In the Cyborg chapter, I wrote about the 
popularity of Crittercam research. A variety of animals are enlisted in experiments that 
track animal activity by attaching a camera to an animal’s upper body. The camera 
records the animal’s perspective and relays this information to researchers in the field. 
Biologists are able to spy on the everyday details of animal activity; they see a new view 
of animal behavior in the wild.  
Researchers highlight the insights they gain from these experiments. LaVern Beier 
who studies brown bears in Alaska, for example, is surprised to see, through the lens of 
a Crittercam, familial interactions between an adult bear and her mother; he had 
assumed familial ties dissolved as bears aged.7 Yet Crittercam knowledge is frequently 
framed by human perceptions and the traditions of broadcast media. For many animals, 
sight, while important, is greatly enhanced by other sensory mechanisms. The case of a 
camera attached to a matriarch of an elephant herd illustrates the anthropocentric 
approach of researchers. An elephant’s eyes are set on the side of her head; this 
arrangement provides a wide-angle view of the world. The camera, however, attached to 
the top of elephant’s head, provides a single lens, limited-scope view of the elephant’s 
perspective. The footage conforms to the traditions of broadcast media rather than risk a 
two-camera view that might give a better sense of an elephant’s visual field.8 Elephants 
are also known to have extremely sensitive feet. The fatty pads at the base of their feet 
as well as sensitive toe bones pick up tremors in the earth. An elephant’s call triggers 
seismic vibrations in the earth that can be felt by other elephants several kilometers 
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away.9 This kind of pedal perception is unknown to humans and as a result remains an 
aspect of elephant perception that is lost in our emphasis on visual stimuli. Our mediated 
experiences are oriented to our own cultural traditions and phenomenological 
understanding. Because of this we likely miss much of embodied animal experience. 
Crittercam experiments simultaneously enhance and restrict our sense of the animal’s 
world.  
In virtual worlds, a similar kind of ontological arrogance prevails. Sherry Turkle 
documents the identity play of participants in virtual environments. Gender, age, race, 
ethnicity and sexuality can be easily modified when the body is no longer required to be 
present. Such shapeshifting is part of the pleasure of virtual communities. But these 
experiments in identity give some participants a false sense of understanding the other. 
The life experience of a digital avatar misses the complexities of lived, real-world 
otherness. Turkle comments: 
Many of the people I’ve interviewed claimed that virtual gender-swapping enabled 
them to understand what it’s like to be a person of the other gender, and I have no 
doubt that this is true, at least in part. But as I listened to this boast, my mind often 
traveled to my own experiences of living in a woman’s body. These include worry 
about physical vulnerability, fears of unwanted pregnancy and of infertility, fine-
tuned decisions about how much make-up to wear to a job interview, and the 
difficulty of giving a professional seminar while doubled over with monthly cramps. 
To a certain extent, knowledge is inherently experiential, based on a physicality that 
we each experience differently.10 
Shapeshifting through digital technologies may provide some sense of alterity, but as 
the above examples illustrate, our mediated experiences fail to capture the complex 
phenomenology of the other. The other remains beyond our reach. 
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5.1.3 Alterity as a New Form of Regulation 
Some shapeshifting experiments are not only limited by anthropocentric mediation but 
also enable new forms of regulation. Animal Superpowers, a project created by Chris 
Woebken and Kenichi Okada, is primarily a whimsical exploration of altered 
phenomenology. But one piece in their project unexpectedly provides an opportunity to 
control unwanted behavior.  
Animal Superpowers is a collection of wearables designed for children. The wearables 
allow children to experience life from an ant’s, bird’s or giraffe’s view. The ant wearable 
is best experienced by crawling on the ground. Two cameras attached to the hands send 
images to a display worn on a child’s head. As the child moves around on all fours, he 
sees the world from an ant’s perspective: a low camera angle, close to the ground. The 
video image is also significantly scaled up, making even small objects appear very large. 
Blades of grass become arboreal. The giraffe view adds height by mounting a periscope 
extension to the top of a child’s head. The diminutive wearer can now see eye-to-eye 
with adults. Her voice is also modified, lowered in pitch to match an adult’s voice. And 
the bird wearable consists of headband that vibrates when a child points her body in a 
particular direction. It becomes a haptic compass, providing feedback to orient her to a 
particular path. The device mimics a bird’s ability to navigate by geomagnetic fields; with 
the headband a child can find her way home using GPS technology and haptic 
feedback.11 These wearable devices are all inspired by animal perceptions. When worn 
by humans, they suggest alternative ways of understanding the world. The creators 
hope to create empathy for an animal’s behavioral and perceptual experience.   
At the same time, the expansive promise of this project paradoxically creates new 
restrictions. Woebken and Okada’s ant wearable not only provides a new intimacy with 
the details of the ground beneath us, but also regulates our movement. The head-
mounted device increases the scale of visual input to such a degree that imagery blurs 
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and nausea occurs if the wearer moves her body too quickly. To avoid this discomfort, 
the wearer resorts to slow, micro-movements. The creators note: “Even a hyperactive 
kid moves very slow because the new 50x scale makes you feel sick if you would move 
at normal speed.” 12 The creators’ comment suggests an alternative use for the 
wearable. A device designed to enlarge sensory perception could easily be re-purposed 
to discipline unruly children. A playful experiment is modified to serve disciplinary needs.  
Whether video game, Crittercam, virtual world or wearable, mediated shapeshifting 
creates ambivalent results. Our efforts to inhabit an animal’s world provide new insights 
and misconceptions, new freedoms and regulations, new intimacies and detachments. 
When we take on animal attributes, we may better understand an animal’s perceptions 
and behavior but also fail to grasp the complexities of animal embodiment and cognition. 
Our attempts to imagine the other’s point of view may also reveal the impossibility of fully 
understanding any other’s perspective. We can observe and examine but ultimately our 
insights are clouded by our speculations and projections and our particular embodied 
and situated knowledge. This doesn’t mean the attempt to transform into the animal 
other is a wasted effort. It does suggest, though, that gaps remain in our knowledge; a 
meager understanding of the animal other quickly grows into epistemological arrogance. 
We know simply what we know; we merely guess at what the other knows.  
5.2 Autonomy & Integration  
Unfamiliar animal perspectives simulated by art and media projects have the potential 
to simultaneously elevate and degrade the animal. We’re suddenly aware of the animal’s 
unique capabilities—his extra-human sensory perceptions—but the animal’s exceptional 
abilities surprisingly validate the human’s sense of superiority. This double logic sees the 
animal as physically and sometimes morally superior but linguistically, cognitively and 
socially inferior. This paradoxical stance places the animal as above and below the 
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human. Animal violence is measured while human violence is excessive. Animals are 
sensitive to their environment while humans disrupt and destroy their surroundings. The 
animal is incapable of pretense while the human is full of deceit. Yet these superior 
animal qualities become evidence of animal weakness, and human flaws become 
indicators of remarkable intelligence and adaptability. The human’s unscrupulous nature 
allows him to shape and control; the animal’s innocence requires him to react and 
submit.  
5.2.1 The Animals’ New Status 
This assumption of human superiority is challenged in the work of ethologists Jane 
Goodall, Diane Fossey and Birute Galdikas. The work of these three biologists altered 
the approach of field researchers studying wild animals. They brought a new level of 
perseverance and empathy to their work; spending years observing, documenting and 
adapting to the communities and cultures of chimpanzees, gorillas and orangutans. 
Their pioneering work was motivated by a belief that apes were worthy of careful 
examination and also respect. Through their work they became shapeshifters: living 
between human and ape cultures; learning from and sometimes adopting ape-like 
behavior; and developing unconventional intimacies between humans and wild animals.  
Before Goodall, Fossey and Galdikas, our understanding of apes was quite limited. 
Most studies were short-term and many researchers were unable to make close contact 
with wild primates—the apes simply avoided their human observers.13 Sy Montgomery 
argues that the three biologists succeeded where others failed in part because of their 
gender. Male researchers thought of themselves as adventurers; they made quick 
discoveries and then sought new research terrain. Galdikas described the male 
naturalist’s approach as: “You conquer, and move onto the next conquest.” These 
female biologists, however, stayed in the field for years, carefully observing the wild 
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apes.14 Montgomery argues that Goodall, Fossey and Galdikas’ approach was to be 
open to their experience in the field—rather than collect data to validate an existing 
theory, they entered the field with few preconceptions. Researchers who focused on 
proving a particular theory frequently missed insights that fell outside their overarching 
framework. Montgomery, writing about Goodall, argues that her method engaged with 
the complexities of animal behavior: 
Hers was the approach that women typically take in configuring the world: 
emphasizing relationships rather than rules, individuals rather than generalities, 
receptivity rather than control.15 
Whether we agree or disagree with Montgomery’s generalities about gender, the work 
of the three researchers seems to reject the conventions of mid-century ethology. 
Montgomery argues that Goodall and Fossey’s qualitative approach ran counter to the 
quantitative methods being promoted in ethology during the early 1960s. The field 
sought to prove its scientific merit by foregrounding the “theoretical, impersonal, 
experimental, and statistical.”16 These “objective” methods were rejected by Goodall who 
emphasized context and narrative in her accounts of chimpanzee behavior. Fossey too 
preferred words and story to quantifiable data; she avoided checklists of animal behavior 
or stopwatch-timed data samples of gorilla activity.17 Both biologists wrote accounts of 
group dynamics and particular chimpanzee behavior. They focused on the specificity 
and difference of individual apes.18 
Beyond issues of methodology and gender, most accounts of Goodall’s success 
emphasize the importance of perseverance. In what is now an almost mythic ethological 
tale, Goodall’s extreme patience is illustrated by an account of young Jane’s interest in 
egg-laying chickens. As a child, Goodall waited in the corner of a chicken coop until a 
hen braved her presence and deposited an egg. Goodall’s early experiment in ethology 
required her to quietly crouch in the coop for five hours—a remarkably long time for a 
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young child to wait in order to satisfy her curiosity.19 This kind of patience served her 
well in her primate research. At first, she found the chimpanzees avoided human 
contact. Pursuing the animals only made them nervous. Eventually Jane found a lookout 










.25 The chimpanzee emerged as a much more 
co
ations. 
20 Montgomery describes her research mantra as: “I am here. I am 
harmless. I wait. To you [the chimpanzee]…I give the choice: to flee or approach or
nore.”21  
Waiting for the chimpanzees rather than chasing them proved to be an effective 
strategy. The chimps soon realized that Goodall posed no threat and would pass by her 
lookout station as they foraged for food. After some time Goodall was able to follow the 
chimpanzees without frightening them. And eventually she c
uching and grooming them like a member of their tribe.22  
Goodall’s approach yielded new insights. Aspects of ape culture are now com
knowledge, but before Goodall’s work, there were many misconceptions about 
chimpanzees. The ape was thought be vegetarian, but Goodall soon witnessed th
hunting other animals and eating their prey.23 Chimp colonies were thought to be 
peaceful communities, but Goodall witnessed territorial tribal warfare. Goodall also 
observed infanticide and cannibalism among chimpanzees.24 And one of her earlies
observations—an ape selecting a twig, stripping it of leaves and using the long thin 
instrument to fish termites out of their mound—disproved the idea that humans were the 
only creatures who created and used tools
mplex animal than previously thought.  
Goodall’s general approach was repeated in the work of Fossey and Galdikas. All 
three women persevered through long-term research projects in difficult living situ
And each sought in different ways to approach the animal on the animal’s terms. 
Fossey’s openness to the animal other manifests itself in her imitations of gorilla 
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behavior. She greeted a troupe of gorillas by grunting and “knuckle walking”; attempti
to communicate through posture and sound her non-aggressive intentions. She also 












al culture. The human acquiesces to the social 
expectations of the troupe. 
26 Galdikas
found her life enmeshed in the lives of orangutans when she became stepmother to 
orphaned orangutans. After giving birth to a son, her child was raised alongside the 
infant orangutans. When Galdikas’ marriage fell apart, her son returned with his father 
Canada in part because he was beginning to exhibit orangutan behavior learned from 
his substitute siblings.27 And Goodall’s parenting skills were influenced by the mothering 
techniques of a chimpanzee named Flo. Flo was a particularly affectionate and attentive
mother who raised her offspring using positive reinforcement. After the birth of her son 
Hugo, Goodall pulled back from her research efforts in order to spend more time with her 
son. Goodall credits Flo’s example of motherly devotion as the reason for her decision
re-focus her energy
pe communities.  
The legacy of these researchers’ approach is seen in the work of contemporary 
primatologists. A recent Nature program documenting mountain gorillas provides a 
striking image of a young researcher, Veronica Vecellio, accommodating the cultural 
habits of a gorilla tribe. Vecellio is filmed glancing downward, avoiding direct eye contact 
with a dominant male gorilla. Her head bobs back and forth as she steals glances at the
giant ape without looking him in the eye. To look directly at the ape could be perceived
as an aggressive gesture. Vecellio enhances her non-threatening posture with gentle 
grunts—a form of vocalization used by gorillas to indicate deference. Vecellio submits to
gorilla hierarchies through gesture, posture and vocalization.29 The silverback tolerates 
her presence as long as she acknowledges his status. These human-animal i
indicate new respect for anim
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5.2.2 Complications of Anthropomorphism 
Despite new ways of framing animal research, a strong anthropocentric streak remains 
in much of ethology. We tend to study animals to understand ourselves. Even the 
empathetic work of Goodall, Fossey and Galdikas was at first motivated by an interest in 
human evolution. Paleoanthropologist Louis Leakey managed the early primate studies 
conducted by the three biologists. Leakey speculated that humans originated in Africa 
and spent many years looking for fossils to back up his theory. But unearthing a fossil 
record of human ancestors was only part of Leakey’s vision. He was also interested in 
early forms of human culture. It was Leakey’s idea to set up long-term primate studies to 
uncover the roots of human behavior. He described the critical questions of his career 
as: “Who am I? What was it that made me what I am?”30 These anthropocentric 
questions often drive primate research. 
Primatologist Frans De Waal’s book Our Inner Ape illustrates the close ties of 
primatology and anthropology. His book blends anthropocentric and zoocentric 
perspectives. With chapter titles the include “Power”, “Sex”, “Violence”, and “Kindness,” 
De Waal surveys the complexities of ape behavior while also commenting on U.S. 
economics, politics and culture. De Waal moves easily from ape culture to American 
culture, using ape relations as way to explain human behavior. He sees the human 
practice of scapegoating in the behavior of chimpanzees living in a zoo who shout at 
nearby lions and leopards as a way to release tribal tension. De Waal relates this 
primate behavior to the invasion of Iraq after the 9/11 attacks—the war becomes an 
outward act of violence designed to diminish domestic anger.31 De Waal discusses 
outrage over CEO compensation packages as a way to transition into an account of his 
research into chimpanzees’ sense of fairness.32 In another example, De Waal compares 
the strict hierarchies of ape tribes to the human obsession with hierarchy. He refers to 
research that suggests humans adjust their vocal frequencies to match the timbre of the 
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highest-status person participating in a conversation. Both humans and apes take social 
status very seriously.33 
Making comparisons between human and ape culture—mapping the behavior of one 
species onto another—can be beneficial. Anthropomorphism draws us closer to the 
animal other. Most forms of relating require varying degrees of projection and 
identification. Our most empathic responses are often framed by the question: “How 
would I feel if I was in his/her situation?” We invariably filter our sense of the other’s 
perception through our own subjective experience. And we label and categorize the 
other’s experience using language familiar to us. Without anthropomorphism we might 
find ourselves unable to relate to the animal other. 
At the same time, viewing the other as no different than ourselves, may blind us to the 
other’s distinction. De Waal, despite his conflation of human and ape behavior, 
recognizes the differences between animal and human culture. Throughout his text there 
are moments that reveal the complications of cross-species comparisons. When he 
writes about bonobos, De Waal argues that anthropomorphic assumptions cause 
humans to misread the apes. Bonobos sexuality includes frequent heterosexual, 
homosexual and intergenerational sexual relations.34 Because bonobo sexual practice 
deviates from our cultural expectations, De Waal notes that it’s difficult for us not to label 
these sexual acts as “promiscuous” or “hedonic.”  Yet such labels reflect human bias 
and miss the advantages of bonobo sexuality: “Bonobos do what they do because it 
provides optimal survival and reproduction in the environment in which they live.”35 The 
bonobos sexuality reduces tribal tension and makes male parentage of newborn 
bonobos less certain. As a result, a male bonobo is less likely to attack an infant who 
may be his offspring. Applying our own cultural norms to bonobo communities ignores 
the social and biological advantages of a different kind of sexuality.   
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De Waal’s account of bonobo sexuality illustrates anthropomorphism’s limitations. 
Though anthropomorphism may draw us near to the animal, it also erases the very real 
differences between and within primate species. And frequently when human values 
frame the animal’s behavior, the animal becomes a minor to our major. Human behavior 
remains the standard and animal behavior falls short of that standard. From this 
perspective the animal is like us but always below us; he remains a degraded copy of 
ourselves. Anthropomorphism’s benefit and bias can be seen in Goodall’s 
unconventional practice of naming the chimpanzees at Gombe. When Goodall began 
her work, animals were generally numbered in the research reports of ethologists.36 
Goodall decided to name rather than number the chimps to emphasize each animal’s 
individuality; a name provides the animal with a presence that a number denies him. Yet 
the names Goodall bestowed on her chimpanzees—names like Flo, Frodo, Freud, Fifi, 
Mr. McGregor37—reflect a particular cultural perspective. These are Western European 
names that hold specific historical, literary and personal associations for Goodall. The 
names are without meaning for the animals. In the garden of Eden, God brings the 
animals to Adam so that he can name them. The act of naming validates Adam’s special 
status and ensures his dominion over the animals. Goodall unexpectedly continues this 
tradition. The human names, categorizes, and differentiates; the animal is required to 
accept the human labels. In this process, the animal is incorporated into human culture 
and falls under human control.  
The anthropocentric tendencies of ethology extend beyond the practice of human-
imposed names. Many animal research projects, particularly primate projects, are used 
to reflect on the origins of man. When animal behavior is studied to understand human 
evolution, we implicitly suggest the animal is less evolved. The human becomes 
evolution’s teleological aim; the animal is left behind in evolution’s march forward. This 
view is illustrated by a recent radio interview with primatologist Marina Davilla Ross. 
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Davilla Ross studies the vocalizations of apes being tickled by human caretakers. She 
describes the ape’s response to tickling as a form of laughter. An ape laughing during 
play strongly connects with our human experience of amusement. Laughter represents a 
behavior we tend to think of as primarily human—we associate it with high-level 
cognitive processes. Davila Ross analyzed the acoustic structure of chimpanzee, 
bonobos, gorillas, orangutans and human-infant laughter. Each species’ laugh was 
different, but the closer the genetic connection between species the closer the laugh. 
This alignment of vocalization and “phylogenetic tree” suggests laughter is a shared 
expression between human and ape—a capability inherited from a common ancestor.38 
The radio program’s host, Ira Flato, played a recording of an orangutan’s laugh. The 
ape’s laughter had a grunt-like quality, less “melodic” than human laughter. One caller to 
the radio program suggested the orangutan’s laugh sounded close to her own snorting 
laugh. Flato then posited that snorting might be a legacy of our primitive past: 
Flato:  Would the most primitive laughter then going way back be more like 
snorting, since it’s a simple thing? 
Davilla Ross: Yeah, more grunt-like. 
Flato:   And so over the years it would evolve into a more complex kind of 
laugh until you get what we have? 
Davilla Ross: There is more structure…there is more variability within the laugh 
series.39  
Flato’s leading questions are colored by anthropocentric assumptions. I suspect a 
laugh’s degree of sophistication depends on the specifics of context and phenomenology 
more than how structured it sounds to the human ear. The interactions of guest scientist, 
caller and host portrayed the complicated discourse that surrounds animal behavior. At 
one moment, animals are capable of social and cognitive capabilities that seem quite 
human. At the next moment, animal capabilities are represented as somehow less than 
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human, and the animal’s behavior becomes a precursor to present-day human behavior. 
We are closely connected to the animal other but always remain securely detached. The 
animal’s evolution can never keep up with human development, and animal behavior is 
denied the possibility of being an equally sophisticated alterative to human behavior. We 
are the evolved animals; the animal other is always something we once were, never 
something we may become. We assume animal cognition and culture to be something 
subhuman, an inferior image of our own intelligence and ingenuity.  
5.2.3 The Animal’s Diminished World 
The shapeshifter’s symbolic resonance stems in part from these strict divisions 
between humans and animals. In ancient myths shapeshifting occurred between 
humans, gods and animals: Zeus transforms into a swan, bull or eagle to seduce 
mortals; Lucius’ inept magic turns him into an ass; and in Asian folklore, the fox takes on 
human form to help or hinder the people she encounters. Since the Enlightenment, an 
array of philosophers has denied the animal the ability to shape-shift. The animal lacks 
the necessary language, cognition, morality or phenomenology to apprehend the other. 
The shapeshifter’s ability to see as the other sees or exist as the other exists is available 
only to the human; only she can comprehend another’s being. Derrida examines this 
division between human and nonhuman as he analyzes the texts of Lacan and 
Heidegger and questions the underlying assumption of human exceptionalism 
embedded in these texts. 
The Enlightenment’s animal lacks the shapeshifter’s cunning or trickery. The animal 
becomes innocent; she is unable to deceive and consequently lives outside human law. 
The human’s skill at prevarication maybe a moral flaw, yet this failing is recast as 
strength. The human’s ability to deceive serves as proof of her superior intelligence. 
Lacan describes the animal’s innocence as her inability to rise above instinctual 
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reactions to the symbolic realm of language. He considers the communication strategies 
of bees to be a “code, or system of signaling” but denies these animal interactions the 
status of language. Derrida summarizes Lacan’s distinction between animal and human 
communication: “When bees appear to ‘respond’ to a ‘message,’ they do not respond 
but react; they merely obey a fixed program, whereas the human subject responds to the 
other, to the question from or of the other.”40 Lacan distinguishes language from fixed 
code by emphasizing language’s fluid, interrelated mix of signs. In Lacan’s view only the 
human is able to participate in this higher level of discourse.  
The animal’s lack of language, according to Lacan, leads to a kind of moral integrity—
the animal is incapable of deception. The animal may be able to make a display of 
strength or sexual prowess—to pretend in “physical combat or sexual display”—but he 
cannot without speech, “pretend to pretend.” “He does not make tracks whose deception 
lie in the fact that they will be taken as false, while being in fact true ones, ones, that is, 
that indicate his true trail. Nor does an animal cover up its tracks, which would be 
tantamount to making itself the subject of the signifier.” Derrida argues that the Lacanian 
animal’s inability to “pretend to pretend” gives the animal his innocence; he lives 
“anterior to the difference between good and evil.” 41 Through a filter of shapeshifting, 
this innocence prevents the animal from grasping the other’s world; the animal cannot 
feign being the other or imagine what the other is thinking/perceiving. She is always 
herself, never something else, locked in her instinctual role. And this integrity or 
innocence results in the animal being denied subjectivity. The human, however, gains 
subjectivity through his artifice. In a twist of logic, the human’s insincerity provides him a 
form of mastery that eludes the animal. Living in the symbolic realm, subjected to the 
restraints of convention and morality yet able to transgress these restraints, the human 
acquires an exclusive status: 
 144
The subject of the signifier is subject(ed) to the signifier. Lacan never stops 
insisting on the ‘dominance’ of ‘the signifier over the subject’ and over ‘the 
symbolic order which is constitutive for the subject.’ The ‘subject’ does not have 
mastery over it. Entry into the human order of the law presupposes this passive 
finitude, this infirmity, this lack from which the animal does not suffer. The animal 
does not know evil, lying, deceit. What it lacks is precisely the lack of virtue of 
which the human becomes subject of the signifier, subject subjected to the 
signifier. But to be subject of the signifier is also to be a subjecting subject, a 
subject as master, an active and deciding subject of the signifier, having in any 
case sufficient mastery to be capable of pretending to pretend and hence of 
being able to put into effect one’s power to destroy the trace. This mastery is the 
superiority of man over the animot, even if it gains its assurance from the 
privilege constituted by a defect, a lack, or a fault, a failing that derives as much 
from the generic prematurity of birth as from the castration complex, which Lacan 
designates…as the Freudian and scientific (or at least nonmythological) version 
of original sin or the Adamic fall.42 
Derrida sees Lacan’s division between human and animal as a continuation of 
Cartesian logic. Descartes famously views the animal as a biological machine. And like 
Lacan, Descartes foregrounds the critical role of language in human identity. The animal, 
according to Descartes, is incapable of differential language:  “For it is very noticeable 
that there are no human beings so unintelligent and stupid, including even mad people, 
who are incapable of arranging different words and composing from them an utterance 
by which they make their thoughts understood; whereas there is no other animal, no 
matter how perfectly or favorably born it may be, which acts similarly.” Descartes goes 
on to note that an animal’s linguistic inferiority is not the result of biological lack—an 
animal has organs that are similar to human organs. Rather, the animal’s silence is a 
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result of cognitive deficiency. And this linguistic failing stands out for Descartes against 
the ability of animals to outperform humans in certain activities: 
Thus whatever they do better than us does not prove that they have a mind 
because, on this assumption, they would have more intelligence than any of us 
and would be better at everything. It proves, rather, that they have no intelligence 
at all, and that it is nature which acts in them in accordance with the disposition 
of their organs, just as we see that a clock, which made only of wheels and 
springs, can count the hours and measure time more accurately than we can with 
all our efforts.43 
Here again we have the double logic of animality. The animal’s superiority in one 
arena proves his inferiority in general.   
Contemporary philosopher Christine Korsgaard echoes the sentiment of Lacan and 
Descartes, this time through the filter of Kantian philosophy. Korsgaard argues that only 
humans can ask if a course of action conforms to universal ethical standards. Only 
humans can achieve this higher level of intentionality regarding our actions. “We have 
the capacity for normative self-government, or, as Kant called it, ‘autonomy.’”44 
Korsgaard sees this self-governance as a distinguishing feature of human morality, 
something that separates us from other primates: 
A form of life governed by principles and values is a very different thing from a 
form a life governed by instinct, desire, and emotion—even a very intelligent and 
sociable form of life governed by instinct, desire, and emotion… 
My point is not that human beings live lives of principle and value and so are 
very noble, while the other animals don’t and so are ignoble. The distinctiveness 
of human action is as much a source of our capacity for evil as of our capacity for 
good. An animal cannot be judged or held responsible for following its strongest 
impulse. Animals are not ignoble; they are beyond moral judgment.45 
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The animal has no choice but to do what he does and this lack of choice implies 
defect. Yet this defect ensures the animal remains in a state of innocence. The human’s 
superior cognitive ability provides him a greater range of choice and higher level of moral 
responsibility. This complex moral terrain leads to humanity’s imperfection; the human 
acts in ways that are good and evil. The human’s superior status makes available to him 
new levels of divine and debased behavior. Korsgaard repeats Lacan’s distinction 
between human response and animal reaction; human morality permits the human to 
respond rather than react. The ability to respond is key to the shapeshifter’s talent; to 
become the other means identifying and even transforming into the other. The process 
requires inhabiting the other’s perspective. Without the benefits of language, cognition or 
morality, according to Lacan, Descartes and Korsgaard, the animal is unable to relate to 
the other, unable to perceive and respond to the other’s situation; unable to imagine 
being the other.  
Heidegger aligns himself with these philosophers when he creates the following 
taxonomies: the stone is without world; the animal is deprived of the world; and the 
human is world forming.46 Heidegger, however, is not concerned with the divisions of 
language or subjectivity; instead his focus is Dasein—he emphasizes being and being-
in-the-world. Heidegger reserves Dasein for the human; the animal never achieves that 
particular kind of being. The animal is defined for Heidegger by his “captivation,” his 
instinctual drive that opens him up to his environment but also blinds or cuts him off from 
the larger world. Heidegger argues that this blindness or deprivation is not simply a 
diminished perception of the world—a narrow channel of sensuality, expression or 
cognition—nor it is it the animal’s alterity—his difference in perspective relative to the 
human. Rather Heidegger posits that the animal is unable to comprehend the being-
ness of the world. “For it is not simply a question of a qualitative otherness of the animal 
world as compared with the human world, and especially not a question of quantitative 
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distinction in range, depth and breadth—not a question of whether or how the animal 
takes what is given to it in a different way, but rather of whether the animal can 
apprehend something as something, something as a being, at all.”47 
Heidegger describes the animal’s instinctual drive as a “disinhibiting ring” that 
surrounds him; a ring that opens him to particular action but denies him the ability see 
himself or the other with whom he interacts as a being. The animal’s drive—“its being 
taken” in by stimuli—“never involves an attending to beings, not even to itself as such.”48 
“More precisely, we must say that life is nothing but the animal’s encircling itself and 
struggling with its encircling ring, a ring by way of which the animal is absorbed without 
its ever being with itself in the proper sense.”49 Here Heidegger denies the animal a 
subjectivity that would permit him to be “world-forming.” Instead the animal lacks a sense 
of selfhood; he is unable see beyond his instinctual drives. Heidegger illustrates the 
animal’s drivenness at the expense of selfhood through a lab experiment conducted by 
biologist Uexkull. The first part of the experiment presents a bee with a bowl of honey. 
The bee eats the honey until satiated and then flies off. In a second phase of the 
experiment, a bee is again given honey, but this time as she eats, her abdomen is 
removed. Despite this violence, the bee continues to gorge on honey, unable to satiate 
her appetite and seemingly unaware of her injury. Honey flows from her wound as she 
continues to feast. Heidegger concludes: 
…it continues with its driven activity regardless precisely because it does not 
recognize that plenty of honey is still present. Rather, the bee is simply taken by 
its food. This being taken is only possible where there is an instinctual ‘toward….’ 
Yet such a driven being taken also excludes the possibility of any recognition of 
presence. It is precisely being taken by its food that prevents the animal from 
taking up a position over and against this food.50 
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The bee is caught in her “disinhibiting ring,” unable to satisfy her drive to feed. She 
cannot exit her world, cannot recognize the injury done to her, can never understand the 
cruel experiment in which she participates. She is isolated in her particular environment, 
detached from the world that surrounds her. 
Yet it remains to be seen if this experiment confirms Heidegger’s argument for a world-
deprived animal. In his example, the bee stands in for the entire animal kingdom; her 
behavior becomes emblematic of all animal behavior. How representative is the bee’s 
drive to devour honey? How many mammals would continue to lap up water or eat food 
if they were eviscerated? Uexkull’s violent experiment seems to speak as much about 
the difference between animals as it does about the effects of a “disinhibiting ring.” 
Heidegger’s sense of animal deprivation is based on a universal animal, one that resides 
above the diversity within and between animal species. By contrast, Derrida in his writing 
about animals, seeks out a specific, non-universal animal. He foregrounds the 
differences between species by substituting the neologism animot for the generic term 
“the animal.” Animot is a particular and unique animal. She does not represent a phylum, 
species or even a pack or tribe. Animot avoids the difference-erasing qualities of the 
category animal and proposes instead an individuated animal. 
Hiedegger’s investigation of the animal’s deprivation may gloss over the differences 
between animals, but his examination of the animal does explore new terrain beyond 
linguistic and cognitive concerns. In general, Heidegger foregrounds the whole organism 
(as opposed to a mechanized or atomized animal) and emphasizes the importance of 
ground or environment to the organism’s capacity. This is an animal that remains 
irreducible and also an animal that draws into focus the surrounding world that shapes 
both human and nonhuman. Steve Baker argues that Heidegger’s divisions are not 
entirely dismissive of the animal other. Baker sees Heidegger struggling to imagine the 
animal’s world without resorting to the well-worn tropes of anthropomorphism.51 And 
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indeed, Heidegger’s hierarchies are not entirely certain. He suggests that the animal’s 
impoverishment may be accompanied by a “wealth” unavailable to the human: “..this 
does not mean that [animal] life represents something inferior or some kind of lower level 
in comparison with human Dasein. On the contrary, life is a domain which possesses a 
wealth of openness with which the human world may have nothing to compare.”52 
Yet despite Heidegger’s emphasis on being and being-in-the-world, his new ontology 
ultimately leads him to the same conclusion as the philosophers who foreground 
language, cognition or ethics. In the end, he denies the animal a critical shapeshifting 
capacity—the ability to “transpose.” Heidegger argues that “transposing” or “going along 
with” the other is an essential human activity. “Transposing oneself into this being means 
going along with what it is and how it is. Such going-along-with means directly learning 
how it is with this being, discovering what it is like to be this being with which we are 
going along in this way.”53 This is a phenomenological “transposing”—a “going along 
with” that privileges “being with” rather than an empathic “feel our way into” or a 
cognitive meeting of the minds.54 This form of shapeshifting becomes a defining human 
trait—“the Da-sein in man means, not exclusively but amongst other things, being 
transposed into other human beings…the being-there of Da-sein means being with 
others.”55 Heidegger’s understanding of human subjectivity, an intersubjectivity 
grounded in a particular context and shaped through social interaction, makes the
to transpose a key element of being. Heidegger argues transposing is so fundamental t
our existence that we are often unaware of the degree to which our subjectivity is formed 
through this “going along with.” If Descartes promotes an isolated subject shaped by her 
consciousness, then Heidegger highlights interdependent beings who emerge in the 




But the animal is always denied this type of existence. The Heideggarian human sees 
beyond the limits of her individuation, but the animal remains enclosed in her 
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“disinhibiting ring.” This is the animal’s deprivation in the world. Contemporary 
nonhuman primate research suggests that Heidegger’s transposing may not be such an 
elemental human characteristic. Goodall documents transpecies interactions the require 
some degree of “going along with.” She witnesses an elderly baboon who frequents a 
chimpanzee feeding station, sits calmly among the tribe and often solicits grooming from 
the younger apes in the group. The chimpanzees understand his gestural requests and 
often accommodate his demands.57 In another example, Gilka, an isolated, young 
female chimpanzee embraces, tickles and plays with Goblina, a young female baboon. 
Goodall records the unusual nature of their relationship: 
It is fairly common for young chimpanzee and young baboons to play together, 
but the games usually consist of wild chasing around, either on the ground or 
through the trees, or sparring when each hits out quickly toward the other and 
then draws away. Often too, such games end with aggressive behavior from one 
or the other. Gilka’s friendship with Goblina was quite different: the contact 
between the two youngsters was nearly always gentle, and they often 
deliberately sought each other’s company…I watched Gilka and Goblina playing 
for ten minutes, and all the time they were amazingly gentle.58 
Both examples suggest chimpanzees and baboons interpret each other’s desires and 
intentions. The “discommunicating worlds” of chimp and baboon intersect in playful and 
affectionate ways. 
Primatologist De Waal also argues that nonhuman primates are able to “transpose;” he 
describes this phenomenon as “theory-of-mind.” Theory-of-mind is the ability to infer 
another organism’s perspective—“the ability to recognize the mental states of others.” 
De Waal highlights 1970s experiments that show chimpanzees going along with the 
human or ape other:  
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Offered a choice among pictures, a chimp named Sarah would select a picture of 
a key if she saw a person struggle with a locked door or a picture of someone 
climbing onto a chair if she saw a man jump up and down to reach a banana. It 
was concluded that Sarah recognized the intentions of other.59 
Though not all theory-of-mind experiments are conclusive, De Waal notes enough 
“positive outcomes” to suggest that apes employ some theory-of-mind in their 
interactions with other apes.60  
Amy Parish, a caretaker of a bonobo tribe at the San Diego Zoo, recounts another 
example of animal transposing. Working as a caretaker, Parish developed a tight bond 
with the matriarchs in a bonobo group. After being away on maternity leave, Parish 
brought in her newborn son to show to the bonobos. As she held up her child to the 
glass wall that separated humans and apes, a senior female bonobo rushed off to gather 
her own child and display him to Parish. Both mothers and offspring shared in a moment 
of familial pride.61 The bonobo matriarch seemed to recognize Parish’s gesture and 
reciprocated in kind.  
While primatologists challenge human-animal divisions through anecdotal and 
experimental evidence, Derrida counters the arguments of Heidegger and Lacan by 
examining the theorists’ underlying assumptions. Derrida flips the philosophers’ 
framework on its head. Rather than prove the animal’s cognitive, linguistic or 
phenomenological abilities, Derrida instead asks if “world-shaping” qualities or the ability 
to “respond” rather than “react” are truly essential human qualities. That is, even if we 
acknowledge that animals lack certain characteristics—something that remains 
uncertain—are we sure that humans universally possess the characteristics we deny 
animals? Derrida’s answer is that we cannot easily ascribe essential features to the 
human. Both the essential animal and the essential human are in doubt.   
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Derrida first questions Lacan’s many distinctions between humans and animals—his 
oppositions of differential and fixed communication, response and reaction, pretense of 
pretense and simply pretense—by interrogating these categorical divisions. Can any 
language be truly fixed? Is any sign system non-relational? Derrida argues that all 
communication—animal or human—implies employing interrelated signifiers. 62 The 
divide between response and reaction also becomes less certain in Derrida’s hands. He 
notes “the reactionality in the response.”63 The human’s response is often instinctual and 
automatic, not unlike Lacan’s animal reaction. And finally, Derrida notes that the 
difference between pretending and pretending to pretend is far from clear: 
It seems difficult, in the first place, to identify or determine a limit, that is to say, 
an indivisible threshold between pretense and pretense of pretense. Moreover, 
even supposing that that limit were conceptually accessible, something I don’t 
think is so, we would still have to know in the name of what knowledge or what 
testimony (knowledge is not the same as testimony) one could calmly declare 
that the animal in general is incapable of pretending pretense. Lacan does not 
invoke here any ethological knowledge (whose increasing and spectacular 
refinement is proportional to the refinement of the animot) or any experience, 
observation, or personal attestation that would be worthy of credence. The status 
of the affirmation that refuses the pretense of pretense to the animal is that of a 
simple dogma. But there is no doubt a dissimulated motivation to this humanist or 
anthropocentric dogmatism, and that is the probably obscure but indisputable 
feeling that it is indeed difficult, even impossible, to discern between pretense 
and a pretense of pretense, between an aptitude for pretense and an aptitude for 
the pretense of pretense. How could one distinguish, for example, in the most 
elementary sexual mating game, between a feint and a feint of a feint?...[there is] 
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the possibility, for every pretense, of being pretense of pretense, and for every 
pretense of pretense of being a simple pretense.64 
In a similar fashion, Derrida questions the opposition that Heidegger proposes 
between understanding the world “as such” or “not as such.”65 That is, Heidegger’s claim 
that only the human understands the world “as such”; the animal cannot conceive of a 
world outside his disinhibiting ring, cannot see beyond his instinctual drive. Only the 
human, according to Heidegger, recognizes reality—the being of being-in-the-world. 
Derrida challenges Heidegger’s conception of the human and her world by casting doubt 
on the human’s ability to comprehend the world “as such”: 
The animal doesn’t know how to ‘let be,’ let the thing be such as it is. It always 
has a relation to utility, of putting-in-perspective; it doesn’t let the thing be what it 
is, appear as such without a project guided by a narrow ‘sphere’ of drives, of 
desires. One of the questions to be raised, therefore, would be to know whether 
man does that. In other words, in order to indicate the governing principle of the 
strategy I would like to follow, it would not simply consist in unfolding, multiplying, 
leafing through the structure of the ‘as such,’ or the opposition between ‘as such’ 
and ‘not as such,’ no more than it would consist in giving back to what Heidegger 
says it is deprived of; it would obey the necessity of asking oneself whether man, 
the human itself, has the ‘as such.’66 
Derrida goes on to state that to understand something “as such” would mean “one 
doesn’t approach it or apprehend it from our perspective, from our own design.” This 
would mean in a sense an end of perspective and an ability to abandon human identity. 
Derrida is perhaps arguing that no true shapeshifter exists; that no one, not even the 
most advanced human, can truly transpose herself onto the other. The pure “as such” is 
lost. In its place there is a plurality of being, a diversity of being that avoids Heidegger’s 
hierarchies. “Hence the strategy in question would consist in pluralizing and varying the 
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‘as such,’ and, instead of simply giving speech back to the animal, or giving to the animal 
what the human deprives it of, as it were, in marking that the human is, in a way, 
similarly ‘deprived,’ by means of a privation that is not a privation, and that there is no 
pure and simple ‘as such.’”67 Neither animal nor human are wholly world-forming; both 
are open and closed-off from the array of intersecting worlds.  
5.3 Aura & Abjection 
Derrida’s doubt about human superiority does not necessarily improve the animal’s 
status. Both human and animal subjectivity become uncertain. The shapeshifter, 
somewhere between human and animal, is a precursor to this type of ambiguous 
identity. The shapeshifter becomes the symbolic subject of an uncertain age. 
Contemporary cultural shapeshifters, the werewolves and vampires that inhabit popular 
imagination, become both auratic and abject emblems as they transgress the divisions 
between animals and humans. They are physically and sexually superior, yet they are 
also degraded monsters, perpetual outsiders unable to find a place within human or 
animal culture.   
The walls between humans and animals are difficult to scale. A human who becomes 
the animal other risks social rejection and communal violence. This division between 
human and nonhuman is often used for political gain. Mark Roberts traces the tradition 
of ascribing animalistic traits to a segment of the population in order to exclude them 
from political-economic-social participation. Roberts argues that the discourses of 
racism, sexism and xenophobia use the animal as a degraded symbol that is mapped on 
to marginalized humans. Members of an excluded group are compared to apes, 
monkeys, dogs, or rodents. The animal is constructed as an absence of humanity—an 
indolent, oversexed or violent creature: 
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In this regard, animality was viewed in its more historically traditional role as lack, 
as what failed to reach the level of the human. It was no longer associated with 
the ancient myths of animal savagery and instinct, which provided an 
explanation—and an excuse—for the excesses of madness. Now its various 
functions and effects served as the basis for inferiority, as a kind of calculus of 
otherness, separating those who bore strong resemblance to animals from those 
who were deemed to have fully human characteristics.68 
And once the connection between minority and animal is secured, the minority can be 
abused in ways that humans so often abuse the animal. 
5.3.1 Affirmative Alerity 
As noted in the previous section, Derrida counters the animal-as-lack argument by 
challenging our assumptions of human superiority. His argues that humans may not be 
as sophisticated as we imagine; humans participate in the animal’s lack. Deleuze and 
Guattari take another approach. They reject an identity that is constructed through 
lack—a common theme in Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis—and instead argue 
for an identity driven by desire. This type of subjectivity does not see animality as 
degraded but rather as something to embrace. For a Deleuzian shapeshifter, desire 
triumphs over fear.  
Deleuze and Guattari argue for an alternative subjectivity that seeks perpetual 
transitions rather than stability. They seek to create a new wildness in the human, a 
“becoming animal” that is different from evolution and regression. This becoming occurs 
through “involution”—“symbioses that brings into play beings of totally different scales 
and kingdoms, with no possible filiation.” Involution seeks increased diversity beyond the 
slow moving processes of reproduction and mutation.69 These becomings emerge 
through infection and affiliation.70 Deleuze and Guatarri’s becoming animal encourages 
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multiplicity, seeking out alternative subjectivities and tying together disparate parts in a 
common goal: 
These multiplicities with heterogeneous terms, cofunctioning by contagion, enter 
certain assemblages; it is there that human beings effect their becomings-animal. 
But we should not confuse these dark assemblages, which stir what is deepest 
within us, with organizations such as the institution of the family and the State 
apparatus. We could cite hunting societies, war societies, crime societies, etc. 
Becomings-animal are proper to them.71 
For Deleuze and Guatarri, animal packs prove a potent metaphor. The distributed 
agency of a pack counters the Enlightenment’s individuated agency. It also provides an 
organizational strategy in opposition to state and familial control. These packs extend 
beyond human and animal classifications. They encompass affiliations that may include 
organic and inorganic entities; “becoming ties together animals, plants, microorganisms, 
mad particles, a whole galaxy.”72 Becoming-animal is a call to recognize the importance 
of existing affiliations and imagine alternative ways of being.   
A new subjectivity promises new liberation. Deleuze and Guattari’s shapeshifter tests 
out new identities, sensibilities and perceptions. This is a transformation that sheds a 
unified, human perspective and seeks out the margin; it celebrates the growing tendrils 
of multiplicity.  
Deleuze and Guattari’s affirmation of alerity is echoed in the shapeshifting symbols of 
contemporary culture. These shapeshifters can be seen in the “coming-out of the coffin” 
minority vampires of True Blood, a costumed Isabella Rossalini who portrays the 
dramatic conflicts of insect reproduction, or the persona of Dr. Tatiana who gives advice 
to lovelorn creatures. In each example, the shapeshifter deviates from human 
expectations and norms.  Dr. Tatiana’s role exemplifies this celebration of difference. 
Oliva Judson is the biologist behind the personality Dr. Tatiana. In her book, she plays 
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the role of a sexpert who responds to letters from sexually frustrated animals.73 Despite 
Judson's anthropocentric format, her approach refuses to privilege the conventions of 
human sexuality. From Judson’s view, evolution tries out of number of strategies—
human sexuality is simply one of many sexualities. Judson’s writes about unfamiliar 
reproductive strategies that decenter human sexuality. Evolution “solves” the problem of 
sex in unexpected and varied ways.  
5.3.2 New Forms of Alienation 
Though the shapeshifter represents new perceptions and freedoms, his transformation 
can also deteriorate into alienation. Deleuze and Guattari’s embrace of the animal other 
inadvertently invents new hierarchies. Their becoming animal privileges the wild and 
predatory animal at the expense of the domesticated, less adventurous animal. They 
posit three tiers of animality: 
We must distinguish three kinds of animals. First, individuated animals, family 
pets, sentimental, Oedipal animals each with its own petty history, ‘my’ cat, ‘my’ 
dog. These animals invite us to regress, draw us into a narcissistic 
contemplation, and they are the only kind of animal psychoanalysis understands, 
the better to discover a daddy, a mommy, a little brother behind them (when 
psychoanalysis talks about animals, animals learn to laugh); anyone who likes 
cats or dogs is a fool. And then there is a second kind: animals with 
characteristics or attributes; genus, classification, or State animals; animals as 
they are treated in the great divine myths, in such a way as to extract from them 
series or structures, archetypes or models. (Jung is in any event profounder than 
Freud.) Finally, there are more demonic animals, pack or affect animals that form 
a multiplicity, a becoming, a population, a tale.74 
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And, perhaps fearing they’ve become too rigid in their divisions, Deleuze and Guattari 
temper their categories: “Or once again, cannot any animal be treated in all three ways?” 
Yet the impact of the divisions remains. Any challenge to the status quo contains the 
potential to rearrange hierarchies without addressing underlying issues of power. The 
three tiers of animality create a new hierarchy as a substitute for existing hierarchies. 
This type of “becoming” replaces one abuser with another and erects a new division in 
place of the old.  
Donna Haraway acknowledges Deleuze and Guattari’s innovation—their ability to 
conjure up “the rich multiplicities and topologies of a heterogeneously and 
nonteleologically connected world”75—yet she argues the theorists’ example of exotic 
alterity misses the everyday world of animality: “we will learn nothing about actual 
wolves in all this.” More disturbing for Haraway than the disregard for the lived 
experience of animals is the general “scorn for the homely and the ordinary…Leaving 
behind the traps of singularity and identity is possible without the lubrication of sublime 
ecstasy bordering on the intensive affect of the1909 Futurist Manifesto.”76 Haraway 
argues that the new hierarchies Deleuze and Guattari construct tend to exclude the 
domestic, the feminine, and the emotional. “Little house dogs and the people who love 
them are the ultimate figure of abjection for D&G, especially if those people are elderly 
women, the very figure of the sentimental.” Haraway continues: 
The old, female, small, dog- and cat-loving: these are who and what must be 
vomited out by those who will become-animal. Despite the keen competition, I 
am not sure I can find in philosophy a clearer display of misogyny, fear of aging, 
incuriosity about animals, and horror at the ordinariness of flesh, here covered by 
the alibi of an anti-Oedipal and anticapitalist project. It took some nerve for D&G 
to write about becoming-woman just a few pages later!77 
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Indeed Deleuze and Guatarri’s becomings are frequently bestowed on men: “Wolf 
men, bear-men, wildcat-men, men of every animality, secret brotherhoods…”78 A chance 
to subvert the divisions of subjectivity manifests our tendency to segregate as we seek 
to topple tradition. 
Other forms of alienation arise when the shapeshifter appears. The shapeshifter 
breaches a fundamental social contract. She suggests that nonhuman alliances may 
prove more compelling than human affiliations. The result is often a communal backlash 
that leads the shapeshifter to new levels of isolation.  
Dian Fossey’s experience is emblematic of this form of alienation. If Goodall 
represents the golden girl of ethology—a reserved figure whose tireless effort generates 
acclaim and support for her research and the chimpanzees she observes—Fossey is 
portrayed as a loose cannon—a troubled woman whose reactionary excesses lead to 
violence and death. Fossey disturbs because she unabashedly identifies with the gorilla 
other, often at the expense of human concerns. Her strong identification with the animal 
permitted her to become a shapeshifter in perhaps the most literal way. In her 
interactions with gorillas she often mimicked ape-like behavior; grunting, scratching, 
chewing, beating her chest, and approaching the animals on all fours.79 Montgomery 
describes the way that Fossey acclimated the mountain gorillas to her presence: 
She would knuckle walk to within a hundred feet of them, then eighty feet, then 
fifty, then thirty. Scratching herself and crunching the bitter wild celery, she would 
settle down in the foliage, kneeling, sitting, or reclining, harmless and calm. I am 
here she announced with a belch vocalization. I am harmless she promised with 
her posture. But further, crunching celery and scratching herself, she told them I 
am one of you.80 
Fossey arrived at the Virunga mountains in 1967 hoping to establish a long-term study 
of mountain gorillas. Her first research site in Kabara had to be abandoned because of 
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civil war in the Congo. Fossey continued her study by crossing the border into 
Rwanda.81 The social turmoil of her early days foreshadowed the difficulties to come. 
Local Rwandans increasingly encroached on the wildlife preserve where the gorillas 
lived. Many viewed the wild animals and the lush mountainous terrain as a valuable 
resource available for exploitation. Poachers hunted gorillas to sell to domestic and 
international markets—Western zoos bought gorilla infants, Western collectors 
purchased preserved gorilla hands and heads, and locals ate gorilla meat as a source of 
protein. Fossey spent a significant portion of her time on “active conservation;”82 
destroying the poachers’ traps, chasing out cattle who wandered onto park lands, and 
patrolling the preserve to keep poachers out.83 Fossey also employed unconventional 
means to frighten the poachers away—she played on traditional superstitions, 
performing as if she were a witch and marking trees with occult symbols hoping to scare 
away poachers from the gorillas’ territory.84 As the conflict between poachers and 
researcher escalated, Fossey invented perverse methods of retribution: when she 
caught a poacher, she humiliated him by stripping him naked and whipping him with 
stinging nettles.85 
Fossey’s battle with the poachers spilled over into her interactions with her graduate 
students. Students were allowed to study with her as long as they also participated in the 
patrols to catch poachers and dismantle their traps. She was demanding and prone to 
fits of anger. She became increasing isolated, avoiding face-to-face contact with her 
students, preferring instead to communicate by means of terse notes typed on scraps of 
paper.86 Her moments of sociability were reserved for the gorillas; with the gorillas she 
was at ease.  
Fossey’s determination to protect the gorillas spilled out of the park and into a nearby 
village. Fossey once rewarded park guards with money when they apprehended a 
poacher. When she learned that the guards had feigned capturing the poacher and had 
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actually split the reward money with the poacher, Fossey sought revenge. She located 
the poacher’s home, hoping to confiscate his gun. When she couldn’t find the weapon, 
she stripped his hut of its interior matting and set the matting on fire. She took one of the 
poacher’s children and threatened to hurt the child if the gun was not produced. The 
battle ended a few days later, Fossey was fined and the child was safely returned. The 
incident portrays Fossey’s rage and her vigilante tactics.87 Her fight for the gorillas left 
her angry, desperate and isolated.  
Fossey heroically tried to assist the struggling gorilla troupes, but her methods 
reenacted the horrific abuses of white colonizers. Her activism was inflected with 
Western arrogance; she often ignored African sovereignty and culture.88 Her battle with 
Batwa poachers failed to recognize the long hunting traditions of that group. Fossey was 
unable to accommodate or redirect this tradition and instead relentlessly imposed her 
own cultural view on the Batwan villagers. At the same time, Fossey remained a rebel, 
the last protector of gorillas besieged by the greed and violence of humans. Galdikas 
argues that Fossey’s actions were in sync with the traditions of her adopted continent. 
She states: “Dian was very, very African. That’s the only reason she survived as a lone, 
white women on the mountain for nineteen years. She was doing what an African would 
have done in the same situation.”89 Fossey’s mix of empathic research and hateful 
revenge remain a curious contradiction. Eventually Fossey’s becoming gorilla was 
stopped short by her death. The day after Christmas, 1985, someone entered Fossey’s 
cabin and killed her with panga knife.90 Fossey’s death reveals the extreme risk that 
shapeshifters take. Once the shapeshifter denies her human identity in favor of an 
emerging, unfamiliar identity, the community she leaves behind may try to inhibit her 
transformation. Her subjectivity is labeled as madness, and she is isolated to prevent her 
perspective from infecting the larger community. If her metamorphosis continues 
unchecked, then violence may be employed to halt her transformation.  
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This scenario is repeated in variety of contexts. Animal Planet’s Living With the 
Wolfman tracks the life of Shaun Ellis, a researcher who studies the behavior of a wolf 
pack he houses in a wildlife park in Devon, UK. Ellis mimics wolf behavior when 
interacting with the wolves: he copies their physical and vocal habits and submits to the 
alpha wolf’s authority. The television show follows the integration of Ellis' fiancé, Helen 
Jeffs, into the wolf pack. Jeff’s becoming-wolf requires changing her diet and hygiene: 
she switches to a high-protein, no sugar diet and lives without fragranced soaps or 
perfume to accommodate the wolves’ olfactory sensitivities.91 Jeffs also endures a series 
of difficult pack initiation rituals. In her attempts to conform to wolf culture and the 
demands of her fiancé, Jeffs suffers physical injury and psychological discomfort. In one 
episode, Jeffs breaks down and cries after a particularly frightening encounter with the 
pack; she also suffers cuts and bruises in her interactions with the wolves. Her attempts 
at metamorphosis cannot keep up with her finance’s shapeshifting desires. The pressure 
to become wolf exhausts Jeffs, and in the show’s final episode, she leaves Ellis and the 
wolf pack to return to the familiar comforts of human life. Ellis remains with the wolves, 
caught in the gap between human and animal culture, no longer integrated into society 
but also not fully wolf. Like Fossey, Ellis’ shapeshifting contributes to his isolation. Ellis 
reflects on the dissolution of his relationship with Jeffs: 
It must be so hard for somebody that loves you to not be able to communicate 
with you for periods of time once you’ve been living with wolves, and I know it’s 
something that I have to address in order to become part of human society 
again…I think her problem came from the fact that the person that she loved was 
more in tune with the wolf pack and more accustomed to being with them that he 
ever was living alongside her.92 
In literature, the touchstone of shapeshifting alienation is Kafka’s tale of Gregor 
Samsa. Samsa is a frustrated salesman who inexplicably wakes up one morning as a 
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large dung beetle. Samsa’s metamorphosis is liberating at first. As an insect he is no 
longer required to support his father, mother and sister and is freed from the demands of 
a controlling boss and stressful job. Yet this momentary liberation quickly returns to 
abjection. Samsa is trapped by his family a second time—they are ashamed of his 
monstrous “becoming” and lock him away in his bedroom. Without Samsa’s income, his 
family is forced seek employment, and they resent his inability to contribute to family 
finances. His insect behavior and features coupled with his inability to communicate 
turns Samsa into a sub-species other. Within a short amount of time, his family sees him 
as unworthy of care and shows little interest in his material or emotional wellbeing. He 
becomes a burden, a hideous creature that requires food and shelter but provides them 
nothing in return. 
Samsa’s metamorphosis engenders a series of phenomenological changes. He retains 
his linguistic and cognitive abilities, but when he attempts to speak to his family his 
words are unintelligible to their ears. He also acquires new tastes and physical traits—he 
enjoys rotting food and loves to scurry up and down walls and ceiling. Despite these 
changes, his sensitivity to the world remains; he still thinks and feels as before. And this 
sensitivity leads him to despondency; his health deteriorates and his appetite declines. 
One night when his sister plays the violin, Samsa is so moved by the music that he 
abandons the safety of his room and ventures into the family’s parlor. The performance 
is not for Samsa or his family but rather for three boarders who represent a new source 
of income for the household. Samsa’s appearance disgusts the boarders, and they 
announce their intention to vacate the unkempt house without paying rent. After this 
incident, the family decides they can no longer tolerate Samsa’s presence. His family’s 
hostility combined with his deteriorating mental and physical health lead Samsa to a final 
metamorphosis. He dies that night, a lonely, emaciated and defeated shapeshifter.  
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A conventional interpretation of Kafka’s tale might focus on the social and economic 
desperation of humans—the human drive to exploit and regulate. Deleuze and Guattari 
emphasize the transformative aspects of the story. They argue that Samsa’s abject end 
is the result of his inability to embark on new transformations, new “becomings.”93 His 
first metamorphosis liberates him from familial and material constraint. But he remains 
stuck in an intolerable domestic situation, trapped by his family’s fear and pride. Had 
Samsa continued to transform perhaps he could become one of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
wild, pack animals, released from social repression, free to imagine a new subjectivity. 
Yet Kafka’s story suggests another interpretation, particularly in the context of animality 
and alterity. As a dung beetle, Samsa remains intelligent and sensitive. He never loses 
his ability to “go along with” his family: he understands their conversations; he avoids 
frightening his family; he worries about the household finances; he clings to a long-held 
dream to help his sister leave home and pursue her musical interests. Yet the family is 
unable to imagine Samsa’s perspective. Samsa’s attempt to communicate only disturbs 
his family. He can talk, but his family refuses to listen. After Samsa disrupts his sister’s 
violin recital, his sister makes clear the family’s unsympathetic view: 
He must go, that’s the only solution, Father. You must just try to get rid of the 
idea that this is Gregor. The fact that we’ve believed it for so long is the root of all 
our trouble. But how can it be Gregor? If this were Gregor, he would have 
realized long ago that human beings can’t live with such a creature, and he’d 
have gone away on his own accord. Then we wouldn’t have a brother, but we’d 
be able to go on living and keep his memory in honor. As it is, this creature 
persecutes us, drives away our lodgers, obviously wants the whole apartment to 
himself, and would have us all sleep in the gutter.94 
Samsa’s sister sees only her own pain. She cannot perceive Samsa’s situation. 
Kafka’s tale may be less about “becoming” other and more about the human’s inability to 
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transpose. For us, the human is the center, and all other beings are secondary. Our 
anthropocentric view infects most aspects of our world. Perhaps Samsa’s situation 
illustrates the animal’s abject state: he knows and feels more than humans can imagine 
yet is treated as a subspecies without voice or reason. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Shapeshifting from ancient to contemporary times is a perilous act. Each 
metamorphosis has the potential to liberate as well as degrade. In ancient myth, the 
gods often punished humans by changing them into animals. But the gods also 
transformed themselves into animals as a way to conceal their identity and pursue 
forbidden pleasures. This is the shapeshifter’s ambiguous status; his transformation 
limits and expands his social and phenomenological worlds.  
Heidegger argues the ability to “transpose” is an essential human trait—only humans 
are permitted to shape-shift. Derrida counters Heidegger’s exceptionalism by 
questioning our ability to perceive the other’s world; we are remarkably unaccomplished 
transposers. Limiting the ability to “go along with” to the human becomes another 
example of human arrogance, particularly when human understanding of the animal 
other remains quite elementary. Decades after Heidegger’s theory of transposing, 
Goodall discovered that chimpanzees used tools, ate meat and waged war—these seem 
rudimentary aspects of an ape’s world yet they were unknown to biologists and 
philosophers until the 1960s. Derrida is perhaps contemplating a post-human identity 
when he questions Heidegger’s essential human. If the human no longer needs to be 
separated from the animal—the human is no longer defined by the nonhuman—then an 
animal “going along with” the “other” becomes a possibility. Like ancient mythical 
characters, contemporary humans and animals reclaim their ability to shape-shift.  
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Animal strength and sensory acuity often exceed human abilities. Some wild animals 
continue to live above the alienations and restrictions of human culture. Yet these 
detachments and differences serve as proof of the animal's impoverished cognition and 
culture. This double logic of animality maintains the human's central position—we resist 
even momentary dislocation. Our world and subjectivity must always reside above and 
beyond the animal's world. Yet doubts about a privileged human subjectivity persist. 
Uexkull hints at the richness and diversity of unknown worlds that surround us. We are 
just beginning to explore the nonhuman worlds that intersect our own. And ethologists 
are becoming adept at documenting animal interactions with the human’s symbolic 
world. The divisions between worlds appear less certain.  
As world boundaries fray, a decentered human emerges. We often react with alarm 
when human superiority is challenged; alterity can be confusing and frightening. But as 
we give up a coherent, unified, anthropocentric perspective, we are able to perceive the 
many worlds that surround us. The shapeshifter affirms this kind of subjectivity. She 
mingles human and nonhuman experience and her alterity subverts the hierarchies and 
divisions of species. She acknowledges that species inhabit different worlds, but they 
need not be irreconcilably divided. This shapeshifter is able to tolerate uncertainty and 
ambivalence as she bridges the gap between human and nonhuman worlds.
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 THEORY & PRACTICE 
This chapter explores the interactions of theory and practice. I’ll be drawing on my own 
experience of multi-modal research as well as the writings of postmodern theorist Jean-
Francois Lyotard. My approach to theory and practice is within a particular context. I am 
writing from the viewpoint of an artist and thinking through my own specific engagement 
with writing and making. I am limiting theory to texts that foreground social relations and 
are inflected with economic, cultural, political, historical and technological concerns. I’m 
also limiting practice to creative action that leads to cultural concepts, artifacts and 
experiences.  
I’ll be employing a familiar organizational structure as I discuss the divisions and 
alignments of theory and practice. The three dialectics provide the framework for this 
essay. The dialectic of irreducibility and procedurality foregrounds epistemological 
concerns; autonomy and integration examine ontological issues; and aura and abjection 
investigate presence and materiality. This structure provides continuity with the previous 
chapters and brings into focus disciplinary context, subjectivity and corporeality. 
Just as I highlighted paradox and contradiction in my discussion of the ambivalent 
animal, I am looking for irresolvable tensions that occur when theory and practice are 
engaged. I’m examining the false starts and insights that emerge through the process of 
thinking, writing and making. This continues the ambivalent aesthetic that runs 
throughout the entire thesis. I am foregrounding the connections and disconnections, 
interactions and isolations of theory and practice. This is a perspective that privileges 
oscillation rather than stability and resolution; a perspective the highlights the important 
push and pull of theory and practice.  
6.1 Writing & Making 
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The interactions of making and writing play an important part in the ambivalent animal 
project. Most of my time and effort was focused on thinking through, reading about and 
writing about the animal other, but even in this analytical mode, the process of making 
influenced and shaped the writing. In particular, I incorporated artistic methods into my 
writing approach. This included developing an aesthetic that guides the interpretative 
framework as well as looking for connections and disconnections in a wide range of 
cultural and scientific sources that examine the animal. This approach mimics my artistic 
practice, a practice that fuses together aspects of society, culture and technology. And 
just as the writing was influenced by my creative practice, the making was altered by the 
methods of philosophy. The creative projects became a form of speculative research—
they are conceptual and symbolic projects that re-work the three dialectics in the 
material realm.   
6.1.1 Methods 
During the process of writing and making, I encouraged a dialogue between the 
particular and the universal. I looked for commonalities and differences as I navigated 
between personal and cultural perspectives. I also created a framework with a particular 
viewpoint that grounded the research. This framework became the three dialectics 
coupled with the ambivalent aesthetic—a framework that was refined over time and 
altered as it encountered a variety of texts and contexts. Personal perspective, 
eclecticism, an aesthetic framework and repetition became four key components in my 
approach to writing and making. 
6.1.1.1 Personal Perspective 
If some methods of research erase the personal, the ambivalent animal project 
embraces personal experience and history. Artistic methods that promote subjective 
rather than objective methods influence my approach. The personal does not, however, 
stand above culture nor are personal motivations left unexamined, but rather individual 
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perceptions are viewed as a valid starting point for research. This approach is 
comfortable with nonobjective beginnings.  
Within the personal there is an element of contingency. Each new project may develop 
in unexpected ways. Such an approach requires a tolerance for failure and also a certain 
degree of optimism that something interesting will emerge from idiosyncratic pursuits. 
Personal perceptions create alternative views that are unavailable to more formulaic 
methods. Contingency also suggests that one person’s methods may not be easily 
adapted by a different person or applied to a different context. We gain insights from the 
methods of other researchers, but we may not be able to replicate their process in our 
own research.   
In the early stages of research, the topic of ambivalent animal emerged through a 
convergence of interests: my experiences growing up with household pets; exposure to 
the issue of animal activists; an interest in health, environment and progressive politics; 
and a desire to better understand the biological manipulations experienced by many 
animals enlisted in the research of biotechnology and genetics. All of these interests led 
me to study the interactions of animals, humans and technology.  
6.1.1.2 Eclecticism 
My process not only embraces the personal but also seeks inspiration from the culture 
at large. The research looks for common ties and intractable differences in a variety of 
texts and artifacts that examine the animal. It seeks out juxtapositions, synthesizes 
disparate perspectives and attempts to navigate a variety of knowledge domains. For the 
ambivalent animal project I reviewed both cultural and scientific texts—art mingled with 
philosophy, design intersected with technology. Analyzing a wide range of texts disrupts 
personal perceptions, provides a sense of historical and cultural context, and expands 
our sense of creative practice. 
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Eclecticism may also encourage impure methods and experiments in materials and 
media. In the ambivalent animal project, eclecticism is evident in the variety of texts 
employed in the writing, in the mix of media in the creative practice, and in the 
intersections of theory and practice.  
6.1.1.3 Aesthetic Framework 
If eclecticism requires us to assess and integrate a variety of perspectives, developing 
an aesthetic framework creates a structure that is able to house this diversity of ideas. 
This framework emerges in the interactions of the individual and community, in the 
exchanges between culture and science, and in the tension between affinities and 
differences. The aesthetic framework focuses the writing and making. I use the term 
“aesthetic” because it suggests an approach that is particular to a person, group or 
specific time. My aesthetic for the ambivalent animal project is particular to this research 
project—it does not seek to create Grand Theory (though it may be employed in a 
variety of contexts), but instead creates a temporary framework with a particular point of 
view. 
The dialectics that examine issues of epistemology, ontology and corporality became 
the framework for the ambivalent animal. This is a structure that underpins both the 
writing and making. An ambivalent aesthetic keeps the dialectics in play, they oscillate 
between the particular and general, subject and object, elevation and degradation. 
Humor is also an important part of this aesthetic in the creative practice—the critique of 
anthropocentrism is tempered by playful experimentation.  
6.1.1.4 Repetition 
Repetition in one sense is the refinement of methods and perceptions. This is the re-
working and re-thinking of ideas and procedures. It seeks clarity, coherence and 
sophistication. Repetition can also be seen as way to generate new insights. Each 
instantiation of an idea creates complications and exposes unresolved issues. This is 
 176
repetition’s expansive potential—it challenges us to continually examine our habits and 
assumptions. 
In the ambivalent animal project repetition can be seen in the series of experiments 
and prototypes that led up to the final creative pieces. It is also in the re-writing and 
editing of the dissertation and the refinement of the aesthetic framework over time. 
Repetition is also in the mix of writing and making and the mixing of media—I test out an 
idea using different media and materials as one way to gain new perspectives and 
generate new questions. And repetition occurs in the organization of the dissertation 
chapters—the three dialectics are applied to each animal role; they frame the cyborg, 
clone, chimera and shapeshifter and propose related yet different insights about each 
role.  
These four components of research may appear to be sequential—we develop a topic 
through personal interest and examine that topic through a variety of texts, then through 
a mixture of personal perspective and analysis we create an overarching framework, and 
finally we explore that framework through writing and making—yet the actual process 
moves back and forth between the different stages of research. There are frequent 
interactions between the personal and communal, the specific and general, and theory 
and practice. And through these expansions and contractions the project slowly 
emerges. 
6.1.2 Speculative Creative Research 
This chapter introduces the creative practice that accompanies the writing portion of 
the ambivalent animal project. I developed two creative projects, Zoocentrix: Purrplex 
and Petite Charm. Both projects engage with the three dialectics; they explore issues of 
epistemology, ontology and corporeality. The projects' artifacts and experiences are 
speculative works—they propose alternative perspectives, bring up new questions, and 
suggest possible avenues of further research.  
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Zoocentrix: Purrplex is a series of artifacts and experiences designed for an 
individuated cat. The project employs tangible media and physical computing and 
includes the following prototypes: Customized CatTV, television programming tailored to 
an individual cat’s preferences; Outside-In, a virtual cat-and-mouse game that includes 
an interface that tracks cat movement and projects twitching images just out of reach of 
a cat's paws; SunSeeker, a moving ’bot that seeks out sunlight in the house—a cat naps 
on top of the ’bot assured he’ll be moved to the warmest place in the house; Meat 
Mobile, a mobile adorned with dried fish that slowly rotates as a cat approaches; Tail-
Twitcher, stuffed-animal mice tails that twitch, triggering a cat’s hunting instinct. My 
colleague and collaborator, Brain Schrank, also created Mama Nipples, a bed/kneading 
pillow/milk dispenser, and Love Bytes, a device that lets a guardian send messages to 
his cat and dispense treats from a remote location. These prototypes were promoted as 
the latest innovation in cat toys and entertainment.  
The second project, Petite Charm, imagines a new kind of pet—a pet who is 
genetically modified to be small and docile enough to live on a human's arm. Petite takes 
nourishment by drawing blood from his guardian’s arm and removes waste through his 
guardian’s digestive tract. Petite Charm's genetic modification permits him to be 
integrated into the guardian’s body, making Petite the ultimate “emotional-support” 
companion. The human host to the parasitic dog encounters corporeal risks and 
caretaking responsibilities. The guardian’s blood could become contaminated resulting in 
illness and Petite requires a steady supply of fresh human blood when he is detached 
from the guardian’s arm. These complications suggest that a solution to one problem—
creating a miniature dog who can accompany his guardian anywhere—generates 
complications—close animal-human integration may sicken the guardian and requires 
the guardian to accommodate new pet-care routines.  
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Zoocentrix and Petite Charm create an opportunity to think about anthropocentrism 
within a culture of techno-science. Zoocentrix questions the human-focus of many 
tangible media/ubicomp projects; it argues that other species might also enjoy the 
benefits of mediated environments. Petite Charm examines anthropocentrism through a 
recapitulation and exaggeration of the long history of human and canine interaction. 
Petite ask us to review our complicated relationship with dogs and consider the ways we 
regulate and are regulated by animals. 
Both projects engage with issues of anthropocentrism and animality through the 
framework of the three dialectics. Zoocentrix explores issues of epistemology and 
materiality as it tries to determine a cat's interests and sense of aesthetics. Observation 
of cat behavior and a review of commercial cat toys inform the design process, yet 
attempting to understand a cat’s needs quickly reveals the difficulty of grasping a cat’s 
desires given our limited knowledge of feline phenomenology. The project also 
foregrounds a cat’s subjectivity—the cat is seen as subject worthy of research and a 
subject whose life might be improved through the techniques of tangible media. At the 
same time the project comments on the utopian rhetoric of techno-science—it questions 
the assumption that animal (or human) lives are inevitably enhanced through 
technological innovation. It parodies the uncritical faith in technology as a savior to both 
animals and humans.  
Petite Charm is inspired by epistemological questions like: What is a dog?; What is a 
pet?; and if a dog is rendered immobile and his metabolism and diet drastically altered, 
is he still a dog or even a pet? The project also examines the ways that pets are the 
seen as the property of humans; the ways in which humans modify and regulate animals 
to meet human needs and desires. At the same time, the corporeal complications of 
Petite Charm—the potential health risks to a human host—suggest that human desires 
are often countered by pet demands. Human and pet enter into a relationship that 
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requires accommodations from both parties, and this in turn alters the subjectivity and 
corporeality of both human and animal. Issues of mediation and materiality are also 
explored in the artifacts that accompany the project. Vinyl-skinned stuffed animals, a 
promotional web site, and mementos for the audience—all become a series of 
experiments inspired by Petite Charm's central concept and realized in a variety of 
material formats.  
The projects were designed for the context and community of Georgia Tech's School 
of Literature, Communication & Culture (LCC) Demo Day. Demo Day is a three-to-four 
hour event at the end of each semester that creates a forum for LCC graduate students 
and faculty to present their research projects. The audience is a mix of Georgia Tech 
students and faculty as well as people who work in the media, entertainment and high-
tech industries. Demo Day provides a moment for students to explain their research as 
well as an opportunity to make professional contacts. For the audience, the event 
introduces them to LCC’s research initiatives—this is a chance to meet with and be 
inspired by a community of digital-media researchers. Research projects are exhibited in 
LCC classrooms and many projects are often presented side by side in a single space. 
This creates a lively environment—students, posters, artifacts and media all compete for 
the attention of LCC visitors. Demo Day encourages a type of salesmanship—it is a 
moment to promote your research to a receptive audience. As part of the ambivalent 
animal project, I was interested in challenging some of the assumptions of Demo Day. I 
wanted to exaggerate the performance of salesmanship and also question the 
technological enthusiasm that often accompanies the demonstration of digital projects. 
To do this, Brian Schrank and I posed as entrepreneurs who were eager to sell the latest 
in animal games and genetically modified pets.  
Audience reaction at Demo Day suggests that many saw the ambivalent animal project 
as unusual and a little out of step with their expectations of new media projects. The 
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juxtaposition between ambivalent animal and other digital media projects was enhanced 
by the space we choose for the works. While most projects are presented side by side in 
large classrooms, we were able to present the ambivalent animal project in what was 
once a telephone room—a narrow, closet-like space, a little more than six feet by 
seventeen feet in dimension. This gave us a semi-autonomous space, one that could be 
disconnected from other Demo Day projects yet still part of the flow of visitor traffic. The 
room was also filled with the smell of dried fish and cat food and the sight of stuffed 
animals and new media artifacts—this was a closet populated with unusual smells and 
objects. Audience members reacted in mostly positive ways. One person stated, “This is 
weird!” but then brought several other people to see the work. Many people found the 
projects amusing. Zoocentrix tended to be an easier project to translate into the interests 
of a media-focused audience. Many participants made connections between ubicomp 
projects designed for humans and Zoocentrix's offerings aimed at cats. On participant 
stated, "This is like a smart home for cats." Petite Charm generated stronger reactions. 
One participant stated, “PETA would be fine with all of these [pointing to Zoocentrix 
projects], but not this [pointing to Petite Charm].” Still, for some, Petite Charm was not 
completely repellant; one audience member said, “I would be interested in that if it was a 
cat instead of a dog.” 
Humor was a critical element of the presentation of this work. I saw humor as part of 
the ambivalent aesthetic—a way to ask questions without slipping into a sanctimonious 
critique. Humor provides one way to create a "weak response" to both anthropocentrism 
and the culture of techno-science. Leonard Lawlor, following after Derrida, describes a 
weak response to speciesism as "ratcheting down" the violence inflicted on animals 
without creating coercive mechanisms that regulate human behavior. By clearly 
exaggerating my salesmanship of Zoocentrix and Petite Charm, I invited audience 
members to participate in my performance. This was a playful way to engage people in 
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difficult issues. To preach or attack directly could easily make people defensive, shut 
down debate and generate hostile reactions. A humorous approach eases people into 
the discussion and has the potential to challenge assumptions without being didactic. 
This approach examines the divisions between animals and humans without creating 
divisive rhetoric. It is a soft form of opposition that hopes to begin a discussion about 
anthropocentrism.  
This sense of play was reinforced by the projects' design. My formal approach included 
stuffed animals and cartoon characters. When Petite Charm is presented as a cute, 
stuffed animal that can be strapped to your arm, the monstrous side of Petite is 
diminished, and he can be seen less as a parasite and more as comforting companion. 
Zoocentrix’s critique of anthropocentrism and techno-utopia was tempered by the toy-
like quality of the artifacts animated by motors, media and sound. And mementos like 
coloring books, badges and stickers referenced the whimsical appeal of childhood 
trinkets and collectibles. This playful sensibility is part of the ambivalent aesthetic—the 
pieces are a mix of strange and familiar, critical and affirmative, dark and light.  
6.2 Irreducibility & Procedurality 
6.2.1 Language Games 
An examination of the interactions of theory and practice offers an opportunity to 
explore the divisions between different modes of research. Jean-Francois Lyotard 
following after Ludwig Wittgenstein examines the language games that are naturalized 
within a particular disciplinary discourse. Each domain of knowledge has its own “game 
rules”—established methods of explicating data, proving competence, and declaring 
success. Lyotard discusses the differences between cultural narratives and scientific 
discourse: 
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Both are composed of sets of statements; the statements are 'moves' made by 
the players within the framework of generally applicable rules; these rules are 
specific to each particular kind of knowledge, and the 'moves' judged to be 'good' 
in one cannot be of the same type as those judged 'good' in another, unless it 
happens that way by chance.1 
Lyotard argues that the “game rules” of science have changed in a postmodern epoch. 
No longer is performance or efficiency the primary goal of science. Performance in this 
context could be interpreted as rigorously employing and exploiting existing “game 
rules.” Contemporary science is less sure of its grasp of a system’s mechanisms and 
“variables”—that is, a system is seen as less stable, not fully “calculable” or knowable. 
Instead of improving the performativity of game rules, postmodern science embraces 
paralogy—it seeks out new “moves” in the language game of science.2 “Science is a 
model of an ‘open system,’ in which a statement becomes relevant if it ‘generates ideas’ 
that is, if it generates other statements and game rules.”3 
This desire for alternative “moves” blurs the boundaries of disciplinary fields. The 
metanarratives of the Enlightenment are unable to contain the diversity of language 
games.4 No single narrative can shape the underlying logic of all language games. And 
without an overarching narrative to guide and restrain knowledge, disciplinary fields 
become less fixed and start to employ new methods of discourse. Postmodernity’s lack 
of consensus permits multiple ways of examining and expressing ideas—no one method 
is able to dominate all others. In this shifting epistemological context, combining theory 
and practice becomes a possibility. Navigating across different modes of inquiry inspires 
new “moves.”  
Moving back and forth between theory and practice creates a unique opportunity. 
Crossing the divide between two language games not only promises the possibility of 
innovation but also makes apparent the differences between the two domains of 
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knowledge. We become conscious of what can be articulated within a language game; 
we recognize the strengths and insights as well as tools, methods and traditions of a 
particular mode of action. We are also conscious of what cannot be easily articulated 
within a domain of knowledge—the types of action and analysis that are excluded or 
forbidden. Switching between language games brings into the focus the advantages and 
limitations of each mode of research. 
Assessing and employing different game rules requires navigating unfamiliar terrain. 
No longer tied to just theory or practice, the practitioner-theorist is forced to discover 
alternative methods of action. Steve Baker describes this “inexpert” action as a mode of 
research commonly employed in an era of paralogy:  
Invention, Lyotard writes, “is always born of dissension,” and this idea is at the 
heart of “postmodern knowledge,” whose principle “is not the expert’s homology, 
but the inventor’s paralogy.” It is a kind of partisan knowledge, in other words, 
which refuses to conform to rules and which may even embrace the apparently 
fallacious, not knowing what will follow from that.5 
Baker notes that this type of “inexpert” action is more likely to create questions than 
provide answers.6 The process of working through different language games requires 
embracing unfamiliar identities and evolving procedures. The theorist-practitioner 
transgresses traditional epistemological borders and engages with a range of ideas, 
materials, communities, and protocols. This may leave the practitioner-theorist in an 
uncomfortable position—he lacks the expert's epistemological confidence. But the 
contingency of his environment may also invigorate well-worn perspectives, 
communication strategies and cognitive processes.  
6.2.2 Ways of Knowing 
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Practice and theory create different kinds of knowledge. The two modes of research 
are often divided by differences in method, medium, expression, and validation. 
Language, rhetoric, history, and economics also play a role in maintaining this division. 
This gap between theory and practice sometimes leads to epistemological inequalities. 
Theory’s capacity to invent knowledge is rarely questioned; practice’s knowledge-
producing ability in the context of art-making, however, remains less sure.  
Epistemological concerns of theory and practice are explored in a listserv hosted by 
iDC (Distributed Creativity)—an academic forum that discusses issues of research and 
pedagogy. One thread examined the emergence of theory-practice Ph.D. programs in 
university new media departments. I use this thread to provide a snapshot of particular 
kind of discourse happening in the early 21st century in a mostly American, humanities-
oriented, academic context. Margaret Morse, professor at UC Santa Cruz, Film & Digital 
Media, moderated the discussion. In her introductory post, Morse highlighted practice’s 
knowledge-producing capacity. She noted that her department holds a “positive belief in 
(media) art as a mode for creating knowledge that should have access to a broader or 
deeper foundation of studies.”7 
Creating a theory-practice Ph.D. as a method to explore a “broader” range of 
knowledge was taken up in a post by Mary Anne Staniszewski who teaches in 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute’s Art Department. Staniszewski wrote that RIT 
developed a practice-theory Ph.D. degree in part to allow students more time to gain 
knowledge outside the domain of art. In her program, art students not only study art 
theory and practice but also explore fields like “communication technologies, biology, 
and gaming”—domains of knowledge that tend to exist outside art-school instruction. 
Staniszweski noted that RPI’s MFA—a two-year terminal degree—does not allow 
enough time for artists to adequately explore interdisciplinary approaches. Providing a 
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Ph.D. degree permits more expansive research methods. Using Lyotard’s framework, 
the Ph.D. program gives students time to learn about alternative language games. 
When Morse writes about art as a “mode for creating knowledge,” though, she moves 
beyond the idea of interdisciplinary study. Practice as a way of knowing and generating 
knowledge is a more radical notion of art and media production than Staniszewski’s idea 
of supplementing practice by exploring other disciplines. Practice as a method of 
producing knowledge challenges the traditional divisions between theory and practice. 
Both theory and practice become modes of understanding, assessing and developing 
insight. In a post following Morse’s, David Hakken proposed that practice creates 
knowledge in a couple of ways. The first way, “a relatively weak claim,” argues that in 
the process of making we recognize what we do not know and return to theory to fill in 
the gaps. The second way, “a stronger claim,” argues “that making (media) art is itself its 
own way of knowing.”8 Morse concurs with Hakken’s claim by relating her own 
theoretical work to art practice:  
I am not an artist, so I can only guess that making an art piece is like writing, in 
that the act of formulating language itself brings out unanticipated insight and 
utterly new perceptions. This reminds me of the essay by Kleist on “the gradual 
completion of thoughts while speaking.” I only know what I really think when I 
write about it.9  
Morse raises practice to the epistemological level of theory. In this framework, practice 
is neither the servant nor object of theory. And theory-practice moves beyond an attempt 
to push practitioners into theory or compel theorists to engage with practice. 
Staniszewski’s argument that a Ph.D. degree allows artists to expand their repertoire of 
knowledge maintains theory’s dominance and extends its influence to interdisciplinary 
study. This perpetuates a Cartesian bias that relegates practice to a subservient 
status—the act of making is tainted by its association with sensuality and bodily labor; 
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theory-writing is elevated through its connection to language, reason and mind. Morse 
and Hakken suggest, however, that practice, just like theory, is a legitimate method of 
producing knowledge.  
A similar debate emerges between art and science. A recent conference for the 
Society for Literature, Science and the Arts (SLSA) organized a roundtable to discuss 
art’s ability to create knowledge and science’s capacity to generate art. The panel 
included a visual artist, literary expert, art historian and physicist. Physicist Sidney 
Perkowitz of Emory University referenced the light-inspired works of James Turrell to 
describe art’s knowledge-making capacity. Perkowitz describes Turrell’s light as 
“granular”: “It’s almost as if you were able to take each individual photon and blow it up 
to a point where we could see it.” Perkowitz views Turrell’s way of working with light as 
unique. “Turrell has found a piece of knowledge about human visual cognition which 
perhaps he alone knows how to express. If he were a scientist he would rush into 
publication and tell us about his important new discovery.” Perkowitz goes on to describe 
key differences in the language games of art and science: 
Here are things that go on in scientific knowledge: 
You express your result in detail. You publish it. It’s meant to be read and 
understood by other scientists in the field to the point where the process can be 
replicated. That’s really, really important. What you publish, it better either be 
consistent with known knowledge or it has to provide a new improved level of 
explanation, a better theory. And finally, at some level, it’s affirmed by the 
community of relevant scientists as being the correct description of what’s going 
on in nature for this particular piece of nature. 
What does an artist do? Artists also have knowledge, but it’s expressed in 
artistic terms but not necessarily in any other kind of detail. Turrell did not write a 
paper about the lighting conditions that makes light look granular. It’s meant to be 
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conveyed not to a whole community of other artists, in parallel to what scientists 
do, but to the viewer—there’s a channel between the artist and viewer. It is not 
exposed to community standards which have attached to them words such as 
“consistent with known knowledge” or “reproducibility.” Again which is what the 
scientist looks for. In general…in art there is no communal mechanism to stamp 
a piece of artistic knowledge as the one correct description of reality or even the 
correct solution to an artistic problem. So maybe the idea of rightness or 
correctness doesn’t apply very well to artistic knowledge at all because it’s more 
individual, it’s between the artist and the viewer; it’s more experiential…in 
Turrell’s thing you actually have to be in the room to understand what he’s saying 
about the granularity of light. And finally it’s more opaque than scientific 
knowledge because it’s not expressed in these detailed forms. But I think the 
opaqueness is a good thing because according to George Braque, the best thing 
about art is that part that you can’t explain.10 
Of course, there are communities that evaluate art practice. Though perhaps 
Perkowitz is expressing a sense that these art communities are less systematic than 
scientific communities in their methods of assessment. They may be more fragmented or 
isolated, less global in their reach, and less willing or able to impose universal standards. 
Steven J. Oscherwitz, a visual artist and professor at Emory University, was also on 
the SLSA panel. He describes art’s influence on the sciences as follows: 
I feel that artists have access to different levels or frequencies of knowledge. And 
these knowledge forms, these forms are actually part of the physical world, just 
like we are, just like animals are, insects are. But we do not yet conceive of ways 
to extrapolate their reality. And I think that as time goes on, art that hangs in 
museums will have a different reality in our minds—will develop new concepts 
about form, abstract form that allows it not to be this impotent, passive, bourgeois 
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thing that hangs in museums….these forms are really, really part of the physical 
world. They have a reality in the world…. In order to really capture certain 
physical laws to understand even diseases like cancer. These forms are going to 
help us solve problems and riddles of nature that our conceptual form in physics 
or biology at this point, they’re not there. 
Oscherwitz’s statement celebrates art’s ability to create knowledge, but he also returns 
the final judgment of knowledge to the sciences. The scientist produces knowledge after 
being influenced by art’s innovation. This leaves art’s knowledge in a subordinate role: 
art’s knowledge is only valuable when it inspires insights in the domain of science. 
Surprisingly, physicist Perkowitz’s view of art is more radical. He respects the difference 
between science and art without rushing to create value judgments. He sees in Turrell a 
type of knowledge that stands on its own merit. Turrell’s light remains a revelation that 
cannot be fully explicated through the language games of science.  
6.2.3 Interactions of Theory and Practice 
When practice and theory engage in a dialogue, new forms of interaction between the 
two domains of knowledge may emerge. In my own practice, these interactions occur in 
a variety of ways. Before developing the framework of the three dialectics, I created 
some initial sketches and prototypes for a project entitled Lovely Monster. I was 
imagining a series of networked, wearable extensions that looked like animal parts and 
responded to individual, communal and environmental data inputs. For example, 
mechanical wings worn on the back might expand and contract based on the wearer’s 
breathing patterns or animate to the breathing patterns of a member of the “flock” or 
respond to air temperature—flapping to cool you when it’s hot and retracting to keep you 
warm when it’s cold. In the process of conceptualizing these animal augmentations, 
issues of art making, subjectivity, materiality, and corporeality came to the fore. These 
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issues highlighted by the Lovely Monster project became the basis for the three 
dialectics. Specifically, the tension between using off-the-shelf, generalized hardware-
software to construct one-of-a-kind artworks led to the dialectic of irreducibility and 
procedurality. General-purpose components require procedural innovation, yet the 
artwork employs these components in ways that are specific to particular person and 
context. Quantifying bodily processes to animate the wearables also challenged me to 
consider the irreduciblity of corporeal perceptions—how do we quantify a person's level 
of stress, contentment or excitement? Such measurements can easily ignore the 
complex physiology and emotions of an individual. Looking to animals for formal, social 
and phenomenological inspiration led to questions of subjectivity and anthropocentric 
arrogance. The division between humans and nonhumans and the complexities of pack 
behavior led to the dialectic of autonomy and integration. And the tension between 
technology that enhances and technology that invades our lives led to the dialectic of 
aura and abjection. To put on an animal wearable gives you access to a new kind of 
phenomenology as well as initiates you into a pack of augmented human-animal hybrids. 
At the same time, wearing the animal apparatus makes you an absurd spectacle and 
transmits bodily data that you may wish to conceal. The Lovely Monster project remains 
in its embryonic stage—it waits for a chance to emerge as a fully developed artifact—but 
its legacy is evident in the structure of the thesis. Thinking through the complexities of a 





6.1 Illustration for the Lovely Monster project 
 
In another example, theory influenced the creation of an art project. Petite Charm, a 
conceptual project that imagines a parasitic pet who is attached to your arm, is inspired 
by the subjective and corporeal transformations proposed by posthuman theorists. The 
project is also inspired by the design research of Royal College of Art professors, 
Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby. Dunne-and-Raby projects investigate about-to-happen 
technological scenarios and develop objects and experiences that engage with the 
interactions of culture and technology. They combine theory’s speculative style with 
industrial and experience design. The work of Dunne and Raby and the methods of 
theory gave me the creative license to explore a project I could not physically 
construct—I was free to engage with issues of biotechnology without becoming a 
bioengineer. Petite Charm houses a variety of symbolic artifacts (stuffed-animal puppies 
that are strapped to the arm, survival-chambers designed to protect and nourish the dog 
when he is detached from a human arm, media artifacts that promote the project as well 
as hint at the complications of hosting a parasitic dog), but the project remains at its core 
a conceptual exploration that tries to comprehend the pleasure and pain of animal-




6.2 Illustration for Petite Charm project 
 
A final example draws on Lyotard’s idea of language games. My training in the 
language game of art—a postmodern pedagogical approach popular in art schools at the 
turn of the 21st century—encourages hybrids of high and low culture. Inspiration was 
sought in eclectic mixtures. This approach to art practice influences my theoretical 
methods. This dissertation navigates across the domains of poststructuralist theory, 
animal studies, ethology, biotechnology, fine art and popular culture. Seeking out a 
variety of sources is everyday practice for many contemporary artists and synthesis 
becomes a part of the artist’s craft. I have employed this sensibility to my theoretical 
work by negotiating between different language games.  
A postmodern mix of language games and media is also evident in my approach to 
Petite Charm. Brian Schrank and I presented the project at LCC’s Demo Day as if it 
were the latest innovation in pet companions. We became salesmen for the Petite 
Charm product and enhanced this performance with a series of artifacts. I created 
several vinyl-skinned stuffed animals that could be attached to your arm and strapped 
the animal to my arm while explaining the project. In addition, I made Petite Charm 
 192
coloring books, Puff Petite rings, badges, posters and stickers—these items served as 
mementos that participants in the performance could keep. Creating paraphernalia 
continued the parody of corporate salesmanship, but it also allowed me to explore the 
ideas of Petite Charm across a range of media. This mix of motivations and artifacts was 
designed to add to the ambivalence of the project. The experience shifted between 
student showcase, entrepreneurial promotion and art performance, and the concept 
moved from one instantiation of the Petite Charm idea to another. This impurity was 
essential to the presentation of Petite Charm—the experience was simultaneously 
critical and oppositional, serious and playful, formal and conceptual.  
 
 
6.3 Petite Charm coloring books, Puff Petite rings, and badge 
 
All the above projects are influenced by the oscillations of theory and practice. My 
epistemological methods—my ways of knowing—borrow from the traditions of both 
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research modes. Writing and making for the ambivalent animal helped to engage 
practice and theory.    
6.3 Autonomy & Integration: Transgressed Divisions 
The dialectic of irreducibility and procedurality and Lyotard’s language games 
foreground epistemological issues. The dialectic of autonomy and integration 
emphasizes ontological concerns. When we move beyond specific game rules and start 
to trace the boundaries of a domain of knowledge, epistemological concerns shift into 
ontological considerations. Why are things divided into categories? How do these 
boundaries of knowledge construct my sense of the world? Are there other domains of 
knowledge, off-limit disciplines or unchallenged assumptions that might enhance or alter 
my methods of research? And how do existing boundaries support the status quo? 
Matei Calinescu notes a shift from epistemology to ontology in literary culture. He 
argues that modernity highlights epistemological uncertainty and postmodernity 
emphasizes ontological confusion. In the modernist age, a protagonist questions what 
he knows. In the post-modern age, he questions what exists in his world. Calinescu 
quotes Brian McHale to support his view:  
The dominant Modernist writing is epistemological. That is, Modernist writing is 
designed to raise such questions as: what is there to be known? who knows it? 
How do they know it and with what degree of certainty? how is knowledge 
transmitted from one knower to another and with what degree of reliability?  
The dominant of Postmodernist writing is ontological. That is, Postmodernist 
writing is designed to raise such questions as: what is a world? what kinds of 
world are there, how are they constituted, and how do they differ?...what is the 
mode of existence of a text, and what is the mode of existence of the world (or 
worlds) it projects?11 
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The distinctions between epistemology and ontology should not be seen as entirely 
incommensurate. The two filters are affiliated. Calinescu argues for a strong link 
between epistemological and ontological questions. He states that “when the inner logic 
of modernist questioning is pushed to the extreme, it brings about postmodernist 
questioning and vice versa.”12 When we investigate a language game, we trace the 
epistemological framework of a particular domain of knowledge. When we compare 
language games, issues of epistemology merge into ontology. We examine the 
interactions between worlds—the differences between language games—and analyze 
the way we inhabit and engage with others within a world.  
An ontological emphasis highlights issues of difference, power and justice. Lyotard 
examines the tension between language games through his concept of the differend. A 
differend reveals the heterogeneity of “phrase regimens”—it highlights the differences in 
address, explication, argument, understanding, ethics and assessment between different 
communities that inhabit different language games. “[A] differend would be a case of 
conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a 
rule of judgment applicable to both arguments.” A differend highlights the variety of 
“phrase regimens” that operate in different domains of knowledge and the injustice that 
occurs when one domain of knowledge imposes its language game on another domain. 
Lyotard argues that “a universal rule of judgment between heterogeneous genres [of 
discourse] is lacking in general.”13  
“Phrase regimens” are situated within and specific to a community and domain of 
knowledge. Phrases are linked in particular ways within “genres of discourse.” Lyotard 
describes the disconnections between phrase regimens as follows:  
For every phrase regimen, there corresponds a mode of presenting a universe. A 
genre of discourse inspires a mode of linking phrases together, and these 
phrases can be from different regimens. The universe presented by a cognitive 
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and the universe presented by an exclamative are heterogeneous. The stakes 
implied in the tragical genre, its intended success (shall we say, the feelings of 
fear and pity on the part of its addressees), and the stakes implied in the 
technical genre, its own success (shall we say, the availability of the referent for 
the addressor’s wants) are, for their part, incommensurable, and they induce 
heterogeneous linkings, be they on the basis of the same phrase.14 
A genre shapes the way that phrases are combined and expressed: “We believe that 
we want to persuade, to seduce, to convince, to be upright, to cause to believe, or to 
cause to question, but this is because a genre of discourse, whether dialectical, erotic, 
didactic, ethical, rhetorical, or ‘ironic,’ imposes its mode of linking onto ‘our’ phrase and 
onto ‘us.’”15 Lyotard’s concept of a differend emphasizes the gap between discourse 
genres and the uncertain process of linking one phrase to another. In the context of this 
chapter, we could say a differend exists between the domains of theory and practice. A 
sensibility of ambivalence highlights the tension between language games; it embraces 
difference while attempting to prevent one phrase regimen from dominating another. At 
the same time, it seeks out new “moves” by engaging both theory and practice. This mix 
of methods hopes to expand the possibilities of both domains by working through this 
differend. And this sensibility is crucial to my own understanding of the integration and 
autonomy of theory and practice. Both “genres of discourse” have their particular 
“phrase regimens”; we could describe this as a certain amount of autonomy. For 
example, one possible generic model of a theoretical phrase regimen could be: a 
general thesis is proposed; arguments and counter arguments are presented; arguments 
move in a logical manner, build on previous arguments and create a trail of supporting 
evidence; resolution is reached when arguments are exhausted and a conclusion can be 
stated; success is achieved when the original thesis is validate or disproved. A phrase 
regimen for art practice might follow a different kind of model: a body of work explores a 
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specific idea, often personal or social; a particular aesthetic or perspective frames the 
work; a series of artifacts or experiences explore different aspects of the idea; success is 
achieved through aesthetic innovation, perceptual disruption or political insight. Different 
genres solicit different phrase regimens. In the previous examples, phrases are linked in 
a theoretical argument or in aesthetic expression. 
Lyotard argues that innovation emerges when different language games interact and 
existing idioms fail:  
In the differend, something “asks” to be put in phrases, and suffers from the 
wrong of not being able to be put into phrases right away. This is when the 
human beings who thought they could use language as an instrument of 
communication learn through the feeling of pain which accompanies silence (and 
of pleasure which accompanies the invention of a new idiom), that they are 
summoned by language, not to augment to their profit the quantity of information 
communicable through existing idioms, but to recognize that what remains to be 
phrased exceeds what they can presently phrase, and that they must be allowed 
to institute idioms which do not exist.16  
Attempts to combine theory and practice cause vibrations between two genres. These 
undulations provide a moment of danger and opportunity. One discourse may quickly 
dominate the other; one genre could determine the operating rules of another. There 
may be irresolvable differences, gross miscommunications and disconnections. But at 
the same time, the interactions of genres may also invent new moves. The ambivalent 
animal project walks a tenuous line—it recognizes the distinctions of theory and practice 
yet proposes that the process of traversing these different domains engenders 
alternative methods of thinking-through, assessing and making. Theory and practice 
never completely merge but rather the tension between the two domains remains in 
play. And this tension, this lack of consensus, may lead to unexpected insights. These 
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interactions of theory and practice have altered both the writing and making of this 
dissertation. The writing’s argument is shaped by an ambivalent aesthetic; the making 
incorporates conceptual approaches and is influenced by philosophical debates. 
6.3.1 Complicity and Critique 
The dialectic of autonomy and integration is not only engaged by the interactions of 
theory and practice, it also appears in an ambivalent aesthetic that mingles oppositional 
and complicit modes of artistic address. Zoocentrix and Petite Charm oscillate between 
affirmation and critique. They engage two sides of contemporary art discourse—one side 
promotes art’s autonomy, the other acknowledges art’s connection to culture and 
markets. Claire Bishop’s writing about relational aesthetics is emblematic of an 
oppositional stance. Joanne Drucker’s assessment of contemporary art highlights a 
complicit approach to creative practice. An ambivalent aesthetic recognizes the 
importance of both positions—it imagines theoretical and creative research that is both 
autonomous and integrated.  
Bishop examines the mechanisms and reception of relational-aesthetic artworks. 
These artworks tend to create participatory experiences rather than traditional artifacts—
the artist invites participants to form a community and shape an aesthetic experience. 
Issues of debate, democracy and political engagement are central to Bishop’s 
investigation of relational aesthetics. Bishop characterizes democracy as a political 
space of continuous challenge: “a fully functioning democratic society is not one in which 
all antagonisms have disappeared, but one in which new political frontiers are constantly 
being drawn and brought into debate…Without antagonism there is only the imposed 
consensus of authoritarian order—a total suppression of debate and discussion, which is 
inimical to democracy.”17 Bishop notes that the rhetoric of relational artworks often 
emphasizes the importance of non-authoritarian social interactions, but she proposes 
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that many of these relational artworks lack the push and pull of democracy; they are 
instead designed for and experienced by a closed-community of like minded cultural 
connoisseurs.  
One artist that Bishop examines in her critique of relational artworks is Rirkit Tiravanija. 
Tiravanija is perhaps best known for an art performance in which he cooks a Thai meal 
in a gallery space and in the process turns an exhibition space into dining room. 
Tiravanija describes his approach as: “it is not what you see that is important but what 
takes place between people.” Tiravanija’s work questions the divide “between 
institutional and social space” as well as “artist and viewer.”18 The gallery is transformed 
into a communal space instead of a promotional/administrative space; the artist creates 
an experience rather than artifact and the participants’ interaction determines that 
experience. Bishop describes relational artworks as lab-like environments that 
encourage multi-participant performances that are “open ended, interactive, and 
resistant to closure.”19 “Relational art works seek to establish intersubjective encounters 
(be those literal or potential) in which meaning is elaborated collectively rather than in a 
privatized space of individual consumption.”20 The social experience trumps the 
aesthetic or formal experience. 
Bishop’s critique of Tiravanija’s social performances is determined by her definition of 
democracy. Tiravanija creates what relational theorist and booster Nicola Bourriaud calls 
a “microutopian” environment. Bishop argues that “there is no inherent friction” in this 
social situation. Tiravanija creates a feel-good art experience that simply gathers a group 
of like-minded art enthusiasts.21 Tiravanija’s work, according to Bishop, lacks the 
antagonism that is at the core of democracy. And this type of democracy guides 
Bishop’s assessment of relational aesthetics: the best work generates social tension. 
As a counter example to Tiravanija’s work, Bishop showcases the art of Santiago 
Sierra. According to Bishop, Sierra’s politically charged events employ a more 
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challenging form of relational aesthetics. Sierra pays participants to engage in 
preplanned activities that comment on economic and social injustice. In one event, 
Sierra hires people to stand side by side while a continuous line is tattooed across their 
backs. In another event, he pays people to masturbate. At the Venice Biennale, Sierra 
paid illegal street vendors to dye their hair blonde and transformed his exhibition space 
into a temporary street vendor market. Marginalized street workers suddenly became 
visible, and art patrons found knock-off handbags for sale within a prestigious art venue. 
Bishop summarizes the experience: “Sierra’s action disrupted the art audience’s sense 
of identity, which is founded precisely on unspoken racial and class exclusions, as well 
as veiling blatant commerce.”22 
Bishop’s analytical framework makes little room for affirmative artworks. Her 
methodology relies on a particular interpretive mode of negation and opposition. As such 
it represents a particular mode of contemporary art critique—art must remain 
autonomous to create a valid aesthetic experience and activist art is privileged over 
complicit art.  
Joanna Drucker proposes a very different mode of address. She privileges affirmation 
and argues that art embedded within the culture provides an opportunity for invention: 
To say that the art world is a long way from revolutionary politics is to make a 
pronouncement so naïve-sounding as to be painful. And yet, the persistence of 
mythology requires such bald assertions. Fine art should be relieved of the 
requirement that it function as a so-called ‘political’ instrument of opposition. Recast 
fine art as a cultural practice of complicity—and its imaginative possibilities expand. 
Such a reoriented aesthetics escapes the predictability and formulaic repetitions 
that obtain within the coercive agendas of an academic avant-garde rhetoric of 
radical opposition.23   
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Drucker argues that affirmative art is often excluded from fine-art discourse because it 
does not conform to a culture of negation. “Is the tendentiousness of affirmation any less 
constrictive than that of formulaic opposition?”24 Drucker sees affirmative art as 
providing a welcome alternative to the activist framework of contemporary fine art.25 S
sees complicit art as opportunity to challenge the “orthodoxy” of art theory that prom




The tenacious core of outmoded discourse is that art exists to serve some 
utopian agenda of social transformation through intervention in the symbolic 
orders of cultural life. Its dreadful, reified rhetoric of elitist posturing passes itself 
off as the spirit of political heroism. Far from the fray of real politics, from grass 
roots community organizing or lobbying agencies, this has become the managed, 
bureaucratic discourse of new academicism, as repressively formulaic as any of 
the nineteenth century salon or atelier styles it disdains. The unthinking position 
continually replicates itself in elite institutions and esoteric, policed languages of 
high criticism. Entrenched and unchallenged, this academic discourse largely 
serves careeristic or professional interests, while claiming a revolutionary, even 
proletarian (can we really even still write that word?!?) agenda. Getting free of 
the grip of habits of thought engrained in this critical legacy is essential if we are 
to reimagine our relation to the world of aesthetic experience—and of actual 
politics as well.27  
Drucker argues for an interpretative mode that embraces artists who are embedded in 
the economic-cultural landscape. This is in direct contrast to Bishop’s interpretative 
mode that employs oppositional strategies of critique. Bishop foregrounds opposition 
and autonomy; Drucker privileges complicity and integration. The critical apparatus of 
both Bishop and Drucker open and close avenues of creative and analytical research. 
Both function to one degree or another as gatekeepers of a particular interpretive model. 
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Seen through a filter of ambivalence, both models have strengths and weakness and 
reveal and conceal ways of understanding and thinking-through art practice and theory. 
An ambivalent framework argues that social criticism need not be fully antagonistic and 
integration in the market place need not be completely complicit. The interactions of 
autonomy and integration are often more productive than complete submission to one 
side or the other.    
I explore this tension between autonomy and integration in Zoocentrix: Purrplex, an 
art/design project that develops interactive experiences for cats. On the surface, 
Zoocentrix houses a series of artifacts that explore a cat’s desire for comfort and 
entertainment. This is an affirmative proposal that seeks to make a cat’s life better 
through digital media. But the project also has some reservations about technology-
driven initiatives. Within a techno-scientific community, technological innovation is often 
proposed as the solution to a range of problems. Zoocentrix simulatanously supports 
and refutes this view. Zoocentrix houses conflicting motives—it tries to enhance a cat’s 
life by integrating technology into cat toys but also questions whether technology alone 
can accommodate a cat’s desire for play. It also parodies the utopian rhetoric that is 



















































6.7 Tail Twitcher: mice tails that twitch when a cat approaches 
 
Zoocentrix proposes that cat concerns trump human concerns: it builds an 
environment that accommodates feline desire and embodiment. This is a challenge to 
anthropocentrism, but a challenge tempered by playful affirmation. The project also 
critiques the utopian drive to solve all problems (and regulate all chaos) through 
technological innovation. The excesses of techno-culture are parodied by the scale and 
variety of cat-focused artifacts. But these cat-centered devices also celebrate machine 
capabilities and the pleasures of automation. Furthermore, the cat’s uncertain 
subjectivity—he is both family member and household commodity—enhances the 
project’s ambiguity. The desires of domestic animals warrant serious research (both in 
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the pet-food and toy industries) and also generate serious revenue, yet pets remain 
somewhat risible subject-objects of inquiry. This ambivalent status adds to the absurdity 
of the Zoocentrix project. A viewer may ask, “Why would such energy be expended on 
the needs of a cat?” My hope is that this question leads the viewer to the project’s 
affirmative and oppositional motivations. Zoocentrix promotes the desires of an 
individuated cat, questions human centrality, comments on techno-culture’s excesses, 
and plays with the toys of tangible, digital media. The project’s impure motives create its 
ambivalent aesthetic.  
6.3.2 The Importance of Difference & Division 
This ambivalent aesthetic keeps autonomy and integration in play and aligns with an 
interpretive sensibility Matei Calinescu calls “weak thought.” Weak thought is an 
alternative to the “metaphysics” or “strong thought” of modernity. Calinescu describes 
strong thought as “a thought that is domineering, imposing, universalistic, atemporal, 
aggressively self-centered, intolerant in regard to whatever appears to contradict it.”28 
Weak thought is open-ended rather than conclusive and embraces contradiction rather 
than consistency. Calienescu sees weak thought in postmodern interpretative models: 
The most adequate expression of weak thought is the ‘right’ hermeneutical 
attitude in which…the interpreter practices, as it were, a methodical weakness 
(made up of attentiveness and compliance to the inner demands of the object of 
interpretation, respect for its essential fragility, willingness to listen to what it says 
before questioning it, and renewed efforts not to impose on it one’s own 
“rationality” or convictions).29 
Calinescu sees this shift from strong to weak thought as a move from “either/or” logic 
to “both/and” logic.30 He describes “weak thought” methods as “dialogic”, “polyphonic” 
and “carnivalizing.” In a similar vein, I wrote in the Chimera chapter about Leonard 
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Lawlor’s argument for a “weak response” to animal cruelty. This is a response that seeks 
to “ratchet down” the violence done to animals without creating totalizing solutions.31 
“Weak thought” and “weak response” suggest the possibility of weak theory and weak 
practice. Drucker’s complicit artist could be an example of this form of creative address. 
The artist is no longer detached—she is no longer an oppositional genius—but instead 
acknowledges her connection to markets, her debt to history, and the influence of the 
broader culture on her practice. Bishop’s description of relational artworks could also be 
an example of weak practice—these open-ended projects avoid creating rarefied 
artifacts and focus instead on creating ephemeral social experiences located in a 
particular space and time.  
Some lament the weakening of theory and practice. Jameson’s description of 
postmodernity’s “waning of affect”32 suggests lost vitality. But weakness need not be a 
pejorative and the tensions between high modernism’s totalizations and postmodernity’s 
lack of consensus can be kept in play. Bruno Latour promotes this mingling of modern 
and postmodern ontologies. We keep some of modernity’s purity but make central 
postmodernity’s hybridity. Latour argues that modernity is able to generate tremendous 
social and scientific change by separating “nature,” “politics” and “discourse.”33 By 
creating clear divisions between science, society and God, the moderns are able to 
exploit the productive potential of natural resources and labor. By creating distinct 
disciplines that bracket out an array of concerns, the moderns expand the scale of 
industry, culture and government. The premoderns who refuse to cleanly divide between 
nature and culture cannot keep up: 
By saturating the mixes of divine, human and natural elements with concepts, the 
premoderns limit the practical expansion of these mixes. Is it the impossibility of 
changing the social order without modifying the natural order—and vice versa—
that has obliged the premoderns to exercise the greatest prudence. Every 
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monster becomes visible and thinkable and explicitly poses serious problems for 
the social order, the cosmos, or divine laws.34 
A rich network of liaisons and hybrids emerge to fill the gap between nature and 
culture. Postmodernity recognizes the expansion of these networks—“In the middle, 
where nothing is supposed to be happening, there is almost everything”35—and argues 
that the false divisions of modernity should be abandoned. Latour, however, proposes 
that we keep in place some of the moderns’ divisions while redirecting our focus to the 
expanding middle ground of hybrids. The divisions maintain modernity’s vitality—we 
keep the modern’s “daring, their research, their innovativeness, their tinkering, their 
youthful excess, the ever-increasing scale of action, their creation of stabilized objects 
independent of society, the freedom of a society liberated from objects” 36—but our focus 
on networks allows us to temper the excesses of modernity—we “reorient and regulate 
the proliferation of monsters by representing their existence officially.”37 In the process, 
our subjectivity is altered. We are no longer humans in opposition to nonhumans but 
instead “passages and relations.” 38 “The human is in the delegation itself, in the pass, in 
the sending, in the continuous exchange of forms.”39 
Latour’s insights into modernity’s dynamic divisions and his emphasis on intermediary 
networks inspires my conception of theory and practice. Just as Latour highlights the rich 
middle ground that links nature and culture, we can also emphasize the many 
negotiations of theory and practice. Art inspires theory just as theory inspires art. Theory 
and practice retain their distinction but this division is no longer the focus; instead the 
interactions of the two domains become central; our efforts are neither theory nor 
practice but rather oscillate between theory and practice and these oscillations become 
the point of our research. Just as Latour invents “nature-cultures” as a neologism that 
captures the interdependence and interactions of the two domains, perhaps we can also 
think of our research as practice-theory or theory-practice. 
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This dialogue between theory and practice not only influences my epistemological 
perspective (as discussed in the ‘Interactions of Theory and Practice’ section), it also 
contributes to my ontological design of the ambivalent animal project. In organizing this 
thesis, I avoided traditional taxonomies that explore historical, theoretical or formal 
analysis and created instead the roles of cyborg, clone, chimera and shapeshifter. These 
roles are designed to inspire creative practice as well as theoretical research. Holistic 
role-driven taxonomies flow more easily for me into cultural practice—the thematic 
chapters trigger associations that can be translated into visual and experiential artworks. 
Using roles also allows me to examine the dialectics in several different contexts. 
Related but different ideas emerge as I shift from one role to another. The cyborg is 
liberated and controlled by his cybernetic entanglements. The clone promises perfect 
replication but each instantiation creates a copy different than the original. The chimera 
is rebel and conformist—he invents hybrid forms but also submits to the demands of 
global capital. The shapeshifter gains partial access to the other’s perspective but also 
encounters the difficulty of inhabiting the other’s world. The roles, united by an 
ambivalent aesthetic and framed by the three dialectics, generate different insights, 
contradictions and conclusions. 
The negotiations of theory and practice also influence the way that subjectivity is 
expressed in my creative research. I initially proposed an art project titled Abandoned 
Routines. The project examines the bond that is forged between human and animal in 
the process of daily pet care. For this project, I proposed a scenario in which a robot 
takes over of the chores of looking after a dog. The robot performs all pet-care tasks; it 
washes, grooms, walks and feeds the dog. The robot liberates the human from tedious 
tasks, but those tasks were a critical component of the relationship between guardian 
and pet. When a robot becomes the pet’s primary caretaker, does the human-dog 
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relationship decline? Is the dog’s affection redirected towards a robot that looks after his 
needs? 
After reading Derrida’s writing on animality, Abandoned Routines seemed too focused 
on the human’s loss. The dog may not miss the human’s retreat; the robot may be a 
more dedicated and disciplined caretaker—the project suddenly seemed far too 
anthropocentric. Consequently I decided to develop a different project that placed the 
animal’s needs and desires at the center of the work. The result was Zoocentrix: 
Purrplex, a project that creates mediated experiences for cats. Issues of machine-animal 
interaction remain, but a cat’s concerns rather than human concerns are brought to the 
fore.  
Zoocentrix artifacts/experiences often promote cat desires at the expense of human 
needs. Some pieces may reduce custodial responsibilities—for example, Tail Twitcher, 
an automated twitching device, requires no human presence to engage a cat in play—
but other pieces demand considerable human effort to maintain. Meat Mobile, a spinning 
mobile adorned with flesh, requires a steady supply of dried fish and a considerable 
amount of clean up. And Meat Mobile’s sensory stimulation may be offensive to 
contemporary Americans: few people hang decaying meat in their homes, and some 
people find the smell of dried fish unappetizing. Accustomed to anthropocentric 
mediated environments, many pet guardians might find Zoocentrix’s artifacts a burden to 
maintain. By focusing on a cat’s desires, a fairly familiar physical computing project is 





6.8 Meat Mobile  
 
Not only did Derrida’s writings inspire Zoocentrix, a variety of post-structuralist, post-
human and animal-studies texts influenced my work on Petite Charm. These writings 
made me more aware of the human’s privileged position and more sensitive to the ways 
in which animals are routinely disparaged, ridiculed, and abused within human culture. 
Petite Charm tries to encapsulate the animal’s equivocal status. Genetically modifying 
an animal so that he is small and docile enough to live on a human’s arm is an 
exaggeration of anthropocentric cultural, economic and aesthetic demands imposed on 




6.9 Petite Charm dogs 
 
Human-animal relationships bring out the best and worst of human behavior. Yi-Fu 
Tuan notes that human-canine interactions in particular are fraught with mixed 
motivations: 
…in the Western world, at least, the dog is the pet par excellence. It exhibits 
uniquely a set of relationships we wish to explore: dominance and affection, love 
and abuse, cruelty and kindness. The dog calls forth, on the one hand, the best 
that a human person is capable of—self-sacrificing devotion to a weaker and 
dependent being, and, on the other hand, the temptation to exercise power in a 
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willful and arbitrary, even perverse, manner. Both traits exist in the same 
person.41 
Petite Charm references this long tradition of dysfunctional human-canine association. 
But it also attempts to create a new relationship dynamic—human dominance is no 
longer assured and the subjectivity of both human and dog is changed. In their altered 
subjectivity, human and dog are simultaneously elevated and degraded. A Petite Charm 
dog suffers gross corporeal manipulation—he is miniaturized, immobilized and 
dependent on human blood for survival. But the dog is also a symbol of biotech 
innovation; he is flesh made plastic and the ultimate “emotional-support companion.” He 
is at once parasite and prize. The human is also is an emblem of biological innovation: 
his body participates in an unfamiliar integration of human and animal. Yet this 
integration requires risk. The dog’s body may introduce toxins into the human body. And 
as caretaker/host, the human is required to supply a steady source of blood. Human and 





6.10 Fall 2009, LCC Demo Day 
 
Both Zoocentrix and Petite Charm explore an ambivalent aesthetic. This aesthetic 
emerges in the interactions of theory and practice. Ambivalence welcomes the 
complexity that develops in the process of engaging different methods of knowing and 
being.  
6.4 Aura & Abjection 
Petite Charm’s fleshly manipulations lead us to the material and corporeal concerns of 
aura and abjection. In the interactions of theory and practice, practice is often tainted 
with a Cartesian distrust of sense-based experience and physical labor. Practice is 
diminished by its association with the body, and theory is elevated through its affiliation 
with rational thought. My view of embodied knowledge and creative practice discounts 
these associations. I am interested in the mingling of mind and body and the slipperiness 
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of Cartesian divisions. In this context, practice need not be excluded from cognition and 
theory need not be detached from materiality.  
From this perspective, theory and practice become interdependent. Theory 
dematerializes and paradoxically lives above and below practice. It oversees the 
interpretation of practice but also relies on practice’s innovation to generate new 
theories. In this way, theory is simultaneously detached and intimately aligned with 
practice. Practice may be rendered mute by theory’s interpretive framework, but its lively 
experimentation may also escape theory’s grasp—practice’s specificity continually 
challenges theory’s generalizations. At the same time, the energy of practice is focused 
and channeled through theory’s framework; it is supported and sustained by the inquiry 
of theory. Both theory and practice expand and limit each other, neither one need rule or 
submit to the other. Both modes of research can engage each other without becoming 
auratic or abject. 
When theory dominates or practice overwhelms, I believe that creative research 
suffers. Theory may coerce, forcing artifacts and events to align with key points in an 
argument. Practice may overwhelm, exploiting technique and sentiment to become a 
form of propaganda. In both cases, the ambiguity of experience is denied. My aim in this 
work is to encourage interactions between theory and practice without exhausting 
meaning. Theory can focus and inspire practice; practice can temper the generalizing 
tendencies of theory and point to new areas of inquiry. Neither mode of research need 
become a totalizing mechanism that destroys nuance or regulates the methods and 
actions of the other. 
Engaging both theory and practice—traversing different language games—may alter 
the rhetorical stance of both modes of research. UCLA’s online journal Mediascape 
provides one example of the kinds of text that emerge when theory and practice are 
combined. The journal includes visual essays alongside traditional academic writing. 
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These visual essays re-work academic prose through the medium of film/video. Eric 
Faden describes these visual texts as “media stylo,” a mixed-media approach to critical 
writing: 
Given the variety of media it incorporates (image, sound, text), the media stylo 
illustrates ideas and concepts difficult to convey through text alone (and hence its 
special affinity toward film and media studies). At the very least, the media stylo's 
most basic advantage is presenting media (let us say a film clip) rather than 
describing it textually. Moreover, this mixture of media allows for mixing rhetorical 
modes—from scholarly analysis, to hypothetical scenarios, outright fictions, 
expository information, narrative storytelling, and even, perhaps most importantly 
[sic], poetics.42 
Similar kinds of experiments in new media—developing essays that include image, 
sound, text as well as digital interaction and simulation—could be a rich area of practice-
theory. The academic essay could be translated into a new medium. And the process of 
translation may alter rhetorical traditions. Faden suggests this is the case with media 
stylo essays: 
Traditional scholarship aspires to exhaustion, to be the definitive, end-all-be-all, 
last word on a particular subject. The media stylo, by contrast, suggests 
possibilities—it is not the end of scholarly inquiry; it is the beginning. It explores 
and experiments and is designed just as much to inspire as to convince.43 
This rhetorical shift from argument to question or from conclusion to possibility aligns 
with my ambivalent aesthetic. In working through the ambivalent animal project, I tried to 
temper theory’s argument with practice’s experimentation. I’m less concerned with 
getting it right and more concerned with discovering irresolvable tensions. The 
negotiations of theory and practice have the potential to inspire and re-direct creative 
research. The goal is not to win a debate but to think, see, do and be in different ways. 
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This kind of rhetoric may be auratic and abject. A weakened argument may be seen as 
an inadequate argument. But open-ended rhetoric also acknowledges the complexity 
and contradictions of world and experience. As such it suggests an alternative to the 
overconfidence of strong but reductive arguments. 
6.4.1 Identity and Materiality 
Auratic and abject oscillations can also be found in the identity of artist-scholar. 
Becoming a liaison between theory and practice requires new skills and methods that 
have material consequences. The practitioner-theorist encounters complicated 
epistemological, social and economic issues. Is the emerging practitioner-theorist better 
prepared to imagine alternative language games and generate new insights? Or is he 
simply a reaction to the demands of the academy, techno-culture and commerce? Is he 
an emblem of flexible labor: a cost-saving academic who can teach both history and 
production? Or is he able to translate the concerns of theory and practice in new ways?  
On the positive side, the artist-scholar experiments with Marx’s labor ideal—he can do 
“one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear 
cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner.”44 Bridging theory and practice makes 
possible more varied labor and could lead to innovation. The artist-scholar is no longer a 
specialist; instead she navigates between language games, working in ways that may be 
inexpert. Steve Baker, writing about creative research that investigates animality, sees 
“inexpertise” as a way out of the routines imposed by tradition and specialization. He 
writes of an “inexpert alliance” between human and animal, an alliance that “has no 
interest in fixed identities” and is “forgetful of such ‘expert’ categories as the human, the 
artist and the animal.”45 Baker celebrates this lack of expertise: “It is, in a sense, entirely 
appropriate that most of the time artists (and writers and philosophers) continue to get it 
wrong, to botch it and bind the animal inexpertly to their own inexpert lives.”46 The artist-
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scholar participates in this uncertain identity, his perspective is not tied to the established 
methods and rewards of either theory or practice and as a result is perhaps free to 
imagine new methods and invent new artifacts and experiences. This is the auratic 
scholar-artist.  
The artist-scholar who explores new media projects also gains from the aura of 
aligning herself with cutting-edge, proprietary technologies. Her work and theory ride 
techno-culture’s zeitgeist. At the same time, developing new technologies requires 
access to capital and technical labor—a requirement that generates new constraints. 
This is the artist-scholar’s abjection: her quest to examine and employ new technologies 
may require government and corporate sponsorship. In her quest for funding, she may 
find her research distorted by the values of her patrons. Lyotard warns that even 
innovative language games often support existing hierarchies. Underlying the liberatory 
effects of new language games is a strong desire for increased efficiency. A rebellion 
can enhance the overall “performativity” of the system by inventing improved methods of 
economic, cultural and social productivity. A critical act or theoretical insight can be co-
opted and transformed to serve the needs of power: “The novelty of an unexpected 
‘move,’ with its correlative displacement of a partner or group of partners, can supply the 
system with that increased performativity it forever demands and consumes.”47 
Is the theorist-practitioner an auratic academic, able to perform in new ways, make 
new moves, and ask new questions?  Or is her status more abject? Does she simply 
conform and react to institutional and economic imperatives? And does the process of 
transforming artists into theorists end up validating the traditional knowledge hierarchies 
within the academy?  
The experience of artists in academic environments may foreshadow the difficulties 
that artist-scholars might encounter. Christiane Robbins, posting to the iDC listserv 
referenced above, argues that artists who enter the academy looking for creative 
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freedom sometimes find themselves trapped by institutional demands. She quotes from 
Judith Adler’s 1978 study of CalArts professors, Artists in Offices.48 Adler’s text portrays 
a risible stereotype of art personalities but also reveals the tension between artists and 
academy: 
A subculture which grows out of highly atomized, “loose” occupational structures 
and exalts qualities of anarchistic individualism (eccentricity, the apostasy and 
the advertisement of personality through flamboyant, spontaneous, and 
outrageous behavior) confronts the culture and imperatives of a bureaucratic 
work organization with its stress on certified and universalistic credentials, 
routinized procedure, formally designated domains of authority and expertise, the 
subordination of the person to the office, and the use of formal and hierarchically 
significant titles. People who may have been drawn to the arts in the first place 
because, like Marcel Duchamp, they “did not want to go to the office,” now 
squirm slightly in their university offices.49 
While Alder highlights the effects of bureaucracy and routine, Tom Sherman, professor 
in the Department of Transmedia, Syracuse University, posting to the same list, 
foregrounds the paralyzing potential of over-theorized art practice. Sherman notes: 
“Artists functioning in a critical academic environment often become so self-conscious 
and tentative they can hardly go forward with their work (Marcel Duchamp said "art is a 
disease;" and sometimes university-based art students are cured by the time they get 
their diplomas).”50Additionally the cultural expectations of a particular department can 
influence practice. These constraints are articulated by Morse as she defends her 
department from an accusation of serving a “corporate agenda.” Morse writes: “I can 
safely say that I and all my colleagues teach and do their research using critical, not 
merely formal and definitely not corporate approaches….We eschew commercial 
purposes in all our efforts—we belong to a research university for a reason.”51 Morse’s 
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defense of her department is a reasonable reaction, but her response also reveals 
departmental homogeneity—all research is framed by criticality. Formal experiments are 
insufficient and commercial approaches are banned. This academic purity denies the 
influence and insight of aesthetic explorations and commercial culture. Academic art with 
its requisite critical voice sometimes becomes a disturbing (or worse, dull) extension of 
the academy’s most didactic, regulating tendencies.  
These posts may reduce the complex character and motivations of many academic 
artists, but they bring into focus the alienation that some artists experience in the 
academy. The academic artist may lose her creative drive when confronted with the 
demands of theory and academic labor. Gaining tenure at a university tends to require 
quantifiable, steady progress and a critical, easily explicated oeuvre. Yet creative 
research may require abandoning the best or most thoughtful (we could say theoretically 
sound) methods in favor of experiments that are untested and prone to failure. Sudden 
reversals or productive-but-difficult-to-justify tangents may diminish an artist’s reputation, 
dilute her brand, or simply fall outside the regulating mechanisms that determine 
academic merit. 
Issues of reputation and output plague most academics, but an artist seems most 
abject in this situation because we expect her to challenge the status quo rather than 
support institutional desires. The mythic artist who displays “anarchistic individualism” 
maybe an outdated stereotype, but artists often have a different sensibility than 
scientists or scholars. Morse notes her encounters with the artistic mind revealed 
cognitive approaches unfamiliar to her: 
When I changed my area of academic expertise, I lost a decade to gypsy 
teaching—but that was a learning experience for me to treasure. It was then that 
I was exposed to art school students and a very different mind set and way of 
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processing information. Every now and then I get a brilliant student at the 
university who reminds [me] of what the art school brain at its best can be like.52 
Morse’s sensitivity to creative cognition and her previous proposal that practice is a 
way of knowing, diffuse the Cartesian bias of the academy. (Her argument could also be 
seen as a continuation of this bias—mind and knowledge persist as the terms that create 
value.) Yet after a century of philosophy and theory challenging the dominance of mind 
over body, the mind retains its privileged position in much of the academy. The artist is 
associated with materiality and alternative ways of knowing and consequently remains a 
marginal figure.  
Whether an artist-scholar will fare better than an academic artist remains to be seen. 
In an environment where extreme specialization is the norm and turf battles are an 
everyday occurrence, an artist-scholar’s “inexpertise” and cross-disciplinary tendencies 
may be viewed as suspect—she could be seen as neither artist nor scholar. At the same 
time, the artist-scholar is at least acquainted with the academy’s mind-driven methods. 
She inhabits a variety of language games and is accustomed to different ways of 
knowing, writing and making. The artist-scholar can also translate the concerns of 
creativity while participating in the dialogue and merit mechanisms of theory. In this way, 
a hybrid identity may be able to counter in part the academy’s mind/theory bias.  
6.5 Conclusion 
My approach to theory and practice welcomes the tension between the two modes of 
research; this tension inspires and shapes my writing and making. This approach 
acknowledges the differences between theory and practice and avoids a synthesis of the 
two that might deny these differences. At the same time, it recognizes the common ties 
of theory and practice—the overlapping concerns, interdependencies and shifting 
boundaries between the two domains of knowledge.  
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Both theory and practice have established language games, regulating mechanisms 
and reward systems. Navigating between these language games reveals what is 
silenced and what is articulated within a discipline. It also provides the potential for new 
moves—alternative approaches that do not readily conform to the expectations of a 
particular domain of knowledge. A practitioner-theorist who grapples with different 
language games is in a unique position to translate and modify the methods of theory 
and practice. This hybrid identity, though, is fraught with institutional and material 
complications. The artist-scholar may invent new methods, artifacts, texts and 
experiences, but she may also find her research dislocated from review-and-reward 
mechanisms and constrained by institutional expectations. 
In the process of thinking through this thesis, my practice has been influenced by 
theory and my writing informed by creative practice. Working across mediums and 
disciplines moved my research in unfamiliar directions. Thinking and working through the 
ambivalent animal project required a mixture of reading, writing, discussing, 
conceptualizing, and making. Building bridges between these different modes of 
research became a critical component of my work. Through this process an ambivalent 
aesthetic developed. Ambivalence tempers theory and alters practice. Theory need not 
overreach and practice need not reform. Instead both theory and practice are able to 
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The ambivalent animal project examines the interactions of animals, technology and 
culture. It does so through a conceptual framework shaped by a particular aesthetic 
approach. This framework is influenced by the writings of poststructuralist theorists who 
question established hierarchies, explore issues of power and desire, highlight boundary 
transgressions, and propose alternative subjectivities. In text and artworks, the project 
employs an ambivalent aesthetic—an aesthetic that evokes two or more incompatible 
sensibilities. Ambivalence highlights the complexity of lived experience, philosophical 
debate and academic inquiry. It foregrounds contradiction and welcomes irresolution. 
The project examines the animal through a process of writing and making. I’ve created 
two art and design projects, Zoocentrix: Purrplex and Petite Charm, as a way to think 
through issues of animality. Zoocentrix develops a series of artifacts and experiences 
that are tailored to the phenomenological interests of an individuated cat. These artifacts 
are realized through the medium of physical computing and designed to engage a cat’s 
sense of play. Petite Charm is a conceptual art project that proposes a symbiotic 
relationship between human and genetically modified dog. Both projects have an 
ambivalent aesthetic—they are a mix of affirmation and critique, impure motives and 
unstable hierarchies. I’ve also written about the animal using four roles—cyborg, clone, 
chimera and shapeshifter—and three dialectics—irreducibility and procedurality, 
autonomy and integration, and aura and abjection. When four animals roles engage 
three dialectics, connected yet varied themes emerge. Each animal type highlights 
different aspects of epistemology, ontology and corporeality and asks us to question the 
anthropocentric assumptions that underpin our sense of knowledge and world. 
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The ambivalent animal project not only examines issue of animality and questions our 
anthropocentric assumptions, it also tries to imagine a digital media project that 
foregrounds culture and content rather than medium and technology. Just as the project 
proposes an alternative subjectivity for the animal, it also argues that issues of animality 
or more generally, philosophy, should be privileged over issues of engineering and 
media. Technology plays an important role in the research, but it is ultimately viewed as 
the minor to the animal’s major. This changes the focus of the research’s questions. 
Rather than think first of pragmatic issues like, How can I solve this problem? or How 
can I make this?, the ambivalent animal project asks, Why do we have this problem? 
and Why are we creating this? These are questions that are inspired by philosophy’s 
methods and grounded in the issues of animal experience and subjectivity. This 
approach raises questions that may inspire the research of engineers. That is, it brings 
up areas of inquiry that could be expanded through more pragmatic methods, but for the 
most part, the project remains in a speculative mode, thinking through the animal other 
by interpreting a variety of cultural texts and making work that questions 
anthropocentrism as well as the discourse of techno-science.   
Several themes emerge in the process of writing and making work about the 
ambivalent animal. The first is the limitation of language, thought, representation and 
being. Ideas and representations strain to contain the messiness of life. The dialectics 
oscillate between two concepts in part because a single concept fails to convey the 
complexity of a situation. Another theme highlights the shifting subjectivity of animals 
and humans. Anthropocentrism is a foundation of Western thought but recent 
philosophical, cultural and biological insights make us less certain of the human’s 
centrality. Divisions between humans and nonhumans may have shaped our identity, but 
contemporary boundaries appear less distinct and subjectivity less stable. Finally, the 
ambivalent animal emphasizes alterity. Multiplicity and difference come to the fore. We 
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participate in many worlds, simultaneously connected and detached from the diversity of 
experience that surrounds us. The ambivalent animal reveals our epistemological limits, 
anthropocentric arrogance and peculiar phenomenology. And the project encourages us 
to imagine alternative ways of knowing, perceiving and being.   
7.1 Combining Theory and Practice 
The ambivalent animal project is a mixture of writing and making. Both artwork and 
text influence each other—the process of creating alters the structure and argument of 
the writing; the process of thinking through and writing about theoretical issues of 
animality alters the creative practice. The tension between the two modes is never fully 
resolved but each influences the other. For example, my creative practice moved toward 
a more conceptual approach as it engaged with the theoretical issues of animality and 
alterity. And my writing kept issues of corporeality and materiality front and center and 
also employed methods borrowed from my creative practice in which I synthesize a 
range of artifacts, procedures and ideas within an aesthetic framework.  
7.1.1 Zoocentix & Petite Charm 
The making part of the dissertation includes two projects: Zoocentrix: Purrplex and 
Petite Charm. Zoocentrix develops a series of artifacts and experiences made for cats. 
These artworks include mobiles strung with fish, stuffed-animal mice that playfully twitch 
their tails, television programs tailored to a particular cat’s viewing interest, a play space 
that tracks a cat’s movement and projects animated images for the cat to chase, and a 
mobile robot that seeks out sun spots in the house—a cat can sleep on top of the robot’s 
lid assured he’ll be kept in warm sunlight as he naps. These artifacts/experiences try to 
imagine a mediated space oriented to the cat’s world and phenomenology. Technology 
is employed not for human needs but instead for the needs and desires of a cat.  
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Creating experiences and artifacts for a cat, attempting to design for a cat’s desires, 
reveals a number of complications. Anyone who has ever presented a toy to a cat knows 
that a cat’s reaction can vary from intrigue to disinterest. And even if the cat enjoys 
playing with the toy at that particular moment, she may soon lose interest in the object 
altogether. Cat desires appear as fleeting and particular as human desires. 
Accommodating ephemeral tastes means that no artifact or experience is ever complete. 
A long-term Zoocentrix project would be in perpetual flux; continually responding to the 
interactions of cat and artifact and adjusting and reinventing the experience with each 
new insight. This attention to cat behavior also argues for an individuated cat—a cat 
distinct from all other cats. Derrida coined the term “animot” to describe a particular and 
specific animal rather than a generic animal. His neologism emphasizes the difference 
between species and within species. Each animal has unique characteristics, behaviors 
and desires. Sensitivity to a cat’s individualism requires a willingness to adapt each 
project to a cat’s unique preferences. It also suggests that a cat should be included 
throughout the design process. This kind of close interaction between human, animal 
and artifact is an avenue of future research I plan to pursue. Such an approach would 
oscillate between the general and specific: you might develop an experience/artifact 
along a particular theme, say hunting, and create a general artifact, something that 
twitches and moves, for example, but then create variations on that theme that attempt 
to engage a particular cat’s interest. 
An individuated cat with changing desires highlights the difficulty of grasping the 
other’s world. Our understanding of the other is often filtered through language, cognitive 
processes and personal phenomenology. Giorgio Agamben, reflecting on the research 
of biologist Uexkull, emphasizes the “uncommunicating” yet intersecting worlds that 
surround us.1 We like to think we stand outside these worlds—that we occupy a space 
that can comprehend the perceptions and experiences of the other. Yet we are often 
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oblivious to the many worlds that surround us. Zoocentrix is an attempt to explore the 
other’s world, but such efforts make us more aware of how little we know about the 
other. Recognizing these limits reveals that most cat toys are designed to appeal to 
humans. These toys conform to our expectations of what a toy should be—they mimic 
the look and feel of children’s toys; they’re easily picked-up by human hands, 
incorporate human aesthetics in scale, texture, color and proportion and are designed to 
be stored away in containers that resemble an infant’s toy box. Human culture 
determines what a cat toy should be. Zoocentrix is an effort to move away from this kind 
of anthropocentric design—it tries to make human concerns secondary and cat concerns 
primary. Yet this effort leads to the humbling realization that we know very little about the 
cat’s sense of aesthetics, individual desires and phenomenology.  
Zoocentrix is a serious attempt to imagine experiences that a cat may enjoy, but the 
project’s motives are not completely pure. The project parodies techno- and corporate 
culture while trying to accommodate the needs of a cat. Most Zoocentrix designs 
incorporate elements of proceduralized interaction—for example, Meat Mobile and Tail 
Twitcher start moving when their sensors detect a cat is approaching. Zoocentrix’s 
sensor-triggered pieces reference the mediated environments of smart homes and 
ubicomp projects. Many of these projects propose a utopian future where human needs 
are met by a variety of responsive devices. Zoocentrix plays on the traditions of 
ubicomp—it proposes, tongue-in-check, that all feline problems can be solved by 
technological means. The project also parodies corporate salesmanship. When 
Zoocentrix was exhibited at LCC Demo Day, fall semester 2009, Brian Shrank and I 
presented the work as an entrepreneurial endeavor: Zoocentrix “products” were 
promoted as the next wave of high-tech cat toys and cat-centric experiences. Our 
performance referenced the excesses of ubicomp and corporate culture. And the 
animal’s ambiguous status also contributed to this parody—if our devices solved human 
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problems the artifacts might seem reasonable, but because the project is focused on 
animals, there is a sense of absurdity in our level of investment. Human needs belong to 
the world of serious engineering; animal concerns are viewed as somewhat risible. The 
ambivalent-animal project, of course, argues against such bias, and the performance 
that showcased Zoocentrix played with this bias. As part parody and part inquiry into a 
cat’s world, Zoocentrix’s ambivalent aesthetic is simultaneously aimed at different 
audiences: the individuated cat and the techno-critical and technocentric population of 
Georgia Tech. 
Petite Charm also explores the complications of technological solutions. This time the 
innovations of biotechnology are explored through a conceptual project that imagines a 
genetically modified dog that is hosted by a human body. The dog is designed to be 
lightweight and docile so that he can easily attach to a human forearm. Petite Charm 
sustains himself by sucking human blood and removes bodily waste by accessing the 
human’s digestive tract. This tight integration of both human and animal solves and 
creates problems. Petite Charm is the ultimate “emotional-support” pet; he can be with 
you at all times. He also avoids the complications of less integrated traveling 
companions: no need to supply food and water or worry about waste removal; no need 
comply with restrictions on animals in public places; no need to kennel your pet when 
you travel or cage your dog when you fly together. You and your dog are now one. But 
this kind of intimacy has its risks and responsibilities. Petite Charm may introduce toxins 
into your body. If you remove your pet from your arm, you need to have on hand a 
supply of human blood to feed your dog. And when Petite Charm dies, the loss may be 
more acute—you not only lose a pet but also a part of yourself. 
Petite Charm like Zoocentrix employs an ambivalent aesthetic. The animal’s uncertain 
status contributes to this aesthetic. In our culture, some animals enjoy unprecedented 
care and attention; other animals are routinely exploited, abused and discarded. Petite 
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Charm exaggerates both our obsession with and abuse of the animal other. It does this 
through imagining a new kind of animal-human intimacy. A dog’s body is modified to 
accommodate the human desire for continual companionship. Petite Charm participates 
in the long history of human coercion of animals through domestication, breeding 
programs and training techniques. Yet this history may be more complex than we 
imagine. The process of modifying animals often alters human life as much as animal 
life. Donna Haraway argues that domestication of wolves required the human to 
accommodate dog desires. Domesticated wolves may have warned of intruders and 
helped in the hunt, but they required food and shelter and relied on humans to raise their 
pups. Canines demand continual human attention and support. Humans may mold dogs, 
but dogs also shape humans. 2 In a similar fashion, Petite Charm not only alters a dog’s 
body but also a human’s corporeality. Both species are required to adapt to each other. 
The human’s privileged position is less certain. 
Zoocentrix and Petite Charm are simultaneously affirmative and critical. Zoocentrix is a 
serious attempt to imagine mediated experiences that a cat might enjoy. At the same 
time, the project parodies the utopian drive to solve all problems (and regulate all chaos) 
through high-tech solutions. A cat’s desires are affirmed even as the excesses of 
techno-culture are questioned. Petite Charm has a similar mix of complicity and critique. 
Genetically modifying a dog to the point that he can survive on human blood and tolerate 
a life of immobility perpetuates the long tradition of modifying animal behavior and body 
to suit human needs. Yet in Petite Charm’s scenario, demands are made on animal and 
human bodies. And the extreme intimacy between pet and host is something to be 
desired and feared.  
7.2 Three Dialectics 
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The writing part of the dissertation is structured by the three dialectics—irreducibility 
and procedurality, autonomy and integration, aura and abjection. The tension between 
the dialectic poles is kept in play—these dialectics do not resolve in a stable synthesis. 
They acknowledge the ambiguity of animal subjectivity and the complexity of animal-
human-machine assemblages. Boundary transgression, lack of resolution and 
contradiction become regular motifs in the ambivalent animal project.  
Each dialectic brings into focus certain theoretical issues: irreducibility and 
procedurality emphasizes epistemology and mediation; autonomy and integration 
highlights ontology and subjectivity; aura and abjection foregrounds corporeality and 
materiality. These theoretical boundaries while distinct are also closely related—how we 
make sense of the world, how we experience and live in the world, and how we are 
treated and treat others in the world are avenues of research that are interconnected. 
Each dialectic orients us in a particular way, but their underlying issues are intertwined.  
The dialectics provide a framework for examining four animal roles—cyborg, clone, 
chimera and shapeshifter. The dialectics shape and are also distorted by these changing 
animal roles. Each animal role generates related but different insights. The dialectics’ 
multi-dimensionality—their mix of epistemology, ontology and corporeality—provide a 
way to investigate an animal through a range of filters. An animal is at one moment a 
symbol or sign, then a subject and finally an embodied presence. Navigating the terrain 
of the animal’s mind, body and soul expands our understanding of the animal other. As 
we consider issues of mediation, subjectivity and materiality we rethink our 
understanding of the animal—each filter creates new questions and challenges our 
assumptions of the animal’s status. The dialectics also provide a way to investigate a 
series of artifacts and texts and generate alternative interpretations. Thus Kafka’s 
Metamorphosis is not simply about human alienation or Samsa’s inability to re-invent 
himself but is also about human and animal divisions and the diminished status of the 
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animal other. The film Fly II is not simply a horror movie that plays on a cultural fear of 
human-animal hybrids but is also an emblem of global capital’s ability to simultaneously 
embrace alterity while also seeking to commodify otherness. Or Preemptive Media’s 
RFID-enhanced cockroaches are not simply cyborgian animals that disrupt the 
command-and-control technologies of Walmart’s inventory system but are also objects 
coerced into serving the polemic of art activists. And Crittercam not only adds to the 
knowledge of biologists studying the behavior of wild animals but also alters the behavior 
of the animals being studied, downplays unfamiliar animal perceptions and embodiment, 
and foregrounds the viewpoint of the animal carrying the camera at the expense of the 
social dynamics of the pack or herd. These are viewpoints that emerge when we 
consider an ambivalent animal through issues of epistemological doubt, corporeal 
manipulation and ontological complexity.  
7.2.1 Irreducibility & Procedurality 
When the dialectic of irreducibility and procedurality encounters cybernetics we 
become conscious of the way that our understanding of the world both influences and is 
influenced by the abstractions of procedurality and mediation. Cybernetic totalism 
argues that all things can be encoded into the machine. Human consciousness, traffic 
flows or economic systems are reduced to quantifiable patterns and simulated in 
cybernetic systems. This perspective privileges procedurality and diminishes materiality. 
The dialectic of irreduciblity and procedurality recognizes the importance of informational 
patterns but also acknowledges the messiness of materiality and unquantifiable aspects 
of life and world. The limitations of cybernetic totalism can be seen in simulations that 
promise a shapeshifter’s ability to see through the eyes of the other but restrict as much 
as they expand our understanding of the other’s world. Every simulation edits data in the 
 235
process of highlighting important patterns. Our mediated worlds are always partial 
views—they reduce, abstract, and smooth over even as they assist, focus and inform. 
The dialectic of irreducibility and procedurality also tempers the utopian rhetoric of 
many cyberneticists. Highly mediated environments may free us from tedious labor, 
expand our social networks, and provide instant, dynamic data flows, but they also 
carefully track and regulate our day-to-day activities. Attentive robots provide consistent 
care to Lely’s dairy cows, but the same cows are also continually surveilled by the 
mechanisms that coddle them. And a SNiF dog enjoys an expanded circle of canine 
playmates, but he also conforms to normative rules that determine appropriate activity 
levels and sociability.  
When irreducibility and procedurality encounter life, they reveal the complex 
interactions of code and flesh. Just as this dialectic tempers cybernetic totalism it also 
tempers genetic essentialism—the body’s form and function may be guided by genetic 
code but corporeal experience is always more than base-pair sequences. We are part 
information but also part irreducible experience. The clone is a genetic copy of an 
original but also an individual who has his own identity and experiences. He is a 
reflection and variation on the original. And synthetic biologists propose creating 
mercurial informational bodies through programmable biological components, yet these 
biological programmers will most likely be troubled by material, cultural and conceptual 
restraints that replay the difficulties of software development as described by Jaron 
Lanier.3 Our complex corporeality is likely to frustrate the mechanisms of genetics and 
biotechnology. 
Jorge Luis Borges’ fictional cartographers who try to create a map so detailed that it 
covers the territory they hope to chart4 makes apparent the massive omissions in the 
most mundane representations. Our procedures to grasp, model, and understand the 
world always fall short. No matter how elegant our abstractions they remain reductions. 
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We create models for clarity and focus but should never forget the important details our 
models elide. Universal claims may motivate us, transcend our present moment, help us 
connect disparate ideas and processes, but we should temper these claims with the 
particularities of context, materiality and difference. As we build frameworks we are also 
conscious of the things we leave out—the unquantifiable and unrepeatable aspects of a 
specific moment. The dialectic of irreducibility and procedurality reveals our 
epistemological reductions and highlight the world’s complexity.  
7.2.2 Autonomy & Integration 
The dialectic of autonomy and integration explores the ontology and subjectivity of the 
animal other. Differences between humans and nonhumans are often exploited to 
human advantage. Indeed human identity is founded on the exclusion of the animal from 
full autonomy and agency. But the close integration of human, animal and machine 
make us less certain of human exceptionalism. The cyborg and chimera create new 
assemblages that combine what was once divided. A mouse who houses human 
neurons or immunological cells challenges the corporeal boundaries between human 
and nonhuman. A simian cyborg fitted with a brain interface that permits him to control a 
robotic arm through his thoughts illustrates the increasingly intimate coupling of animal 
and machine. This blurring of corporeal boundaries argues for a new kind of subjectivity. 
Latour notes that the rise of hybrids between the poles of nature and culture shift human 
subjectivity. We work as liaisons that support the networks of humans and nonhumans. 
In the process we are decentered, we are “in the pass,”5 no longer the focal point around 
which everything else turns but instead weavers of diverse ideas, objects, subjects, and 
procedures.  
Derrida challenges us to imagine “every other (one) as every bit other”6 and recognize 
the other that we privilege at the expense of all others. When the hierarchies of 
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otherness collapse, we may be less likely to exploit the animal other. We can no longer 
justify our abuse through traditional divisions designed to serve human interests. 
Leonard Lawler inspired by Derrida asks us to imagine a new kind of ontology that 
recognizes human commonalities with the animal other while also respecting the 
differences between and within species. He combines “biological continuism” with 
“transcendental separatism” to propose a human subjectivity that is the same as and 
different from the animal other.7   
Scientists also question the divide between humans and nonhumans. Biologists 
document the affinities of humans and animals. Ethologists record examples of animal 
culture: animals use tools; animals pass on survival skills to their young; animal packs 
create social hierarchies and behavioral expectations; animals show signs of empathy 
and morality; some animals learn linguistic and mathematical skills.8 And the patient and 
empathic research of Goodall, Fossey and Galdikas reveals an array of affinities 
between human and nonhuman primate culture. The field of genetics also challenges 
the division between animal and human informational bodies—biotech labs routinely 
combine human, animal and plant cells to create high-tech chimeras.  
The dialectic of autonomy and integration argues that we are deeply connected to the 
other but remain different. It welcomes difference without twisting that difference to 
human advantage. Our unique human talents are often perversely expressed—we 
exploit rather than protect or care. Our assumptions of human supremacy cleanly divide 
the human from the nonhuman. Yet the more we examine the animal other, whether 
through ethology, genetics or philosophy, the less sure we are of our privileged position. 
We may be a different kind of animal, but we remain animals nonetheless. We are 
attached to and separate from the nonhuman animal, connected yet different. But our 
difference need not result in abuse and violence. Perhaps we can become in Derrida’s 
words “an animal that didn’t intend to harm the animal.” 9 
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7.2.3 Aura and Abjection 
The dialectic of aura and abjection brings corporeality and materiality into focus. The 
animal is an ambivalent symbol—at once a sign of freedom and strength and also an 
emblem of depraved and irrational behavior. Descartes viewed the animal as a soulless 
machine, driven by instinct, and lacking language, human emotion and rational thought. 
Heidegger echoes Descartes’ sentiment with his hierarchy of human, animal and stone. 
The stone is worldless, the animal poor in world, and the human world-forming. The 
human leads and the animal follows. The human shapes his environment and the animal 
is trapped in his “disinhibiting ring,” unable to imagine anything beyond his own 
instinctual drives.10  
Derrida questions Heidegger's conception of the animal. Heidegger views the human’s 
ability to transpose—her ability to comprehend the world of the other—as an essential 
human trait. Derrida disputes the human’s ability to transpose—we are often unable to 
see beyond our own phenomenology. We are surrounded by many animal worlds yet 
are mostly oblivious to these worlds. We rarely see beyond our world into the other’s 
world.  
The animal other is often an abject victim of human violence. Humans who are closely 
aligned with the animal may also become victims of violence. Mark Roberts notes that 
animal characteristics are often ascribed to minority groups as a way to separate a 
particular population from the dominant culture and justify abuse of that group.11 And a 
human who privileges animal concerns over human interests may be ostracized from 
society and vulnerable to attack. Dian Fossey’s fierce loyalty to her gorilla tribes led to 
isolation and eventually her death. Fossey choose the gorillas’ world over the human’s 
and in the process became an outcast exposed to the same violence inflicted on the 
animal other.  
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At this historical moment, the animal’s status is particularly ambiguous. On the one 
hand, new laws and cultural attitudes promote the welfare of certain animals in ways that 
are unprecedented in Western culture. At the same time, growing human consumption, 
environmental degradation and factory farming commodify and annihilate large numbers 
of domestic and wild animals. Animals embedded in high-tech environments are similarly 
auratic and abject. A cyborgian animal may be the star of an art installation or represent 
the bleeding edge of cognitive science, but her body is severely modified by high-tech 
accoutrements and her desires redirected to meet the needs of art, research and 
industry. Biotech lab chimeras represent a level of plasticity unavailable to humans, but 
these knock-out mice and fluorescent rabbits are also products designed for global 
markets. Animal bodies incorporate the latest of biotech innovation but they do so to 
accommodate the demands of medical-research industries. Lab animal concerns are 
subjugated to corporate and institutional imperatives. In a variety of contexts the animal 
fluctuates between subject and object—she is a prized companion and global 
commodity, an art star and expendable lab animal, an impressive chimera and regulated 
cyborg.  
7.3 Central Themes 
Several themes emerge through this investigation of four animal roles framed by the 
three dialectics. The first is the limits of language, thought, representation, and being. 
The dialectics oscillate in part because existing categories and taxonomies are unable to 
capture the complexity of existence. An ambivalent animal is simultaneously subject and 
object, autonomous and integrated, auratic and abject. Recognizing the restrictions of 
language and experience opens us up to other ways of seeing, thinking, knowing and 
being. We question our methods of inquiry and sense of reality. Our epistemological and 
ontological traditions circumscribe our ability to re-imagine, reconnect and reinvent. 
 240
Moving back and forth between practice and theory is one way to explore the limits of 
making and writing. When we engage different modes of research we are more likely to 
see the divisions between different methods of inquiry and address. We recognize the 
rhetoric and reasoning of a particular mode of research—the traditions and assumption 
of a “language game”—and may also be able to invent new “moves.”12 In the ambivalent 
animal project, the interactions of theory and practice changed the way I approached 
writing and making. The writing is influenced by synthetic creative practice—it combines 
a range of artifacts and ideas from high and low culture as well as techno-culture. The 
writing also aims to be interdisciplinary—it charts a course through the fields of animal 
studies, art and design, media and culture studies and philosophy. And my creative 
practice shifted to the conceptual side of practice—I engaged with ideas as much as 
materials.  
The dissertation’s ambivalent aesthetic also foregrounds the limits of language and 
experience. Ambivalence sees contradiction as a manifestation of our inability to control 
the complexity of the world through stable identities, theories and taxonomies. Each 
attempt at description or reason leaves out incompatible details and irreconcilable 
differences. Each time we speak, write, code, or create we enclose and 
compartmentalize experience and lose the ambiguity of the moment. Recognizing the 
limits of language and thought encourages a mode of inquiry that questions traditional 
boundaries and holds in tension opposing ideas. And this tension is the driving force of 
the ambivalent aesthetic. This aesthetic attempts to convey the complexity and paradox 
of animal-culture-machine interactions.  
Another theme of the project is the interactions between anthropocentrism and a 
decentered human subject. Anthropocentrism is deep seated within human culture. 
Derrida argues that a sense of human superiority underpins much of Western 
philosophy.13 We create divisions between humans and nonhumans in a desperate 
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attempt to justify our abuse of the animal other. Animals submit to human needs—they 
are removed, killed, eaten, and domesticated to satisfy our desires. This dissertation 
expands the critique of anthropocentrism to the lives of animals mediated and modified 
by the concepts and practices of cybernetics and biotechnology. Animals solicited by the 
demands of technology illustrate the ambiguous status of the animal other—they are at 
the forefront of radical corporeal and subjective shifts but this precursor status is 
obtained through becoming a research object. Animals precede the human—forecast 
the human’s future—and also submit to the risks and demands of untested theories and 
procedures. 
Despite our culture’s ongoing anthropocentrism, a counter trend is also on the rise. 
The decentered human is no longer limited to the debates of poststructuralist and 
posthuman theorists. A human who is closely connected to the nonhuman other—
whether animal, machine or environment—is part of everyday popular discourse. A 
decentered human emerges in a convergence of cultural, economic, political and 
technological changes: the rise of animistic machines; social justice movements that 
make us more conscious of the abuse of power; research in biology that reveals animal 
culture and cognition to be more sophisticated than once thought; environmental 
degradation that highlights poor human stewardship; genetic commonalities between 
species; globalization that tempers Western economic hegemony and fosters 
multicultural diversity as it also challenges ethnic identity; and even an increase in 
single-occupant households that are populated with animals that act as companions and 
child substitutes. All of these and no doubt many other factors challenge the 
Enlightenment’s idea of human individuality; a coherent, unitary self is harder to 
maintain. We are less confident that our species is evolution’s ultimate biological marvel. 
We appear to be another experiment among so many biological experiments. And we 
may not be as world forming as Heidegger imagines—instead we shape and are also 
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shaped by the world. Latour imagines a new kind of human subject that finds his 
humanity in the role of liaison or delegate. This human develops interfaces between 
natural and artificial, human and nonhuman, science and culture.  He becomes “a 
weaver of morphisms.”14 This is a humbler human whose purpose and identity is based 
in part on nonhuman networks of activity.  
A final theme is ambivalence’s embrace of alterity and multiplicity. The project views 
multiplicity not as a loss of unitary identity or a form of madness but as a celebration of 
conflicting desires and alternative “becomings.” Each attempt to shapeshift orients us to 
alternative subjectivities and phenomenologies. And the process of transformation also 
makes more apparent our own particular alterity.  
When we judge the cognitive abilities or cultural sophistication of animals we invariably 
base our assessments on human talents. Our intelligence and culture become the 
measure of all intelligence and culture. Alterity challenges our assumptions of 
superiority. It suggests that our ways are not necessarily the best ways. And it asks us to 
imagine other methods of thinking, living and being.  
We are surrounded by multiple worlds, most of them unseen and unrecognized. The 
ambivalent animal project acknowledges our limited understanding of the other’s world 
even as it attempts to imagine the other’s desires and needs. The world is diverse and 
complex, and we comprehend so little of it. Heideigger claims the ability to transpose—
this “going along with” the other15—as a uniquely human characteristic. Such human 
exceptionalism is paradoxically used to dominate the nonhuman others; because we 
know more, we are justified in our coercion and abuse. Derrida argues that our species 
remains rather inept at transposing and understanding the world “as such.”16 We like to 
think that our world rises above all other worlds and that our views are detached from 
our cultural and phenomenological bias; we want to believe that we see more clearly 
than our nonhuman counterparts. But as we consider the possibility of alternative 
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subjectivities and multiple worlds, we begin to realize how little we know of the other and 
also how rich the other’s world appears to be. And this may leads us to a less arrogant 
and more generous engagement with the animal other.  
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ZOOCENTRIX & PETITE CHARM DOCUMENTATION 
A.1 Zoocentrix: Purrplex Documentation 
A.1.1 Customized CatTV 
 





A.2 Customized CatTV Circuit Diagram 
 
A.1.1.1 Customized CatTV Arduino Code 
// Variables: 
char sensorValueToSend = 0;            // Value of the sensor 
int actualSensorValue = 0;             // value from the analog input 
 
void setup() { 
  //  set the states of the I/O pins: 
  Serial.begin(9600); 
  Serial.flush(); 
} 
 
void loop() { 
 247
   
  //processing calling 
  if (Serial.available() > 0) { 
    int inByte = Serial.read(); 
    Serial.flush();  
    int i; 
    for (i=0; i <2; i++) {    
    // read the analog inputs and send the values of the sensors. 
     if (i==0) { 
        actualSensorValue = analogRead(0); 
        sensorValueToSend = scaleValue(actualSensorValue,100, 550, 255); 
     } else { 
        actualSensorValue = analogRead(1); 
        sensorValueToSend = scaleValue(actualSensorValue,250, 550, 100); 
     }   
 // Serial prints to see in Wiring Serial’s Monitor 
      //Serial.print(i); 
      //Serial.print(" : "); 
      //Serial.print(actualSensorValue, DEC); 
      //Serial.println(" END ");  
      Serial.print(sensorValueToSend,BYTE); 





int scaleValue(int sv, int low, int high, int scaleMax) { 





A.1.1.2 Customized CatTV Processing Code 
/* 
 * VideoSpeedGL.  
* Press and drag the mouse to change the playback speed. Releasing the 




import javax.media.opengl.*;  
import processing.serial.*; 
JMCMovieGL myMovie; 
int pvw, pvh; 
float maxSpeed = 10f; 
float videoSpeed = 0f; 
Serial port;                         // The serial port 
int[] serialInArray = new int[2];    // Where we'll put what we receive 
int serialCount = 0;                 // A count of how many bytes we receive 
boolean firstContact = false;        // Whether we've heard from the microcontroller 
int currentTime; 
int timeLimit = 500; 
int previousTime; 
 
void setup() { 
  // Setup frame 
  size(720, 480, OPENGL); 
  frame.setResizable(true); 
  background(0); 
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  currentTime = millis(); 
  previousTime = millis(); 
  myMovie = movieFromDataPath("fishrain.mov");  
  myMovie.loop(); 
   // Print a list of the serial ports, for debugging purposes: 
  println(Serial.list()); 
  // I know that the first port in the serial list on my mac 
  // is always my Keyspan adaptor, so I open Serial.list()[0]. 
  // On Windows machines, this generally opens COM1. 
  // Open whatever port is the one you're using. 
  port = new Serial(this, Serial.list()[0], 9600); 
  port.write(65);    // Send a capital A to start the microcontroller sending 
} 
 
void draw()  
{ 
  PGraphicsOpenGL pgl = (PGraphicsOpenGL) g; 
  GL gl = pgl.beginGL();   
  { 
    if (pvw != width || pvh != height) 
    { 
      background(0); 
      gl.glViewport(0, 0, width, height); 
      pvw = width; 
      pvh = height; 
    } 
    myMovie.centerImage(gl); 
  } 
  pgl.endGL(); 
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  currentTime = millis(); 
 
  if (currentTime - previousTime > timeLimit) { 
    delay(300); 
    println("Sending 65 Time LIMIT EXPIRED"); 
    port.write(65); 
  } 
 
  // If no serial data has beeen received, send again until we get some. 
  // (in case you tend to start Processing before you start your 
  // external device): 
  if (firstContact == false) { 
    delay(300); 
    println("Sending 65"); 
    port.write(65); 
  } 
} 
 
void serialEvent(Serial port) { 
  previousTime = millis(); 
  // if this is the first byte received, 
  // take note of that fact: 
  if (firstContact == false) { 
    firstContact = true; 
  } 
  // Add the latest byte from the serial port to array: 
  serialInArray[serialCount] = port.read(); 
  //print (serialCount + ":" + serialInArray[serialCount] ); 
  serialCount++; 
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  // print("serialCount " + serialCount); 
  // If we have 6bytes: 
  if (serialCount >= 2 ) { 
    //for (int i=0; i<2; i++) { 
        //print(serialInArray[i]); 
       //print(" : "); 
    //} 
   // println(" END");    
 
    // Send a capital A to request new sensor readings: 
    // println(xpos + ":" + ypos + ":" + fgcolor); 
    port.write(65); 
    serialCount = 0; 
  } 
   
  println("IR Sensor" + serialInArray[0]); 
  println("photocell " + serialInArray[1]); 
   
  videoSpeed = 1f-(float)serialInArray[0]/255f; 
  if (videoSpeed < 0.25f || serialInArray[1] < 20) { 
    videoSpeed = 0.25f; 
  } 
  println(videoSpeed); 







  float num = maxSpeed *((float)mouseX / (float)width); 
  println(num); 





  myMovie.setRate(1);   
} 
 
JMCMovieGL movieFromDataPath(String filename) 
{ 




A.1.2 Meat Mobile 
 




A.4 Meat Mobile Circuit Diagram 
 
 
A.1.2.1 Meat Mobile Arduino Code 
int actualSensorValue1 = 0;             // value from the analog input 
int actualSensorValue2 = 0; 
int motorpin1 = 5;  
int motorpin2 = 6; // L293D Pin En1 connected to pin PWM 1 (on-board LED) 
int speed1 = 12; 
int incSpeed1 = 1; 
int speed2 = 12; 
int incSpeed2 =1; 
 
void setup() { 
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  //  set the states of the I/O pins: 
  Serial.begin(9600); 
  Serial.flush(); 
} 
 
void loop() { 
  actualSensorValue1 = analogRead(0); 
  actualSensorValue2 = analogRead(0); 
   
  Serial.print(actualSensorValue1, DEC); 
  Serial.print(" : "); 
  Serial.print(actualSensorValue2, DEC); 
  Serial.println(" END ");  
     
  if (actualSensorValue1 > 460) { 
    if (speed1 < 180) { 
      speed1++; 
    } 
      
    analogWrite(motorpin1, speed1); // turn ON the Motor  
    delay(50); // wait 100ms for next reading 
  } else { 
    if (speed1 > 12 ) { 
       speed1-=2; 
       analogWrite(motorpin1, speed1); // turn ON the Motor at medium speed 
       delay(50); // wait 100ms for next reading 
    } 
  } 
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  if (actualSensorValue2 > 460) { 
    if (speed2 < 180) { 
      speed2++; 
    } 
   
    
    analogWrite(motorpin2, speed2); // turn ON the Motor  
    delay(50); // wait 100ms for next reading 
  } else { 
    if (speed2 > 12 ) { 
       speed2-=2; 
       analogWrite(motorpin2, speed2); // turn ON the Motor at medium speed 
       delay(50); // wait 100ms for next reading 
    } 















A.6 OutsideIn Circuit Diagram 
 
A.1.3.1 OutsideIn Arduino Code 
//set variables to control which pin we are reading from on the multiplxer 
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#define CONTROLpin1 2 
#define CONTROLpin2 3 
#define CONTROLpin3 4 
#define CONTROLpin4 5 
 
// Variables: 
char sensorValueToSend = 0;            // Value of the sensor 
int actualSensorValue = 0;             // value from the analog input 
 
 
void setup() { 
  //  set the states of the I/O pins: 
//  pinMode(LEDpin, OUTPUT); 
  pinMode(CONTROLpin1, OUTPUT); 
  pinMode(CONTROLpin2, OUTPUT); 
  pinMode(CONTROLpin3, OUTPUT); 
  pinMode(CONTROLpin4, OUTPUT); 
 
  Serial.begin(9600); 
  Serial.flush(); 
} 
 
void loop() { 
  if (Serial.available() > 0) { 
    int inByte = Serial.read(); 
    Serial.flush(); 
  int i; 
  //int j; 
  for (i=0; i <16; i++) { 
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    // set control pins on the multiplexers 
    digitalWrite(CONTROLpin1, (i&15)>>3);//bit4 
    digitalWrite(CONTROLpin2, (i&7)>>2);//bit3 
    digitalWrite(CONTROLpin3, (i&3)>>1);//bit2 
    digitalWrite(CONTROLpin4, (i&1)   );//bit1 
 
    // read the analogue inputs and send the values of the sensors. 
   // for(j=0; j<4; j++){ 
      actualSensorValue = analogRead(0); 
      // You will have to adjust this line so that can send the  
      // sensor value in one byte. 
     // Also, adjusting for a photocell--the first one--that range of sensor input is 
     //a little different than other photocells 
     if (i == 0) { 
        sensorValueToSend =  scaleValue(actualSensorValue, 300,600, 100); 
     } else { 
       sensorValueToSend =  scaleValue(actualSensorValue, 500,800, 100); 
     } 
      //sensorValueToSend = actualSensorValue; 
     //actualSensorValue = scaleValue(actualSensorValue, 500,800, 100); 
       
     Serial.print(sensorValueToSend,BYTE); 
     /* 
     Serial.print(i); 
      Serial.print(" : "); 
      Serial.print(actualSensorValue,DEC); 
         Serial.print(" "); 
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     */ 
       
    //} 
    // if you uncomment this line you can check the control pins  
    // of the multiplexers with your multimeter. 
    //delay(5);  
  } 
  //Serial.println(" END "); 
  } 
} 
int scaleValue(int sv, int low, int high, int scaleMax) { 
 
 return (int)constrain(scaleMax * ((float)(sv-low)/(float)(high-low)),0,scaleMax); 
} 
 
A.1.3.2 OutsideIn Processing Code 
import processing.serial.*; 
Serial port;   
GridSquare[][] myGrid = new GridSquare[4][4]; 
int[][] onOffGrid = {{0,0,0,0},{0,0,0,0},{0,0,0,0},{0,0,0,0}}; 
char[][] myKeys = {{'q','w','e','r'},{'a','s','d','f'},{'z','x','c','v'},{'t','y','u','i'}}; 
int rowCnt= 0; 
int colCnt = 0; 
int rowTotal = 4; 
int colTotal = 4; 
int xOffset = 100; 
int yOffset = 100; 
boolean firstTime = true; 
ArrayList myAnims = new ArrayList(); 
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int[] serialInArray = {100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 
100, 100, 100};    // Where we'll put what we receive 
int serialCount = 0;   
int currentTime; 
int timeLimit = 500; 
int previousTime; 
int stageWidth = 800; 
int stageHeight = 800; 
boolean firstContact = false; 
 
void setup() { 
  size(stageWidth,stageHeight); 
  frameRate(24); 
   // Print a list of the serial ports, for debugging purposes: 
  currentTime = millis(); 
  previousTime = millis(); 
  println(Serial.list()); 
 
  // I know that the first port in the serial list on my mac 
  // is always my  Keyspan adaptor, so I open Serial.list()[0]. 
  // On Windows machines, this generally opens COM1. 
  // Open whatever port is the one you're using. 
  port = new Serial(this, Serial.list()[0], 19200); 
  port.write(65);    // Send a capital A to start the microcontroller sending 
  
   
  //Create grid squares 
  for (int i=0; i< rowTotal; i++) {   
    for (int j=0; j<colTotal; j++) { 
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      myGrid[i][j] = new GridSquare(j*200, i*200, 200, 200, color(104, 18, 18), color(115, 
22, 20), myKeys[i][j]); 
    }  
  } 
} 
 
void draw() { 
  background(255, 255, 255); 
  currentTime = millis(); 
 
  if (currentTime - previousTime > timeLimit) { 
    delay(300); 
    println("Sending 65 Time LIMIT EXPIRED"); 
    port.write(65); 
  } 
 
  // If no serial data has beeen received, send again until we get some. 
  // (in case you tend to start Processing before you start your 
  // external device): 
  if (firstContact == false) { 
    delay(300); 
    println("Sending 65"); 
    port.write(65); 
  } 
   
  rowCnt=0; 
  colCnt= 0; 
  //build an 2D array that shows which cells are on and which are off by contacting each 
grid cell 
 264
  for (int i=0; i<rowTotal; i++) { 
    for (int j=0; j<colTotal; j++) { 
      //20 is the cutoff point for the sensor, values range from 0 tp 100 
      if (serialInArray[i*4+j] < 10) { 
        myGrid[i][j].rolledOver(true);  
      } else { 
        myGrid[i][j].rolledOver(false);  
      } 
      onOffGrid[i][j] = myGrid[i][j].getOnOff(); 
       
    } 
  } 
 /* 
  for(int a= 0; a<onOffGrid.length; a++) { 
        print(onOffGrid[a][0] + ":" + onOffGrid[a][1] + ":" +onOffGrid[a][2] + ":" + 
onOffGrid[a][3]); 
        println("END"); 
  } 
 */ 
   
  for (int i=0; i<rowTotal; i++) { 
    for (int j=0; j<colTotal; j++) { 
       
    //celll is currently on 
      if (onOffGrid[i][j] == 1) { 
    
        //see if current cell is attached to an animation 
        ArrayList anims = new ArrayList(); 
        anims = checkACell(i, j); 
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         //if the current cell is not attached to any animation, check surrounding cells 
         if (anims.size()==0) { 
            int[] cellOn = new int[2]; 
            int upRow = i-1; 
            int downRow = i+1; 
            int colSideLeft = j-1; 
            int colSideRight = j+1; 
             
            //limit the row and cols to ones that exit on the grid    
            if (upRow < 0) { 
               upRow = i; 
            } 
            if (downRow >= rowTotal) { 
               downRow = i; 
            } 
            if (colSideLeft <0) { 
               colSideLeft = j; 
            } 
            if (colSideRight >= colTotal) { 
               colSideRight = j; 
            } 
                
            boolean cellAssigned = false; 
            println("upRow  " + upRow  + " downRow " + downRow + " colSideL " + 
colSideLeft + " colSideRight " + colSideRight); 
            for (int l=upRow; l<=downRow; l++) { 
                for (int m=colSideLeft; m<=colSideRight; m++) { 
                   anims = checkACell(l, m); 
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                   if (anims.size() > 0) { 
                    //there are anims attached to a surrounding cell 
                       cellOn[0] = i; 
                       cellOn[1] = j; 
                       int[] XY = myGrid[i][j].getXY(); 
                       println("my anim index " +  " X " + XY[0] + " Y " + XY[1] + " L " + l + " M " + 
m + " I " + i + " J " +j); 
                         /*for (int a=0; a<myAnims.size()-1;a++) { 
                           Anim tmpAnim = (Anim)myAnims.get(a); 
                           int[] currentCell = tmpAnim.getCurrentCell(); 
                           if (currentCell[0] == l && currentCell[1] == m){ 
                             tmpAnim.setCurrentCell(cellOn, XY[0], XY[1]); 
                           } 
                         }*/ 
                       
                       for(int o= 0; o<anims.size()-1; o++) { 
                         ActiveAnim tmpAA = (ActiveAnim)anims.get(o); 
                         Anim tmpAnim = (Anim)myAnims.get(tmpAA.getAnimIndex()); 
                         tmpAnim.setCurrentCell(cellOn, XY[0], XY[1]); 
                         cellAssigned = true; 
                       } 
                       //break;   
                    } 
                }  
             } 
                
             if (!cellAssigned) { 
                int[] XY = myGrid[i][j].getXY(); 
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                int[] cell = {i, j}; 
                Anim tmpAnim = new Anim("butterfly/LWhite00", "png", 10, XY[0], XY[1],  
myGrid[i][j].getMyWidth(), cell, 0, 0, stageWidth, stageHeight); 
                myAnims.add(tmpAnim);   
                myAnims.add(new Anim("butterfly/MWhite00", "png", 11, XY[0], XY[1],  
myGrid[i][j].getMyWidth(), cell, tmpAnim.getXOffset(), tmpAnim.getYOffset(),stageWidth, 
stageHeight));  
                myAnims.add(new Anim("butterfly/SWhite00", "png", 11, XY[0], XY[1],  
myGrid[i][j].getMyWidth(), cell,tmpAnim.getXOffset(), tmpAnim.getYOffset(),stageWidth, 
stageHeight));  
             } 
              
         }  
         //otherwise if current cell is on and attached to an animal, than leave things as they 
are 
     } 
    } 
  } 
  //clean up anims that cells are off or are out of bounds 
  //println("myAnims size before removal " + myAnims.size()); 
   
  for (int n=myAnims.size()-1;n>=0;n--) { 
    Anim tmpAnim = (Anim)myAnims.get(n); 
    tmpAnim.displayAnim(); 
    boolean outOfBounds = tmpAnim.checkLimits(); 
    boolean cellOff = tmpAnim.checkCell(onOffGrid); 
     
    if (outOfBounds || cellOff) { 
      println("out of bounds " + outOfBounds); 
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      myAnims.remove(n); 
    } 
 } 
    //println("myAnims size after removal " + myAnims.size()); 
}  
    
ArrayList checkACell(int a, int b) { 
  //cycle through the animation array to see if any are attached to the grid cell passed in 
the parameter 
   ArrayList activeAnims = new ArrayList(); 
   println("anims size before " + activeAnims.size()); 
 
  int [] myCell = new int[2]; 
  for (int k=0;k<myAnims.size(); k++) { 
    Anim tmpAnim = (Anim)myAnims.get(k); 
    myCell = tmpAnim.getCurrentCell(); 
    if (myCell[0] == a && myCell[1] == b) { 
      activeAnims.add(new ActiveAnim(k));  
    } 
  }   




 void serialEvent(Serial port) { 
  previousTime = millis(); 
  // if this is the first byte received, 
  // take note of that fact: 
  if (firstContact == false) { 
 269
    firstContact = true; 
  } 
  // Add the latest byte from the serial port to array: 
  serialInArray[serialCount] = port.read(); 
  //print (serialCount + ":" + serialInArray[serialCount] ); 
  serialCount++; 
  // print("serialCount " + serialCount); 
  // If we have 6bytes: 
  if (serialCount > 15 ) { 
    for (int i=0; i<16; i++) { 
      //if (i==0 || i==2 || i==4 || i==7 || i==8 || i ==10 || i == 13 || i==15 ) { 
        //print(100-serialInArray[i]); 
      //} else { 
        print(serialInArray[i]); 
      //} 
      print(" : "); 
    } 
    println(" END");     
  
    // Send a capital A to request new sensor readings: 
    
    port.write(65); 
    // Reset serialCount: 
    serialCount = 0; 
  } 
} 
 
//scale the values from 0 to 1 to send to the machine 
  float scaleValue(int x, int low, int high) { 
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    /*if (low == 46) { 
    println(x); 
    }*/ 
  return (int)constrain(100*(float)(abs((x - low))/(float)(high-low)),0,100); 
  } 
 
 void keyPressed() { 
    /* 
    for (int i=0; i<rowTotal; i++) { 
      for (int j=0; j<colTotal; j++) { 
       myGrid[i][j].checkKey(key); 
      } 
   } */ 
  } 
 
class ActiveAnim { 
  int animIndex = 0; 
  ActiveAnim(int ai) { 
    animIndex = ai; 
  } 
   
  int getAnimIndex() { 
    return animIndex; 
  } 
} 
 
class Anim { 
  BitmapDisplay myAnimal; 
  String fileName,  fileExtension; 
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  int fileNum, myX, myY, myOffset, myXOffset, myYOffset, oscillateX, oscillateY, 
stageWidth, stageHeight; 
  boolean negPos; 
  int[] currentCell; 
   
  Anim(String fname, String fext, int fnum, int x, int y, int offset, int[] cc, int xOffset, int 
yOffset, int sw, int sh) { 
    fileName = fname; 
    fileExtension = fext; 
    fileNum = fnum; 
    myX = x; 
    myY = y; 
    myOffset = offset; 
    currentCell = cc; 
    myXOffset = xOffset; 
    myYOffset = yOffset; 
    oscillateX = int(random(30)); 
    oscillateY = int(random(30)); 
     
    stageWidth = sw; 
    stageHeight = sh; 
    if (oscillateX>2) { 
      negPos = false; 
    } else { 
      negPos = true; 
    } 
    setOffset(); 
    myAnimal = new BitmapDisplay(fileName, fileExtension, fileNum); 
  } 
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  int[] getCurrentCell() { 
    return currentCell;  
  } 
   
  void setCurrentCell(int[] cc, int x, int y) { 
    currentCell =cc; 
    myX = x; 
    myY = y;    
  } 
   
  boolean checkCell(int[][] oogrid) { 
     
    if (oogrid[currentCell[0]][currentCell[1]] == 0) { 
      return true; 
    } else { 
      return false; 
    } 
  } 
   
  boolean checkLimits() { 
    boolean overLimit = false; 
   // println("X " + myX + " Xoffset " +  myXOffset + " Y " + myY + " Yoffset " + myYOffset); 
    if (myX + myXOffset  < 0 || myX + myXOffset >= stageWidth || myY + myYOffset < 0 ||  
myY + myYOffset >=stageHeight) { 
      overLimit = true; 
    } 
    return overLimit; 
  } 
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  int getXOffset() { 
   return myXOffset;  
  } 
   
  int getYOffset() { 
   return myYOffset;  
  } 
   
  void setOffset() { 
     
    if (myXOffset == 0 && myYOffset==0) { 
     int tmpOffset = myOffset; 
     int randNum = int(random(3)); 
    switch (randNum) { 
      case 0: 
      myYOffset = tmpOffset; 
      break; 
      case 1: 
      myYOffset = -tmpOffset; 
      break; 
      case 2: 
      myYOffset  = 0; 
    } 
     
  tmpOffset = myOffset; 
  randNum = int(random(3)); 
  switch (randNum) { 
    case 0: 
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    myXOffset = tmpOffset; 
    break; 
    case 1: 
    myXOffset = -tmpOffset; 
    break; 
    case 2: 
    myXOffset = 0; 
  } 
   
  if (myXOffset == 0 && myYOffset == 0) { 
     
    randNum = int(random(2)); 
    int randNum2; 
    if (randNum == 0) { 
      randNum2 = int(random(2)); 
      if (randNum2 == 0) { 
          myXOffset = myOffset;; 
      } else { 
          myXOffset = -myOffset;; 
      } 
     }else { 
       randNum2 = int(random(2)); 
       if (randNum2 == 0 ) { 
         myYOffset = myOffset;; 
       } else { 
         myYOffset = -myOffset;; 
       } 
      } 
     } 
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   } 
  } 
 
  void displayAnim() { 
    if (negPos) { 
      oscillateX = -oscillateX; 
      oscillateY = -oscillateY; 
      negPos = false; 
    } else { 
      negPos = true; 
    } 
myAnimal.displayImage(float(myX + myXOffset + oscillateX), float(myY + myYOffset+ 
oscillateY)); 
  } 
} 
 
class GridSquare {  
  color colorOn, colorOff; 
  int myX =0; 
  int myY =0; 
  int myWidth = 0; 
  int myHeight = 0; 
  int onOff = 0; 
  char myKey; 
 
  GridSquare(int x, int y, int w, int h, color cOn, color cOff, char mk) { 
    myX = x; 
    myY = y; 
    myWidth = w; 
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    myHeight = h;  
    colorOn = cOn; 
    colorOff = cOff; 
    showButton(colorOn); 
    myKey = mk; 
  } 
   
  void showButton(color clr) { 
    smooth(); 
    noStroke(); 
    fill(clr); 
    //rectMode(CORNER); 
    rect(myX, myY, myWidth, myHeight); 
  } 
   
  int getOnOff() { 
    return onOff; 
  } 
 
  int[] getXY() { 
    int[] XY = {myX, myY}; 
    return XY; 
  } 
   
  int getMyWidth() { 
    return myWidth; 
  } 
    
  //check if the square is rolled over 
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 void rolledOver(boolean overCell) { 
    //if (mouseX > myX  && mouseX < myX + myWidth && mouseY > myY && mouseY < 
myY + myHeight) { 
    if (overCell) { 
      showButton(colorOn); 
      onOff = 1;     
    }  
    else { 
      showButton(colorOff); 
      onOff = 0;    
    } 
  } 
   
  void checkKey(char mk) { 
    println ("checkKey " + mk + " " + myKey); 
    if (myKey == mk) { 
      onOff =1; 
    } else { 
      onOff =0; 
    } 
  } 
} 
 
//load and display bitmap animation cycles 
class BitmapDisplay { 
  PImage[] bitmaps; 
  int bitmapsIndex = 0; 
  String fn; 
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BitmapDisplay(String fileName, String fileExtension, int fileNum) { 
    fn  = fileName; 
    bitmaps = new PImage[fileNum]; 
    loadBitmaps(fileName, fileExtension); 
    
  } 
 
  void loadBitmaps(String name, String extension) { 
    //file names will always start with 01, thus the i=1 initialization in the for loop   
    for (int i=1; i<=bitmaps.length; i++) { 
      String fileName = name + ((i < 10) ? "0": "") + i + "." + extension; 
      //subtract one from the i because the loop started at one instead of zero 
      bitmaps[i-1] = loadImage(fileName); 
    } 
  } 
  void displayImageIndex(int index, float xpos, float ypos) { 
    image(bitmaps[index], xpos, ypos); 
  } 
   
 
  void displayImage(float xpos, float ypos) { 
    //move to the next png image, if at the end of the animation cycle of frames, start back 
at the beginning 
    bitmapsIndex++; 
    if (bitmapsIndex >= bitmaps.length) { 
      bitmapsIndex = 0; 
    }  
    println("fileName " + fn); 
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    image(bitmaps[bitmapsIndex], xpos, ypos);   
  } 
} 
 
A.1.4 Tail Twitcher 
 
A.7 Tail Twitcher 
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A.8 Tail Twitcher Circuit Diagram 
 
A.1.4.1 Tail Twitcher Arduino Code 
 
int actualSensorValue = 0;             // value from the analog input 
int motorpin = 6; // L293D Pin En1 connected to pin PWM 1 (on-board LED) 
int speed = 12; 
int incSpeed = 1; 
 
void setup() { 




  Serial.begin(9600); 
  Serial.flush(); 
} 
 
void loop() { 
  
  actualSensorValue = analogRead(0); 
  Serial.print(actualSensorValue, DEC); 
  Serial.println(" END ");  
     
  if (actualSensorValue > 300) { 
    if (speed < 180) { 
      speed++; 
    } 
  
    analogWrite(motorpin, speed); // turn ON the Motor  
    delay(100); // wait 100ms for next reading 
  } else { 
    if (speed > 12 ) { 
       speed-=2; 
       analogWrite(motorpin, speed); // turn ON the Motor at medium speed 
       delay(100); // wait 100ms for next reading 
    } 





A.9 Zoocentrix Poster 
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A.2 Petite Charm 
A.2.1 Petite Charm Stuffed Animal Prototypes 
 
A.10 Petite Charm Dogs 
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A.2.2 Petite Charm Web Site 
 
A.11 Petite Charm web site: Home page 
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A.12 Petite Charm web site: Profile page 
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A.13 Petite Charm web site: Petite Care page 
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A.14 Petite Charm web site: Shop page 
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A.15 Petite Charm web site: Play page 
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A.2.3 Petite Charm Parafernalia 
 
A.16 Petite Charm Stickers & Badges 
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A.17 Petite Charm Coloring Book 
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A.18 Petite Charm Poster One 
 292
 












Adler, Judith. Artists in Offices. New Brunswick: NJ: Transaction Books, 1979. 
Agamben, Giorgio. The Open: Man and Animal. Translated by Keven Atell. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2004. 
Anderson, Martin. “Versions: Invasions of the Body Snatchers,” Den of Geek, online 
blog, January 29, 2008, 
http://www.denofgeek.com/movies/8781/versions_invasion_of_the_body_snatchers.
html 
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics in Steven M. Cahn ed., Classics of Western Philosophy. 
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 1977. 
Aristotle. “The History of Animals” in The Animals Reader: The Essential Classic and 
Contemporary Writings, Linda Kalof and Amy Fitzgerald, eds, New York: Berg, 2007. 
Auger, James and Jimmy Loizeau, Augmented Animal, Composite image from RCA staff 
pages. http://www.interaction.rca.ac.uk/people/staff/james-
auger/projects/project2.html. 
Baker, Steve. The Postmodern Animal. London, UK: Reaktion Books, 2000. 
Ballon, Marc. “Animal-Tissue Values at Heart of Edwards’ Success.” Los Angeles Times, 
online. July 16, 2001. http://articles.latimes.com/2001/jul/16/business/fi-22886. 
Ballantyne, Coco. “Longest Piece of Synthetic DNA Yet.” Scientific American, January 
24, 2008. http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=longest-piece-of-dna-yet. 
Baudrillard, Jean. Simulacra and Simulation. Translated by Sheila Faria Glaser. Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994. 
“Bear Island.” National Geographic Television. Executive Producer/Cinematographer: 
Greg Marshall. DVD. 2007 
“Behold, Alba: Genetically Modified Glow Bunny Sparks a Debate Between its Creator, 
SAIC Professor Eduardo Kac and Students,” F-News, student newspaper at The 
School of the Art Institute of Chicago. November 2000. 
Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations. Ed. Hannah Arendt, “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction,” New York: Schooken Books, 1968.  
Berger, John. “Why Look at Animals?” from About Looking, 198, Pantheon Books in The 
Animals Reader: The Essential Classic and Contemporary Writings. 
Berger, Kevin. “The Artist as Mad Scientist.” Salon, online. June 22, 2006. 
http://mobile.salon.com/ent/feature/2006/06/22/natalie/index.html. Accessed 
01/22/2010. 
Bergeron, Louis. “When love beckons, male elephants can feel it in their bones.” 




“Best Friends Again,” BioArts International. 
http://www.bestfriendsagain.com/about/challenges.html,  
Bishop, Claire (2004). “Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics”, OCTOBER 110, fall 
2004. 
Borges, Jorge Luis. “On Exactitude in Science” in Collected Fictions. New York: Penguin 
Books, 1998.  
Bolter, Jay David and Richard Grusin. Remediation: Understanding New Media. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999. 
Bolter, Jay David and Blair MacIntyre, Maribeth Gandy, Petra Schweitzer. “New Media 
and the Permanent Crisis of Aura,” Convergence: The International Journal of 
Research into New Media Technologies, Vol. 12, No. 1, 21-39, 2006. 
Broadie, Sarah. “Soul and Body in Plato and Descartes” online version of paper 
delivered at the Foerster Lecture on the Immortality of the Soul, University of 
California, Berkeley, 2000. http://www.newdualism.org/papers/S.Broadie/Soul-and-
Body.htm 
Buchen, Lizzie. “Human Laughter Echoes Chimp Chuckles.” Wired Science, June 4, 
2009, http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/06/evolutionlaughter/ 
Burt, Jonathan. Rat. London, UK: Reakton Books, 2006. 
"Cellborg Humidity Sensor." Nanoarchitecture. 10 January 2007. 
http://nanoarchitecture.net/article/cellborg-humidity-sensor/. 
Calinescu, Matei. Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism: Avant-Garde, Decadence, 
Kitsch, Postmodernism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987. 
Craig J. Saper, Networked Art. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2001.  
Crittercam Chronicles, Frequently Asked Questions. National Geographic, web site. 
http://www.nationalgeographic.com/crittercam/faqs.html. Accessed 01/22/2010. 
De Waal, Frans. Our Inner Ape: A Leading Primatologist Explains Why We Are Who We 
Are. New York: Penguin Group, 2005. 
Debatty, Régine. "Interview with Heidio Cumao." We Make Money Not Art. 25 May 2008. 
http://www.we-make-money-not-art.com/archives/2008/05/-you.php. Accessed 
01/22/2010. 
Deleuze, Giles. Difference and Repetition, translated by Paul Patton, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994. 
Deleuze, Gill & Felix Guatarri. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism & Schizophrenia. 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. 
Derrida, Jacques. “’Eating Well’ or the Calculation of the Subject” in Points…Interviews 
1974-1994, Editor Elisabeth Weber. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995. 
 296
Derrida, Jacques. The Animal That Therefore I Am. Translated by David Wills. New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2008. 
Derrida, Jacques. The Gift of Death. Translated by David Willis. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press, 1995, p. 66.  
Descartes, Rene. Discourse on Method and Related Writings. Translated by Desmond 
M. Clarke. New York: Penguin Books, 1999, first published 1637. 
Descartes, Rene. From the Letters to the Marquess of Newcastle, 23 November 1646 in 
The Animals Reader: The essential classic and contemporary writings. Editors Linda 
Kalof and Amy Fitzgerald. New York: Berg. 2007. 
Design and the Elastic Mind, Paola Antonelli, ed. New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 
2008. 
Dickey, Christopher. “I Love My Glow Bunny.” Wired. Issue 9.02, April 2001. 
DNA Tribes, “Frequently Asked Questions About DNA Tribes® Genetic Ancestry 
Analysis”, updated March 14, 2009. http://www.dnatribes.com/faq.html 
Doyle, Richard. On Beyond Living: Rhetorical Transformations of the Life Sciences. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997. 
Drucker, Johanna. Sweet Dreams: Contemporary Art and Complicity. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
“Elephant TV.” Animal Planet/Discovery Communications. Director: Clifford Bestall. 
Producer: Tracey Harding, 2008. 
Faden, Eric. “A Manifesto For Critical Media” Mediascapes, Spring 08. 
http://www.tft.ucla.edu/mediascape/Spring08_ManifestoForCriticalMedia.html 
Foer, Jonathan Safron. Eating Animals. New York: Little, Brown & Company, 2009. 




Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. 
New York: Vantage Books, 1995. 
Foucault, Michel. History of Sexuality: An Introduction. Volume I. Translated Robert 
Hurley, New York: Random House, 1978. 
“Friendly Bacteria in the Digestive System.” http://www.typesofbacteria.co.uk/friendly-
bacteria-digestive-system.html. Accessed 01/22/2010. 
Fresh Air, WHYY, NPR. Terry Gross interview with Michael Pollan. April 3, 2002. Pollan 
discusses his research into the beef industry. Online transcript of interview at: 
http://www.uic.edu/~takata/some_articles/FreshAir_Micahel_Pollon_on_beef_industr
y,_hormones,_antimbiotics.html. Accessed 02/01/10. 
Glass, Ira. “Reunited (And It Feels So Good): Act Two. If By Chance We Meet Again.” 
This American Life. July 1, 2005. 
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/Radio_Episode.aspx?episode=291 
 297
Goldberg, RoseLee. Performance Art: From Futurism to the Present. Thames & Hudson, 
London, UK: 2001. 
Goodall, Jane. In the Shadow of Man. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000.  
 “The Gorilla King.” Nature, PBS, Fred Kaufman, Executive Producer, 2008. 
 “Growing Miracles.” Part One. CBS Evening News. Air date: February 6, 2008. Wyatt 
Andrews, reporter.  
Handwerk, Brain. “Mice with Human Brain Cells Created,” National Geographic News. 
December 14, 2005. 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/12/1214_051214_stem_cell.html 
Haraway, Donna. “Cyborgs to Companion Species: Reconfiguring Kinship in 
Technoscience” in Linda Kalof, Amy Fitzgerald, eds., The Animals Reader: The 
Essential Classic and Contemporary Writings. New York: Berg, 2007. 
Haraway, Donna J. 
Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium.FemaleMan_Meets_OncoMouse: Feminism 
and Technoscience. New York: Routledge, 1997. 
Haraway, Donna J., Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New 
York: Routledge, 1991. 
Haraway, Donna J. When Species Meet. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2008, p. 86. 
Hayles, N. Katherine. How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature and Informatics. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
Heidegger, Martin. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, 
Solitude. Translated by William McNeil & Nicholas Walker, Bloomington, IN: 
Indianapolis University Press, 1995. 
Holland, Eugene W. Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to 
Schizoanalysis. New York: Routledge, 1999, p 28. 
 
Houdine, Louis-Marie. “Dealing with difficult topics in public: A communication workshop 
focused on controversial issues in science.” European Molecular Biology 
Organization (EMBO) Members Meeting, Barcelona, 28 October 2007. 
http://www.embo.org/scisoc/media_wkshop07_houdebine.pdf.  
 
iDC, praxis-based Ph.D. January 15, 2007. https://lists.thing.net/pipermail/idc/2007-
January/002115.html 
Invasion, Oliver Hirschbiegel, Director, David Kajganich, Screenplay, 2007. 
Jameson, Frederic. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, p. 35, quoting Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism, London: 
1978, p. 188. 
Judson, Oliva. Dr. Tatiana’s Sex Advice to All Creation. New York: Henry Holt & 
Company, 2002. 
Linsey, Jennifer. Jane Goodall: 40 Years at Gombe. New York: Stewart, Tabori & 
Chang, 1999. 
 298
Kac, Eduardo. “Life Transformation—Art Mutation.” in Signs of Life, Eduardo Kac, ed. 
Cambridge, MA; MIT Pres, 2007. 
 
Kac, Eduardo and Ronnel, Avital. Life Extreme: An Illustrated Guide to New Life. 
Barcelona, Spain: Policrom, 2007. 
Kafka, Franz. Franz Kafka: The Complete Stories.  New York: Schocken Books, 1971. 
Korsgaard, Christine M. “Morality and the Distinctiveness of Human Action” in Primates 
and Philosophers, eds. Stephen Macedo and Josiah Ober, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.  
Kristeva, Julia. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, translated Leon S. Roudiez, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1982. 
Krulwich, Robert. “Your Family May Once Have Been a Different Color.” NPR, Morning 
Edition, February 2, 2009. 
http://www.npr.org/templates/text/s.php?sld=100057939&m=1 
Lanier, Jaron. “One-Half of a Manifesto,” WIRED, 8.12, December 2000. 
Latour, Bruno. We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press,1993. 
Lawlor, Leonard. This is Not Sufficient: An Essay on Animality and Human Nature in 
Derrida, New York: Columbia Press, 2007. 
Layton, Julia. “What is the Missiplicity Project.”How Stuff Works. 
http://science.howstuffworks.com/genetic-science/missyplicity2.htm. 
Living with the Wolfman. Shaun Ellis. Episode Eight. Animal Planet. 
Lyotard, Jean-Francois.  The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi, translators. Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, p. 26. 
“Lely Juno: Feed Pusher.” Marketing brochure downloaded from Lely’s web site: 
http://www.lely.com 
Lingus, Alphonso. “Animal Body, Inhuman Face” in Zoontologies: The Question of the 
Animal. Editor Cary Wolfe. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003.  
Lyotard, Jean-Francois. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute. Translated by Georges Van 
Den Abbeele. Minnesota, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1988. 
“Natalie Jeremijenko at Postmasters.” http://post.thing.net/node/1024. Accessed 
01/22/2010. 
Napier, Laura. “Icarus Redeemed.” Article. 
http://www.articlejournel.net/issue_04/rebecca_horn.html 
Neiman, Susan. Moral Clarity: A Guide for Grown-up Idealists. New York: Harcourt, 
2008, p. 10.  
Marx, Karl. The German Ideology. Part 1: Feuerbach. Opposition of the Materialist and 
Idealist Outlook, in section, “Private Property and Communism.” 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm. 
 299
Moggridge, Bill. Designing Interactions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007. March 2003. 
"Monkey's Robot Arm Feel Natural." Live Science, online. 28 May 2008. 
http://www.livescience.com/health/080528-monkey-brain.html. Accessed 01/22/2010. 
 
Montgomery, Sy. Walking with the Great Apes: Jane Goodall, Dian Fossey, Birute 
Galdikas. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991. 
Mosier, Donald E. Ricahrd J. Gulizia, Stephen M . Baird and Darcy B. Wilson,  
“Transfer of a functional human immune system to mice with severed combined 
immunodeficiency”, Nature 335, 256-259, 15 September 1988. 
Palca, Joe. On Science, National Public Radio, podcast, November, 26, 2008. 
 
Plato. Phaedo in Plato: Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic translated by B. 
Jowett Roslyn, NY: Walter J. Black, 1942. 
Plato. The Republic in Steven M. Cahn ed., Classics of Western Philosophy. 
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 1977. 
 “Raptor Force.” Nature. Producers John Rubin and James Donald. Co-Producer and 
Cinematographer, Neil Rettig. National Geographic Television and Educational 
Broadcasting Corporation, 2007. 
"Real Snail Mail."  Boredom Research. http://www.boredomresearch.net/rsm/. Accessed 
01/22/2010. 
Renneberg, Reinhard. Biotechology for Beginners. Burlington, MA: Academic Press, 
2008. 
Ridely, Matt. “Modern Darwins,” National Geographic, February 2009. 
Riz Kahn’s One on One, Aljazeera, Kahn interview with Kac, 2008. 
Roush, Wade. “Genetic Savings and Clone: No Pet Project.” Technology Review, March 
2005. http://www.technologyreview.com/Biotech/14215/ 
“Roundtable: Does Art Produce Knowledge? Can Science Produce Art?” Chair: Laura 
Otis. SLSA 23rd Annual Conference, November 7, 2009, Atlanta, GA. 
Roberts, Mark S. The Mark of the Beast: Animality and Human Oppression. West 
Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2008. 
Royle, Nicholas. Jacques Derrida. New York: Routledge, 2003. 
Rubinowitz, Susan. "Glowing Rabbit Sparks Controversy," Petplace.com, September 23, 
2003, http://www.petplace.com/Articles/artShow.asp?artID=1365. Accessed 
03/30/10. 
Sandhana, Lakshmi. "Augmenting the Animal Kingdom." WIRED 3 May 2005. 
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2005/05/67349. Accessed 
01/22/2010.  
Sandhana, Lakshmi. “Collar Cultivates Canine Cliques.” WIRED, April 4, 2005. 
http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2005/04/67160. Accessed 02/1/10. 
 300
Schriber, Michael. “Monkey’s Brain Runs Robotic Arm.” Live Science, online. 2 February 
2005. http://www.livescience.com/technology/050218_monkey_arm.html. Accessed 
01/22/2010. 
Schrodinger, Erwin. What is Life? The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell & Mind and 
Matter. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1967, first published 1944. 
Shana, Healthy. “New Show Alert: Living with the Wolfman.” Science On TV. October 
16, 2008. http://www.scienceontv.com/2008/10/16/new-show-alert-living-with-the-
wolfman/ 
Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation. New York: New York Revies, 1990 (2nd Edition), 1975 
(1st edition). 
Signs of Life: Bio Art and Beyond. Eduardo Kac, ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005. 
Singer, Emily. “Synthesizing a Genome from Scratch.” Technology Review. January 25, 
2008. http://www.technologyreview.com/biomedicine/20112/. 
Sturken, Marita and Lisa Carwright. Practices of Looking: An Introduction to Visual 
Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Than, Ker. “Microbe and Machine Merged to Create First ‘Cellborg.’ Live Science, 
online, October 27, 2007. 
http:///www.livescience.com/technology/051927_cellborg_sensor.html. Accessed 
02/10/2009. 
Thacker, Eugene. “Biomaterial labor and ‘Life Itself,’” in catalog for Touch Me Festival—
OutInOpen, ed. Tomisalv Medak and Petar Milat, 2005.  
Thacker, Eugene. “Data Made Flesh: Biotechnology and the Discourse of the 
Posthuman.” Cultural Critique 53, Winter 2003. 
Thacker, Eugene. “Open Source DNA and Bioinformatic Bodies” in Signs of Life, 
Eduardo Kac, ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007. 
Thacker, Eugene. The Global Genome: Biotechnology, Politics, and Culture. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2005. 
“Tickling Gorillas and the Evolution of Laughter.” Science Friday, broadcast Friday, June 
5, 2009. 
“Tiffany Holmes: Early Work.” Artist’s web site. http://tiffanyholmes.com/?page_id=11. 
Accessed 01/22/2010. 
Tuan, Yi-Fu, “Animal Pets: Cruelty and Affection” in The Animals Readers: The Essential 
Classic and Contemporary Writing, eds. Linda Kalof and Amy Fitzgerald. New York: 
Berg, 2007. 
Turkle, Sherry. Life on Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet, New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1995. 
Wade, Nicholas. “A Gene for Romance? So It Seems (Ask the Vole).” The New York 
Times: Science Times. July 19, 2005.  
Watanabe, H and A. Fujiyama, M. Hattori, T. D. Taylor, A. Toyoda, Y. Kuroki, H. 
Noguchi, A. BenKahla, H. Lehrach, R. Sudbrak, M. Kube, S. Taenzer, P. Galgoczy, 
 301
 302
M. Platzer, M. Scharfe, G. Nordsiek, H. Blöcker, I. Hellmann, P. Khaitovich, S. 
Pääbo, R. Reinhardt, H.-J. Zheng, X.-L. Zhang, G.-F. Zhu, B.-F. Wang, G. Fu, S.-X. 
Ren, G.-P. Zhao, Z. Chen, Y.-S. Lee, J.-E. Cheong, S.-H. Choi, K.-M. Wu, T.-T. Liu, 
K.-J. Hsiao, S.-F. Tsai, C.-G. Kim, S. OOta, T. Kitano, Y. Kohara, N. Saitou, H.-S. 
Park, S.-Y. Wang, M.- Yaspo, L. and Y. Sakaki. "DNA sequence and comparative 
analysis of chimpanzee chromosome 22," Nature 429, 382-388, 27 May 2004. 
 
Weiss, Rick. “Synthetic DNA on the Brink of Yielding New Life Forms”, Washington Post, 
December 17, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/12/16/AR2007121601900.html 
Wells, H. G. The Island of Dr. Moreau. New York: Bantam Dell, 2005, first published 
1896. 
Wiener, Norbert. Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the 
Machine. New York: Technology Press, John Wiley & Sons, 1947. 
Wilmut, Ian. “The Rights and Wrongs of Cloning Humans,” transcript of an address given 
to The American Association for the Advancement of Science, Philadelphia, PA, 
2wice, N. 3, 1998. 
Wolf, Eckhard. “Animal Cloning in Germany” in Renneberg, Reinhard. Biotechnology for 
Beginners, Burlington, MA: Academic Press, 2008. 
Wolfram, Stephen. A New Kind of Science. Champlain, IL: Wolfram Media, 2002. 
 
 
